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 Abstract 
Introduction 
Electronic prescribing (EP) has been shown to be effective in reducing prescribing 
errors in a range of settings including paediatrics.  However, the lack of a consistent 
definition of error and a variety of error detection methods makes it difficult to draw 
conclusions about the impact on patients.  An ability to clearly understand and 
consistently measure how EP systems can prevent harmful prescribing errors in 
children is, therefore, required.  In addition, an evaluation of a range of EP systems 
in current use can help to gain an understanding of how to improve EP in the future.  
The aims of this work were to: firstly develop a range of paediatric prescribing 
indicators that are likely to cause harm if prescribed. Secondly, test a range of EP 
and clinical decision support (CDS) systems currently in use for their ability to 
prevent the errors described by the paediatric prescribing indicators. 
Method 
An eDelphi consensus study was carried out with 21 expert panellists from the UK.  
Panellists were asked to score each prescribing error for its likelihood of occurrence 
and severity of outcome should the error occur.  Indicators were included in the final 
list if a consensus of 80% or higher was achieved and were in the high risk 
categories.  The indicators were then sent to a group of hospitals using EP in their 
paediatric departments.  The paediatric pharmacists simulated the indicators in their 
EP systems and provided feedback on whether the error could be prescribed and 
what level of CDS was presented to the prescriber during the prescribing process. 
Results 
In the consensus process two rounds of scoring took place.  These identified 41 
paediatric prescribing indicators with a high risk rating and greater than 80% 
consensus.  The most common error type within the indicators was dose (n = 19) 
and the most common drug classes were antimicrobial (n = 10) and cardiovascular 
(n = 7).  The indicators were converted into a set of prescribing errors which were 
then tested using eight different EP systems across 15 different sites.  In 90% of 
tests the error was permitted by the EP system i.e. it was possible to prescribe the 
error.  Levels of CDS varied, both between different systems and the same system 
at different sites.  Allergy, drug name and therapeutic duplication errors were most 
likely to be prevented by the CDS.  Drug-drug interactions, clinical contraindications 
and duration errors were least likely to be prevented. 
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Conclusions 
A set of 41 paediatric prescribing indicators describing potential harm for the 
hospital setting were successfully identified.  Simulation of the errors in EP systems 
in use in the UK showed that the majority of them would not be prevented.  Post-
prescribing checks were in place to prevent the errors reaching the patients.  The 
future development and implementation of EP and CDS for the paediatric population 
needs to take into account the different requirements for paediatric patients.  Careful 
development of intelligent CDS in order to ensure paediatric patients are protected 
from prescribing errors likely to cause harm is also required. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
This thesis reports a programme of research into paediatric prescribing errors, the 
development of a set of paediatric prescribing indicators and the use of these 
indicators to test the ability of a range of electronic prescribing systems to prevent 
them.  Chapter 1 will summarise the current knowledge and thinking around 
medication errors generally, focussing on prescribing errors in children.  Methods 
used to determine their causes and impact will also be discussed.  The chapter 
concludes with a statement of the aims and objectives of the author’s research.  
Chapter 2 will describe the process of developing a set of paediatric prescribing 
indicators from a wide range of sources.  Chapter 3 will describe the process of 
gaining consensus on the indicators in order to create a list of prescribing errors 
likely to cause harm.  Chapter 4 will describe the use of these indicators to test a 
range of electronic prescribing (EP) systems in use in the UK.  Finally Chapter 5 will 
provide a discussion of the whole programme of research along with limitations, 
future work and make conclusions. 
1.1 Background 
The increase in understanding of the extent and consequences of adverse 
events in healthcare over the preceding 15 years has resulted in a number of 
large scale policy changes in both the UK and the US.  The landmark Harvard 
Medical Practice Study found that an adverse event occurred in 3.7% of 
hospital admissions in the US.1, 2  Estimates in the UK suggest that adverse 
events occur in 10% of hospital admissions equivalent to around 850,000 
events per year, costing approximately £2bn a year in additional hospital 
stays.3 
As a result of this increased awareness, the Chief Medical Officer published a 
report in 2000, “An Organisation With A Memory”3 which described the 
necessity to promote patient safety by reducing errors.  It acknowledged that 
the UK like many other countries’ had little systematic learning from adverse 
events and service failures.  The report highlighted many types of adverse 
event and attributed a significant cost to them both in terms of additional 
hospital stays and litigation.  A similar report had been published in the US.4  
These two reports acknowledged that both system failures and human factors 
contributed to errors.  They also acknowledged the potential contribution of 
new technology to improve patient safety. 
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The Department of Health’s response to this report was to publish a series of 
documents outlining its plans for implementing the recommendations from “An 
Organisation With A Memory”.  Firstly “Building a safer NHS for Patients”5 
outlined the development of a national system for learning from error and 
adverse events and the creation of a new independent body, the National 
Patient Safety Agency (NPSA), with the core aim of improving patient safety 
by reducing the risk of harm through error.  
Secondly in January 2004 a comprehensive report was published specifically 
relating to the issue of medication errors within the NHS outlining numerous 
actions and recommendations for all areas of the NHS to improve patient 
safety and reduce medication errors.6  The NPSA went on to develop the 
National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) which has since become a 
vast repository of patient safety incidents reported within healthcare in the UK.  
Medication errors form a significant proportion of the reported incidents and as 
such, the NPSA produced numerous alerts and reports in an attempt to 
reduce harm from specific medication errors.7-9 
1.2 Definitions 
To enable a proper exploration and understanding of the area of adverse 
events in healthcare a good understanding of some of the key terminology is 
essential.  Definitions of key terms relevant to this thesis and in their relation 
to healthcare are summarised in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1 Definitions of common terms used in this thesis
Term Definition 
Adverse event Any event or circumstance leading to unintentional harm or 
suffering
10
 
Patient safety incident (PSI) Any unintended or unexpected incident which could have 
or did lead to harm for one or more patients receiving 
healthcare
10
 
Adverse drug event (ADE) Injury resulting from medical intervention related to a drug
11
 
Adverse drug reaction (ADR) A response to a medicinal product that is noxious and 
unintended effects resulting not only from the authorised 
use of a medicinal product at normal doses, but also from 
medication errors and uses outside the terms of the 
marketing authorisation, including the misuse, off-label use 
and abuse of the medicinal product.
12 
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Medication Error (ME) 
A medication error is any preventable event that may 
cause or lead to inappropriate medication use or patient 
harm while the medication is in the control of the health 
care professional, patient, or consumer. Such events may 
be related to professional practice, health care products, 
procedures, and systems, including prescribing; order 
communication; product labelling, packaging, and 
nomenclature; compounding; dispensing; distribution; 
administration; education; monitoring; and use
13 
Prescribing Error (PE) A clinically meaningful prescribing error occurs when, as a 
result of a prescribing decision or prescription writing 
process, there is an unintentional significant (1) reduction in 
the probability of treatment being timely and effective or (2) 
increase in the risk of harm when compared with generally 
accepted practice
14
 
Dispensing Error (DE) An unintended deviation from an interpretable written 
prescription or medication order, or any unintended 
deviation from professional or regulatory references, or 
guidelines affecting dispensing procedures, was also 
considered a dispensing error
15
 
Medication Administration 
Error (MAE) 
A deviation from the prescriber's medication order as 
written on the patient's chart, manufacturers' 
preparation/administration instructions, or relevant 
institutional policies
16
 
1.2.1 Adverse Events 
Studies relating to adverse events experienced by patients and their impact 
use a variety of definitions to describe the various different types of event. 
The Harvard Medical Practice study published in 19911, 2 was a landmark 
study conducted in the US; the authors defined an adverse event as “an 
unintended injury that was caused by medical management and that resulted 
in measurable disability”.  By this definition, therefore, events which do not 
cause harm are excluded.  However, as the understanding of the nature and 
causes of these incidents has increased, an awareness of the need to include 
“near misses” has necessitated an evolution of the definition to remove the 
need for harm to have occurred.  In the UK the NPSA has defined both 
adverse events and patient safety incidents (Table 1.1).  Patient safety 
incidents are a subset of adverse events. 
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Medication errors, therefore, are a subgroup of patient safety incidents.  The 
US National Co-ordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and 
Prevention has the most comprehensive definition of a medication error13:- 
"A medication error is any preventable event that may cause or lead to 
inappropriate medication use or patient harm while the medication is in the 
control of the health care professional, patient, or consumer. Such events 
may be related to professional practice, health care products, procedures, 
and systems, including prescribing; order communication; product labelling, 
packaging, and nomenclature; compounding; dispensing; distribution; 
administration; education; monitoring; and use."  
This definition is also used by the NPSA in the UK and the World Health 
Organization. 
Medication errors therefore, are preventable and many do not cause harm.7  
For example a dispensing label describing the formulation as tablets rather 
than capsules, or a prescription for omeprazole twice a day when the intention 
was for the patient to receive it once a day.   
Some medication errors can cause an adverse drug reaction; for example if 
the wrong dose of a drug is prescribed and administered, there is an 
increased likelihood of a toxic effect if the dose is too high.  These reactions, 
caused by a medication error are preventable.  However, a proportion of 
adverse drug reactions are idiosyncratic and therefore, not predictable or 
preventable.  Many studies do not distinguish between errors and adverse 
drug reactions which can be important when evaluating the results. 
Many published studies use the term adverse drug event (ADE) which 
includes both medication errors and adverse drug reactions (ADR).  The term 
ADE was used by the early researchers as a definition in order to include 
harm resulting from drugs being used inappropriately.  It therefore includes 
most of the preventable drug-related harm that occurs to patients due to 
errors.17  More recently both the European Medicines Authority (EMA) and the 
Medicines Healthcare Regulatory Authority (MHRA) have amended their 
definition of an ADR.  The MHRA definition is: 
“An adverse drug reaction (ADR) is a response to a medicinal product which 
is noxious and unintended. Response in this context means that a causal 
relationship between a medicinal product and an adverse event is at least a 
reasonable possibility”.12 
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It therefore, includes both reactions caused by the normal use of a medicinal 
product as well as reactions caused by a medication error. 
1.3 Medication Errors 
The use of medication to treat disease, alleviate symptoms and prevent illness 
is the most common intervention used in healthcare.   The vast majority of 
medication does not cause harm.  Analysis of medication errors reported to 
the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) suggests that 80% of 
medication errors cause no harm.7 However, all medicines carry some level of 
risk.  Patients can experience adverse reactions from the medicines they take 
and the pharmaceutical industry and government bodies such as the MHRA 
collects information on these as part of a post marketing surveillance strategy. 
The precise incidence of medication errors in the NHS is not known. There is 
no clear definitive research detailing the incidence of medication errors as a 
whole in the UK.  In the US, early work by Bates et al11 reported a rate of 
actual ADEs as 6.1% and potential ADEs as 5.5% of admissions.  In the UK, 
preventable ADEs are thought to cost an estimated £750 million.7  The audit 
commission report “A spoonful of sugar” quoted an increase in deaths from 
medication errors from 20 to 200 per year from 1990 to 2000.18  It is often 
more useful to group medication errors by the part of the drug use process in 
which they occurred e.g. prescribing, dispensing and administration. 
Reports of prescribing error rates vary between 9 and 15% of medication 
orders in the UK,19, 20 and can often cause considerable harm to patients.21  
The EQUIP study by Dornan et al20 used pharmacist intervention methodology 
to identify prescribing errors made by hospital doctors in a range of hospitals 
in the UK.  The mean prescribing error rate was 8.9 per 100 medication 
orders.  It was noted that errors were most often made at the time of the 
patient’s admission. 
Dispensing errors are specifically confined to the pharmacy department.  Beso 
et al22 studied dispensing error rates in a busy hospital pharmacy and reported 
the rate as 2.1% for errors identified within the pharmacy (internal errors) and 
0.02% for errors identified outside of the pharmacy (external errors). 
Medication administration errors (MAE) are less commonly studied and 
reported incidences vary between 5.6 and 19% of error opportunities.23, 24  
One problem with the MAE literature is a lack of clear definition of an 
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administration error.  A review of MAE studies looking at methodological 
variance25  identified 16 reports with three different error definitions.  The 
overall MAE rate was calculated as 5.6% for non-IV error opportunities.  The 
use of opportunity for error (OE) as a denominator in MAE studies has 
become common practice and allows studies to be compared with more 
rigour.  This review included studies undertaken on both adult and paediatric 
wards.  A second review looking specifically at the prevalence of MAE in 
health care settings, identified a mean of 19.6% error rate when wrong time 
errors were included and a rate of 8% when wrong time errors were 
excluded.16   
By categorising medication errors into these functional groups it is possible to 
address the solutions to the specific errors in a more targeted way.   
1.4 Medication Errors in Children 
Studies of medication error rates in children have not been reported as 
extensively as in adults.  Those paediatric studies that have been published 
tend to concentrate on prescribing errors.26, 27  Kaushal et al28 reviewed 
medication orders for ME, potential ADEs and ADEs in paediatric hospital 
units.  The results were then compared with previously published adult work.  
While the ME rates were similar between adults and children the potential 
ADE (medication errors with the potential to cause an adverse event) rate was 
three times higher.  Holdsworth et al29 prospectively reviewed medical records 
for ADEs and potential ADEs for paediatric inpatients.  They reported a rate of 
6 per 100 admissions for ADEs and 8 per 100 admissions for potential ADEs.  
These results suggested that the errors were common in hospitalised children; 
in particular those with more complicated medical conditions.  Specific error 
types have also been investigated within the paediatric setting.  Ghaleb et al30 
studied both the prescribing and administration error rate in children admitted 
to five London hospitals.  The prescribing error rate was 13.1% of medication 
orders and the administration error rate was 19.2% of OE.  A study involving a 
specialist paediatric hospital in north west England reported an error rate of 
7% of medication orders.31  
It is clear from these reports that there is a significant ME rate within the 
hospital paediatric population which in some cases considerably exceeds 
reported rates for adults. 
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Medication ordering is one of the most complex aspects of medical care, 
requiring physicians to simultaneously integrate a thorough understanding of 
available medicines, disease processes and patient specific information in the 
context of a particular clinical circumstance.32  This increased error rate could 
be due to the added level of complexity of prescribing for children with the 
need to take into account weight, clinical indication, altered physiology and 
pharmacokinetics. 
Since medication related harm is associated with a substantial proportion of 
potentially avoidable mortality and morbidity in both adults and children there 
is a considerable focus of attention on improving prescribing safety.3, 6 
1.5 Causes of Medication Error 
To help understand how medication errors occur it is important to have an 
understanding of their classification which can be contextual, modal or 
psychological.  Contextual classification relates to the time and place at which 
an error occurred.  Categories such as prescribing, dispensing and 
administration errors are commonly used contextual classifications.  The 
literature on medication errors usually uses this type of classification and 
reports will often include a single type of error such as prescribing errors.  The 
advantage of using this classification is that it helps to focus solutions in a 
particular area.  Further sub-classification of medication errors is also common 
(Table 1.2).  These categories are used by the NRLS and aid the thematic 
analysis of medication errors.  In addition, within a single institution such as 
University Hospital Southampton (UHS) this classification is used in a similar 
way.  It allows one to interrogate the ME database and to target specific areas 
that may require improvement, such as prescriptions for the wrong dose of a 
specific drug or dispensing errors involving drugs with similar sounding 
names. 
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Table 1.2  Common error types and their description 
Error Type Description Example 
Contraindication Contraindication to use of the 
medicine in relation to drugs or 
conditions 
Warfarin prescribed to a 
patient with active bleeding 
Mismatching between 
patient and medicine 
(wrong patient) 
Patient given someone else’s 
medicine  
Patient administered 
enoxaparin intended for 
another patient 
Omitted 
Medicine/ingredient 
Omission or delay in a patient 
receiving a dose of a drug at 
the correct time 
Lack of stock of medicines 
on a ward leads to a missed 
dose 
Patient allergic to 
treatment 
Patient administered a 
medicine to which they have a 
documented allergy 
Amoxicillin prescribed to a 
patient with a documented 
allergy to penicillin 
Wrong/omitted/passed 
expiry date 
Use of a drug beyond its expiry 
date. 
Administration of a dose of 
co-amoxiclav suspension 
that has past its expiry. 
Wrong/omitted patient 
information leaflet (PIL) 
Usually dispensing of a 
medicine with the wrong leaflet 
Dispensing a pack of aspirin 
without the PIL 
Wrong/omitted verbal 
patient directions 
Providing the wrong (or no) 
instructions during a verbal 
counselling episode 
Failing to counsel a patient 
about their newly started 
warfarin therapy 
Wrong/transposed/ 
omitted medicine label 
Any mistake in the labelling of 
a medicine, usually at 
dispensing 
Patient dispensed two 
medicines with the labels on 
the wrong packaging. 
Wrong/unclear dose or 
strength 
Wrong doses Child prescribed 10mg/kg of 
ranitidine instead of 1mg/kg 
Wrong drug Wrong drug Amiloride dispensed instead 
of amlodipine 
Wrong formulation  Wrong formulation Solid dose form prescribed 
instead of liquid 
Wrong frequency Correct drug and correct dose 
but used at the wrong 
frequency 
Paracetamol 1g administered 
more frequently than every 4 
hours. 
Wrong method of 
preparation/supply 
Incorrect preparation of a 
medicine 
Erythromycin injection 
reconstituted with sodium 
chloride 0.9% instead of 
water for injection 
Wrong quantity Wrong quantity of a medicine 
provided to a patient 
1 week course of 
flucloxacillin provided instead 
of the necessary 2 week 
course. 
Wrong route Medicine prescribed or 
administered by the wrong 
route 
Depot Intramuscular injection 
administered intravenously 
Wrong storage Medicine stored 
inappropriately 
Infliximab injection stored at 
room temperature rather than 
in the refrigerator 
 
Modal classification describes the way in which an error occurs e.g. omission, 
substitution.  These types of error can occur in any of the contexts mentioned 
above.  Errors of omission occur commonly when prescribing for patients on 
admission to hospital.  Without a clear drug history prescribers can fail to 
prescribe all the medicines required for their patients, resulting in omitted or 
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delayed doses.  The process of medicine reconciliation is designed to reduce 
this type of error and is now seen as an integral part the hospital admission 
process as well as at other points at which care is transferred.33, 34 
The use of a psychological classification helps to better explain events than 
pure description and is based on work by James Reason.35, 36  The advantage 
of this classification is that it uses a generic error-modelling system that can 
be applied to all types of human error.  This allows comparison with other 
industries in which errors have significant consequences such as the aviation 
industry.  The disadvantage is that it tends to focus on the individual making 
the error rather than the system they are working in.   
This is not the only approach to looking at human error.  Jens Rasmussun 
also made a case that human error cannot be studied independently of 
individual working within an institution, but rather within the context of their 
work.  His work related to human error in the context of the Dutch Nuclear 
Industry.37  He suggested that the human worker is in a continuous state 
adaptation and learning.  His work is similar in nature to that of James Reason 
but presents an extremely complex view of the nature of human error and 
psychology, making it, in the opinion of the author, less useful as a way to 
help healthcare workers gain an understanding of human error and the 
reasons why errors occur. 
The underlying theories proposed by Reason have been applied to a 
medication safety and specifically a prescribing context by Aronson et al.38  
The key error types are outlined below together with appropriate examples. 
Knowledge-based Error 
An error caused by lack of knowledge of the patient or drug (or both).  
Examples include prescribing gentamicin without taking into account the 
patient’s reduced renal function, or prescribing a penicillin containing antibiotic 
without knowing the patient’s allergy status.  These types of errors ought to be 
avoidable with adequate knowledge and access to reliable up to date 
information.   Interception of such errors can occur by using computerised 
decision support and cross checking by pharmacists and nurses.  Clearly 
education and training has a major role to play in helping to avoid knowledge 
based errors. 
Rule-based Error 
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The use of an inappropriate/bad rule or applying a good rule in the wrong way.  
An example could be prescribing a solid formulation for a patient with a naso-
gastric tube when there is a suitable liquid alternative. 
Action-based Error 
Action based errors are often referred to as slips.  The intended action is 
correct, but a slip in attention results in an error.  For example, having the 
intention to prescribe cefotaxime but selecting cefuroxime on the electronic 
system; writing clonazepam instead of the intended clobazam; or picking up a 
bottle of sodium chloride oral solution instead of sodium bicarbonate.  One 
way of helping to prevent these errors is to create conditions in which they are 
unlikely.  In the last example above having different packaging and labelling 
for the two similar preparations, or stocking only the most commonly used 
preparation.  Technical errors such as adding the wrong diluent to an injection 
or writing illegibly are also classed as action-based errors.  They may be 
reduced by the use of checklists and reminders.  Electronic prescribing (EP) 
systems have the potential to influence this type of error. 
Memory-based Errors 
Often regarded as lapses, an example might be forgetting to specify a 
maximum frequency for a prescription for “when required” paracetamol; or 
knowing a patient is allergic to penicillin but forgetting.  These types of errors 
are hard to avoid or prevent; some electronic prescribing systems have the 
functionality to reduce these types of error. 
Latent Factors 
The psychological classifications detailed above are referred to as active 
failures.  Humans work within systems and there are several properties of 
systems that can make them more error prone.  In the case of medication 
errors these latent factors may increase the likelihood of an error occurring.  
1.5.1 Causes of Medication Errors in Children 
The most commonly reported medication error in children is wrong dose.7  
This is to be expected when the vast majority of doses need to be 
individualised using either the patient’s age, weight or in some instances body 
surface area (BSA).  This increases the opportunity for error.  In particular the 
need to calculate a dose heightens the risk of error with mathematical 
operations, decimal points, trailing zeros and various units of measure.   
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Added to this is the lack of availability of appropriate commercially available 
formulations which enable children’s doses to be easily administered.  A lack 
of knowledge of these formulations and concentrations can lead to significant 
dosing errors. 
The lack of an appropriate formulation can necessitate the use of an 
unlicensed medicine or “special”.  These formulations may be used by a 
specific hospital and may not be readily available in the community.  This can 
increase the risk of missed doses when a preparation is only available from a 
single supplier that might not be recognised by the community pharmacy. 
Unfamiliarity with the paediatric population has also been cited as contributing 
to medication errors in children.39   
1.6 Reducing Medication Errors 
In this section strategies and solutions for reducing medication errors are 
discussed, particularly in relation to paediatric medication errors.  The role of 
electronic prescribing specifically is reviewed in Section 1.8 
1.6.1 Individual Perspective 
General Principles of Good Prescribing 
The ten principles of good prescribing (see Table 1.3) are included in a paper 
by Aronson.38  They follow the natural process of prescribing and take into 
account the patient, the drug and the prescriber.  They are completely 
generalisable to all prescribing.  
Table 1.3 Principles of good prescribing
38
 
 Area Description 
Indication  Be clear about the reasons for prescribing and the risks and benefits. 
History Take into account the patient medication history (including over the 
counter medicines and allergies) 
Diseases  Take into account other factors/co-morbidities that might alter the 
benefits and harms of treatment (e.g. renal function) 
Patient Take into account the patients/carers expectations and concerns 
Effectiveness Select effective, safe and cost effective medicine.  Consider benefit 
versus harm, best formulation, dose regimen and individualisation 
Information Utilise national and local guidelines 
Order Write clearly with an awareness of common mistakes that lead to 
error. 
Monitor Monitor the treatment 
Communicate Ensure your prescribing decisions are clearly documented, take 
particular care in relation to healthcare interfaces 
Knowledge Prescribe within the limitations of your knowledge 
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1.6.2 Prescribing for Children - Additional Measures  
Bearing in mind the general principles in Table 1.3 and the causes of 
medication errors in children there are some specific points that must be 
considered when prescribing for children.40 
 Age and Weight - Check that information is accurate and up to date. 
 Dose rounding.  Doses need to be rounded to an amount that can be 
easily administered yet are still suitable for the individual patient.  A 
knowledge of the available formulations is essential. 
 Calculations – Complex calculations should be double checked by a 
second party; for critical or high risk medicines; calculations should 
be documented. 
Drug Administration 
Nursing staff should utilise the 6 ‘rights’ of medicine administration41 ensuring 
the right:- 
 Patient 
 Drug 
 Route 
 Dose 
 Frequency 
 Documentation 
This list while easy to recall could be argued does not contain all the elements 
that require a check at the point of administration.  Specifically formulation is 
not included.  There are specific groups of patients for whom the correct 
formulation is vital such as infants, children and patients with enteral feeding 
tubes.  In addition, an acknowledgement that there is a patient at the end of 
the administration process could also be considered.  This may seem obvious 
but responding to any patient queries in relation to the administration is 
paramount.  Their concerns should be listened to and checks made with the 
prescriber. 
1.6.3 Organisational Perspective 
In addition to ensuring safe working environments, there are several 
organisational initiatives that can help to reduce medication errors.  
Standardising equipment and prescription charts have been cited as possible 
ways to improve medication safety.20  A well developed reporting system and 
fair blame culture is also vital to reduce barriers to reporting errors and aid 
learning.42  The work of the NRLS has been vital in this regard and safety 
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warnings based on the reported medication errors are regularly published.43  
There is no direct evidence to show the importance of communication in 
preventing drug errors; however conclusions may be drawn from analysis of 
identified errors.  This is supported by Fortescue et al44 who noted that 47.4% 
of inpatient drug errors could have been prevented by improved 
communication between doctors and patients. 
Clinical Pharmacy Service 
A systematic review of the interventions of hospital pharmacists in improving 
drug therapy in children45 concluded that pharmacist review of medication 
charts was very important in identifying medication errors and is likely to be 
the most effective method of improving drug therapy in children.  The 
conclusion was based on a review of 14 studies, reporting on the interventions 
made by hospital pharmacists on paediatric patients.  There was one UK 
based study by Guy et al46 which reviewed interventions by both pharmacists 
and nursing staff to prevent prescribing and administration errors in a 
specialist children’s hospital.  Over 4 weeks the pharmacists detected 190 
interventions, 0.5% of which were regarded as life threatening.  A more recent 
study, not included in the review, reported on prescribing errors intercepted by 
pharmacists in the paediatric and obstetric setting of a tertiary hospital in 
Spain.47  While one of the aims of this study was to observe any difference 
between the interventions in the two clinical settings, the paediatric 
intervention rate was 2.4%.  All the interventions were scored for severity; of 
the 1357 paediatric interventions 224 (16.5%) were deemed at least serious in 
nature.  
Education and Training 
The Department of Health highlighted the importance of both training and 
competency assessment for junior doctors in paediatrics.6  Davey et al48 
showed that prescribing errors by junior doctors could be reduced by 46% 
following the introduction of a prescribing tutorial.  The introduction of a 
bedside prescribing guideline, however, did not have an effect on error rate.  
In a controlled study, Gordon et al49 showed a significant difference (63% 
versus. 79% p<0.0001) in the scores on a prescribing assessment between 
two groups of junior doctors, one of which had completed an e-learning 
intervention.  The positive impact of the intervention remained even after three 
months, with the e-learning group showing significantly higher scores. 
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1.7 Electronic Prescribing 
1.7.1 Description and Definitions 
Electronic prescribing was defined in the UK by Connecting for Health in 2009: 
The utilisation of electronic systems to facilitate and enhance the 
communication of a prescription or medicine order, aiding the choice, 
administration and supply of a medicine through knowledge and decision 
support and providing a robust audit trail for the entire medicines use 
process.50 
This definition clearly covers all the aspects of, not just the prescribing 
process but the entire medicines use process.  A common misconception is 
that electronic prescribing is just the electronic transmission of prescriptions 
between care settings.  Another term that is also used to describe electronic 
prescribing particularly in the US, is Computerised Physician Order Entry 
(CPOE).  This can cover other types of order made by medical staff in addition 
to medicines. 
1.7.2 Effect on Medication Errors 
The effect of electronic prescribing or CPOE on medication errors has been 
the subject of several review articles in the last 15 years.51-56  The earliest 
review by Kaushal et al55 published in 2003, was a systematic review of CPOE 
and clinical decision support (CDS) systems on medication safety.  A total of 
12 studies were identified some of which assessed isolated CDS devoted to a 
specific drug group such as antibiotics or specific drugs such as theophylline.  
The authors concluded that the use of CPOE and isolated CDS can 
substantially reduce medication error rates.  The most recent systematic 
review by Radley et al52 identified 16 studies and undertook a meta analysis to 
derive a summary estimate of the effect of CPOE on medication errors.  They 
concluded that: 
CPOE can substantially reduce the frequency of medication errors in 
inpatient acute settings; however, it is unclear whether this translates into 
reduced harm for patients.52 
1.8 Impact of Electronic Prescribing in the Paediatric Population 
The following section is devoted to the literature review.  In addition to the 
search strategy this section contains two sub-sections dealing with the 
detection of medication errors and clinical decision support (CDS).  It is 
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important to have an understanding of both of these areas when appraising 
the literature. 
1.8.1 Search Strategy 
An extensive search of the published literature was carried out using the 
following search terms:  prescribing, error, paediatrics, children, infants, 
electronic prescribing, e-prescribing, medication error, administration error and 
dispensing error.  The following databases were interrogated, Embase, 
Medline, and CINAHL using the search strategy listed in Appendix 1. 
1.8.2 Medication Error Detection 
Reporting a medication error (as with all errors) in the NHS is voluntary and 
reactive and as a result, not all errors are reported in this way.57  When 
reviewing any evidence relating to the rate of medication errors or one of the 
specific processes such as prescribing, it is vital to take into account not only 
the definition of an error used in the study, but also the method of 
identification.  There is no gold standard method of identifying prescribing 
errors58 and this can be assumed for all types of medication error.  Table 1.4 
lists the common types of detection method their advantages and 
disadvantages. 
Table 1.4 Medication error detection methods 
Method Description Advantages Disadvantages Example(s) 
Pharmacist 
Intervention 
Pharmacist 
documentation of 
errors identified 
during 
prescription 
monitoring 
process 
Easy to 
undertake as 
part of normal 
working patterns 
Tends to focus on 
prescribing errors 
rather than other 
processes 
Equip Study
20
 
Ghaleb et al
30
 
Dean et al
59
 
Incident 
Report 
Analysis 
Review of 
spontaneous 
routine incident 
reports 
Easy to 
interrogate and 
collect 
Relies on 
spontaneous 
reporting so 
significantly under 
-reports 
Ross et al
60
 
Sari et al
57
 
Trigger Tool Screening for 
specific triggers 
such as 
abnormal 
laboratory results 
or prescriptions 
for antidotes 
such as 
flumazenil 
Targets specific 
incident types 
which cause 
high levels of 
harm 
Time consuming, 
may miss low 
level errors. 
Rozich et al
61
 
Record 
Review 
Retrospective 
review of 
healthcare 
records 
Comprehensive Time consuming, 
relies on small 
number of 
individuals to 
Woloshynowych 
et al
62
 
Neale et al
63
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identify incidents. 
Relies on 
comprehensive 
and accurate 
records 
Observation Direct 
observation of a 
part of the 
medication use 
process 
Accurate, likely 
to spot error that 
may have not 
been considered 
Observation bias 
– staff may be 
less likely to 
undertake their 
normal routines or 
workarounds in 
the knowledge 
that they are 
being observed 
Ghaleb et al
30
 
The sensitivity of a routine system for reporting patient safety incidents was 
studied by Sari et al.57  They retrospectively reviewed the case notes of 1,006 
hospital admissions for patient safety incidents.  This information was then 
compared with the reports submitted to their incident reporting system.  They 
identified 325 incidents, of which only 10% had been reported using the 
incident reporting system.  This would suggest that a large proportion of 
patient safety incidents are not reported.  Errors that do not reach the patient 
or have been considered as causing no harm are rarely reported.  Other 
barriers to reporting may include fear of discipline and lack of error 
awareness.42   
In addition it is difficult to compare results when different denominators are 
used to calculate rates; this is where the development of prescribing indicators 
can help to level the playing field in relation to comparing results.  
1.8.3 Clinical Decision Support 
When reviewing the literature in relation to electronic prescribing, one 
important element of a system to consider is the level of clinical decision 
support (CDS).  Table 1.5 lists the most common elements of CDS with an 
associated description and a classification for the purpose of the literature 
review.  This list was derived from the descriptions used in the papers that 
were reviewed and the taxonomy used by Stultz et al.64  In addition the author 
has further categorised each functionality into basic or advanced to enable 
systems described in the literature to be easily distinguished. 
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Table 1.5 Clinical decision support details and category 
Description Detail Basic/Advanced 
Allergy Checking System checks the patient’s allergies with the 
drug being prescribed and warns prescriber. 
Basic 
Drug-Drug 
Interaction 
System checks for known drug interaction and 
provides warning to prescriber often with 
details of cause of interaction and possible 
consequence. 
Basic 
Therapeutic 
Duplication 
Prescriber is warned when a drug is selected 
in a similar therapeutic class to one already 
prescribed. 
Basic 
Order sets - Basic Pre-defined orders of specific combinations of 
treatment which can be selected to enable 
ease of use e.g. acute post-op pain order set. 
Basic 
Hard Stop System allows entry of stop date for a 
prescription at which time the prescription 
stops without review 
Basic 
Soft Stop System allows entry of a date for review of the 
prescription.  Prescription is not necessarily 
stopped but alert provided to users requesting 
a review. 
Basic 
Dose Range 
Checking 
Checking the dose entered against a pre-
existing dose range for the patients weight.  
Prescriber is provided with a warning if the 
dose is outside pre-set limits. 
Advanced 
Clinical Rules Prescription is automatically checked against 
the patients clinical parameters such as 
diagnosis, renal function and liver function 
and an order amended or warning provided 
Advanced 
Dose Rounding Automatic rounding of a dose to a suitable 
value based on formulation and variation 
Advanced 
1.8.4 Literature Review 
A search for studies investigating the impact of electronic prescribing on 
prescribing errors in paediatric patients retrieved 15 studies.  The studies are 
summarised in Tables 1.6 and 1.7.  Table 1.6 provides a summary of the 
pertinent study characteristics and details of the intervention and its level of 
CDS. Table 1.7 summarises the results.    
None of the 15 studies reported any randomised methodology, 10 studies 
used a retrospective review to look at both pre and post EP implementation 
data; two were retrospective for pre-implementation and four studies were 
entirely prospective.  Only two of the studies were conducting in the UK, with 
10 from the US and one each from Israel, Iran and Canada.  In terms of error 
identification methodology, nine reports used a retrospective review of case 
notes or electronic records, two use incident reporting and five used 
pharmacist interventions.  The majority of specific paediatric populations 
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involved in the trials were general paediatric patients, four reports specifically 
related to critical care areas and two involved neonatal units. 
Han et al65 assessed the change in mortality of patients transferred to their 
hospital for specialist tertiary care.  This was the earliest report to use 
mortality data as an outcome and one of the first reports of the use of EP in a 
paediatric setting.  The EP system that was used had a basic level of clinical 
decision support (CDS), with the possible additional benefit of dose checking, 
but this was not clear.  The retrospective review of admission data showed a 
statistically significant increase in mortality from 2.8% in the 13 months prior to 
EP, to 6.57% (p<0.001) in the 5 months following implementation.  There were 
no significant demographic or clinical differences between the two groups.  
Several limitations in the study were identified in the report.  These included 
the specific population that was studied, who were patients admitted through 
inter-facility transport and as such, may not have been generalisable to a 
whole hospital population.  A specific problem in relation to time critical 
medicines such as IV antibiotics was highlighted.  Following the 
implementation of EP there were increased delays in doses as drugs had to 
be ordered on the system prior to preparation within the pharmacy.  The study 
period following the implementation was short at only 5 months, which may 
not have allowed for full acclimatisation for users of the system.  It is possible 
that, as users became accustomed to the system the results may have 
improved; however, other studies have shown an immediate effect on MEs.66  
Another confounder highlighted by the authors was that the EP system was 
part of a new clinical application system that was implemented hospital wide.  
As a result, other computerised systems were implemented concurrently.  This 
may have affected the education and training of staff required to use multiple 
new systems. 
Del Beccaro et al67 studied the effect of computerised physician order entry 
(CPOE) on risk adjusted mortality in a paediatric intensive care unit (PICU).  
Using similar methodology to Han et al65 they retrospectively reviewed 
admission data for 13 months before and after implementation.  Interestingly 
the system used in this report was the same as the one implemented in the 
previous report65 but is described in slightly more detail.  It included an 
advanced level of CDS with dose checking which, it is suggested was part of 
the Han et al system but with the addition of 230 order sets.  The results 
showed a slight reduction in mortality but this was not statistically significant 
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(4.22% versus 3.46% p=0.32).  There was no difference in demographics 
between the two study populations.  
Following the results reported by Han et al65 where an increase in mortality 
rate was observed following the introduction of an EP system, Keen et al68 
conducted a similar study on NICU and PICU in the US.  They showed a small 
decrease in mortality after the implementation of a basic EP system.  The 
paper does not describe the EP system in detail and the description of the 
CDS is limited to basic order sets.  The system was implemented on high care 
areas at least 3 years after being used in the other areas within the hospital, 
implying that users were already very familiar with it.  This report highlights the 
importance of the way in which EP is implemented in a centre.  The 
preparatory phase took approximately 2 years compared with 3 months 
described by Han et al;65 other differences included a design specifically for 
the paediatric population and extensive support and training.  These were all 
identified as possible causes of the increase in mortality reported by Han et 
al.65 
A study published in 2010 by Longhurst et al69 reported a significant decrease 
in hospital wide mortality following the introduction of an EP system of 20% (p 
= 0.03).  It did include CDS, but this was not clearly defined within the report.  
As with many other studies of this type, the authors used historical 
retrospective data as a control.  Data were collected over a nine year period 
with no acclimatisation period.  The report detailed the similarities between the 
two populations and interestingly, a small but statistically significant difference 
(p <0.01) in the case mix index, suggesting a slightly increased risk of 
mortality in the intervention group.  With a data collection period spanning 
many years it is possible that another intervention took place that contributed 
to the mortality.  The authors identify specific patient safety initiatives such as 
catheter related sepsis and surgical site infection interventions having been 
implemented, however, no significant decreases in these infections had been 
seen.  
In 2003, King et al70 published a study that was conducted in a large tertiary 
teaching hospital in Ontario.  A basic EP system was implemented on 2 
medical wards and compared to 3 control wards (1 medical and 2 surgical).  
This methodology differs from many studies in having a control group studied 
at the same time as the intervention group.  The ME rate was calculated using 
patient bed days and reported as errors per 1000 patient days.  There was a 
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nine month acclimatisation period.  Over the six year study period the team 
observed a 40% reduction in the ME rate compared to control.  However, only 
14 out of a total of 804 errors were identified as prescribing errors, the majority 
being administration errors.  This is likely to be because the ME were 
identified using the hospital’s internal incident reporting system.  The reliability 
of this system to collate incidents is variable.  Certainly in the UK there is 
evidence to suggest that only 10% of incidents are reported on a system such 
as this.57  Furthermore in the UK, the majority of medication error reports 
uploaded to the National Reporting and Learning Service (NRLS) are 
administration errors.7  Despite the limitations of the error identification 
method and the paucity of prescribing errors included in the data, this study 
clearly shows the positive impact of a basic system on ME rates. 
Cordero et al71 studied the impact of a CPOE system incorporating EP in a 
Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) in Ohio US.  The system had an 
advanced level of CDS which included drug dose calculations and dose range 
checking.  In order to evaluate the impact a single drug, gentamicin, was 
studied.  Records of 117 patients prescribed gentamicin prior to the 
implementation of EP were retrospectively examined for dose errors and 
compared with a similar group of patients after implementation.  The results 
showed an impressive reduction in gentamicin dosage errors to zero.  The 
decision support tool used in this study was specifically designed for the use 
of gentamicin in this population and this study clearly illustrates the value of 
this targeted approach.  Not all EP systems provide this level of support.  This 
also illustrates how important it is to understand the level of CDS used in each 
study to add clarity to the interpretation of the results and associated 
conclusions. 
The additional impact of a system with advanced CDS in the US was shown 
by Potts et al.72  This study involved prospectively collecting all errors relating 
to the medication ordering process for two periods of 2 months before and 
after the implementation of EP in their PICU.  There was a significant 
reduction in MEs from 39.1% to 1.6% (p <0.001).  The authors classified their 
medication errors into potential ADEs, where the prescriber provided incorrect 
or inappropriate information; medication prescribing errors (MPEs) where 
inadequate information was provided requiring interpretation and rule 
violations (RV) where hospital policy had not been adhered to.  MPEs and 
RVs were almost eliminated and potential ADEs were reduced significantly by 
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40.9% (p<0.001).  Most types of potential ADE such as therapeutic 
duplication, wrong drug, wrong units and allergy were eliminated by the 
system.  However, errors involving dose and frequency were not.  The authors 
suggested that this was because of the lack of CDS that would have assisted 
the prescriber in choosing the correct indication-specific dose or a specific 
frequency for the patient.  In this study the post implementation data collection 
was started one month after implementation.  This allowed for all staff to be 
trained on the system.  The results clearly show the impact of a system with 
relatively advanced CDS.  Although it did not eliminate all errors; and the 
authors blame the lack of a paediatric specific CDS; the CDS described in this 
study is advanced compared to some of the other systems investigated in 
other studies.65, 66, 73 
Upperman et al66  conducted a study of the implementation of EP in a 
Pittsburgh children’s hospital.  A broad medication error definition was used, 
encompassing prescribing dispensing and administration.  The level of CDS in 
the system was not well described but consisted of standard warnings.  The 
results were expressed as the number of errors per 1000 doses ± the 
Standard Error of the Mean (SEM).  Errors following the introduction of EP 
increased insignificantly from 0.3 ± 0.04 per 1000 doses to 0.37 ± 0.05 per 
1000 doses (p=0.3), however, harmful errors decreased significantly from 0.05 
±0.017 to 0.03 ±0.003 per 1000 doses (p<0.05).  Errors were identified using 
the hospital error reporting system as opposed to active observation of errors 
and the data was collected retrospectively.  Prior to implementation there had 
been a hospital wide drive to increase reporting and this intensified after 
implementation of EP.  In addition, the whole hospital changed at once rather 
than taking a stepwise approach.  The significance of this is unclear but it did 
mean that there was no control group where the EP system was not being 
used.  The paper therefore, reports a trend of decreasing severity of errors but 
this has to be tempered by the limitations of the data collection method. 
Holdsworth et al74 studied the impact of CPOE on the incidence of ADE in a 
large cohort of paediatric patients on both PICU and general paediatric wards 
in the US.  The study compared data collected 15 months after the 
implementation of an advanced CPOE system with similar data collected 
approximately 4 years previously.  ADEs were defined as an injury from a 
medicine or lack of medicine.  Potential ADEs were defined as the potential to 
result in a significant injury.  Both of these parameters showed a significant 
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decrease after the implementation of CPOE.  The post implementation relative 
risk was 0.64 (95% CI 0.43-0.95) for ADEs and 0.56 (95% CI: 0.34-0.91) for 
preventable ADEs, compared to pre-implementation data.  The authors 
reported a reduction in dispensing errors, wrong dose errors and drug choice 
errors.  This highlights two important factors to consider when analysing 
studies conducted in the US and comparing them to UK practice.  Firstly, the 
medicine management systems are often very different.  In the study sites 
there was a unit dose dispensing system electronically linked to the CPOE.  
This would contribute significantly to the reduction in dispensing errors and is 
a system that is not in general use in the UK.  Secondly, the level of CDS 
within the system was advanced with both dose range checking and dose 
recommendation information available for common and alternative indications.  
In addition, the system included a sophisticated automatic dose rounding tool.  
The authors noted the significant time difference between the two data 
collection periods.  There were small changes in the medicine management 
processes between these two periods including formulary revision and 
highlighting look-alike, sound-alike issues.  However, these were regarded as 
ongoing evolutionary changes, likely to have taken place in any organisation 
and completely different to the revolutionary change that occurred with the 
introduction of CPOE.  Another important aspect of this study is the 
acclimatisation period.  In this case, post-implementation data were collected 
after 15 months.  This allowed time for the system to be embedded within day 
to day practice and to identify and resolve any early issues with the system 
Walsh et al75 conducted a time series analysis of the change in error rate 7 
months before and for 9 months after the implementation of an EP system, 
which included dose checking, in the US.  Medication errors were identified 
retrospectively using a range of methods including case note review and 
incident reporting.  Identified errors were then reviewed and categorised by a 
panel.  A 7% decrease in non-intercepted errors was found, but no change in 
the rate of injuries or incomplete/wrong orders.  Most importantly the rate of 
wrong dose errors, the most common type of error, did not change despite the 
automated weight-based dose checking.  The authors compared their results 
with a study of similar methodology conducted in adults76 which showed a 
significant reduction in non-intercepted errors of 55%.  The explanations put 
forward by the authors for this difference are important considerations when 
comparing paediatric studies as well as medication error studies in general.  
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Firstly the difference between off-the-shelf systems and home-grown systems; 
there are numerous advantages and disadvantage between these two system 
types.  Home-grown systems tend to reflect the way in which a hospital works 
and might be better matched to other systems already in place.  Support for 
the system however, may be difficult to obtain.  Off-the-shelf systems usually 
come with a significant level of support from the vendor yet may require 
significant changes in working patterns in order for them to be implemented. 
This important distinction is highlighted by this study with respect to dose 
errors. The system had CDS which included weight based dosing, but it was 
primarily designed to identify overdoses based on maximum adult doses and 
as an off-the-shelf system this was difficult to change.  Secondly, the authors 
left a six month gap after the introduction of EP before collecting data for the 
same months each year thus allowing for seasonal changes to be taken into 
account.  The time series based nature of this study provided some interesting 
results.  There was a downward trend of incidents for the 6 months prior to 
implementation of EP.  Immediately after implementation the error rate was 
similar to the initial rate and showed a similar downward trend over the study 
period.  Additionally a peak of errors was noted to occur in September and 
October in both periods at the beginning of the academic year as opposed to 
later in March and April.  This study’s methodology allows for seasonal 
variations which is an important consideration within paediatrics.  In the UK 
admissions tend to increase in the winter months due to RSV with a resulting 
increase in pressure on services.77 
A fascinating study by Kadmon et al78 showed how the evolution of an EP 
system could affect the prescribing error rate.  This was a retrospective review 
of prescribing errors during the same month each year over 4 years during 
which an EP system was introduced on the PICU of a tertiary children’s 
hospital in Israel.  The authors clearly defined the categories of prescribing 
errors that were identified.  All errors were categorised by an experienced 
PICU physician with 10% of the errors also categorised by the PICU 
pharmacist.  The overall inter-rater reliability score showed substantial 
agreement with kappa, κ = 0.788 (95% CI: 0.638 – 0.938).  The study 
identified three types of prescription error: potential ADE (previously defined) 
as well as medication prescription errors (MPE) defined as an incomplete or 
illegible prescriptions and rule violations (RV) which were defined as 
prescriptions not adhering to the institute’s prescription writing policy, a similar 
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categorisation was used by Cordero et al.71   Other studies may include 
incomplete and illegible prescriptions as potential ADEs arguing that these 
also have the potential to cause harm.  
Initial post implementation results showed only a small reduction in total 
prescription errors (8.2% to 7.8%) and potential ADEs (2.5% to 2.4%).  The 
centre then introduced an advanced CDS which included: default drug doses, 
routes and frequencies as well as a dose range checking system designed 
only to prevent overdosing.  No other CDS was included in the system.  
Following this the prescribing error rates dropped significantly to 4.4% 
(p=0.0004) as did the potential ADE rate to 0.8% (p=0.0014).  It is important to 
note that these data were collected immediately after the introduction of the 
CDS as opposed to the previous data collection period which occurred 1 year 
after the initial introduction of the EP system.  This occurred because of the 
need to keep data collection to the same month each year (September) thus 
reducing potential bias due to seasonal case load differences.  The lack of 
improvement in prescribing error rate after 1 year of EP followed by the 
relatively sudden drop immediately after CDS implementation is very powerful 
and highlights the importance of the CDS in preventing errors.  In addition the 
CDS targeted the most common type of error found in paediatrics and more 
importantly in a PICU, that of wrong doses.  For systems that are to be used in 
children this report shows the importance and value of dose range checking in 
EP systems. 
Jani et al73 studied dosing errors specifically as part of wider prescribing error 
work which was undertaken before and after the implementation of EPMA in a 
large tertiary UK paediatric hospital.  Errors from outpatients and discharge 
prescriptions were collected in addition to inpatient errors for the renal and 
urology patients.  In this case errors were identified prospectively by 
pharmacists during their normal working pattern.  This observational technique 
has become the gold standard for identification of prescribing errors and was 
used in the EQUIP study.20  A total of 8,723 prescriptions were analysed 
across the two collection periods.  The EP system that was implemented had 
very basic CDS including weight range checking.  There was a reduction in 
dosing error rates from 2.2% to 1.2% and absolute reduction of 1% (p<0.001).  
Most of the reduction in dose errors was observed in the outpatient and 
discharge prescribing rather than the inpatient setting where there was a small 
but negligible increase.  The authors postulated that this was due to the 
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relatively small number of errors observed with inpatients and these errors 
tended to be ones would have been prevented only by more advanced CDS.  
It is not clear from the paper whether there was an acclimatisation period; 
however, subsequent communication with the authors revealed that there was 
a 5 month acclimatisation period for the inpatient setting only.79  Many other 
studies have shown a greater reduction but most of these have studied 
systems with more advanced CDS.  In addition to number of errors, the 
severity of the errors was also evaluated using a validated severity scoring 
system involving 5 judges who gave a score to each error of between 0 and 
10.80  There was a reduction in the severity of the errors with the potential to 
result in minor and moderate outcomes (p=0.009 and 0.019 respectively).  
There was also a reduction in severity of dose errors with the potential for 
severe outcomes but this was not statistically significant (p=0.11).  This study 
shows that both the number and severity of dosing errors can be reduced 
using very basic EPMA systems in a specific group of patients, but with most 
impact on less severe errors.   
Kazemi et al81 prospectively studied the introduction of an EP system with 
CDS in a neonatal unit in Iran.  They focused attention specifically on 
antibiotics and anticonvulsants and recorded only dose and frequency errors.  
Following the introduction of the EP system without CDS, the error rate 
reduced from 52% to 50%.  However following the introduction of an 
advanced CDS which calculated the dose of the antibiotic or anticonvulsant 
based on indication, age, weight, gestational age and GFR, there was a 
reduction in the prescribing error rate to 33% (p<0.001).  In a similar way to 
Kadmon et al78, this study highlights the importance of CDS in particular, in 
relation to dosing errors.  However, the study reported an extremely high error 
rate initially.  Several reasons were given for this including the lack of any 
ward based clinical pharmacy service and the need to transcribe all doses 
onto paper based charts even in the presence of an electronic system.  All the 
data collection periods were the same length but they did not occur at the 
same time of year; however, there is less likely to be seasonal case load bias 
within a neonatal unit unless there is a seasonal variation in births.  It is 
inferred that data collection took place immediately following the 
implementation of the various EP and CDS systems.  If so this would not have 
given prescribers the opportunity to become acquainted with the system and 
may have resulted in a less pronounced reduction than data collected a little 
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later after acclimatisation.  While showing some excellent results, the initial 
high error rate and the different nature of services in Iran need to be taken into 
account. 
Sullins et al82 studied the introduction of EP at one site and electronic 
medication administration record (eMAR) in a second, both in the US.  The 
objective was to understand whether the order of implementation would make 
a difference to medication errors.  The EP site was a children’s hospital, the 
eMAR site was an adult hospital.  Errors from medication charts were 
collected retrospectively for a periods of 30 days before and after 
implementation of each system.  The national definition for medication errors 
was used.13  The medication error rate in the EP centre was reduced by 
13.3%.  The errors were classified into prescribing administration and 
dispensing errors.  Interestingly the prescribing error rate increased slightly 
after implementation, this being balanced out by a larger reduction in 
administration errors.  The number of actual errors was relatively small, with 
an increase from 20 to 23 errors.  This increase was attributed to wrong timing 
errors.  The authors cite the limited training opportunities for staff on the 
system and its complexity.  The definition used in this study meant that both 
documentation errors and errors of omission were included.  In addition, there 
is no detail in the report of the EP system and its level of CDS. This again 
illustrates the importance of the timing on the data collection period in relation 
to the implementation  
O’Meara and Shaheen83 presented the results of an audit of prescribing errors 
after the introduction of EP in neonates and children at the Neonatal and 
Paediatric Pharmacists Group (NPPG) annual conference in 2013, they were 
published in abstract form only.  Prescribing errors were identified using 
observational techniques on six paediatric wards and one neonatal ward.  The 
prescribing error rate increased from 8.5% to 15.7% following EP 
implementation.  The authors also scored the severity of the prescribing errors 
and this showed that there was an increase in the number of minor errors and 
a decrease in the number of severe and moderate errors after the 
implementation of EP.  Unfortunately the abstract does not detail the EP 
product that was used so the level of CDS is unknown.  Also it is not clear how 
soon after the implementation of EP the post EP data were collected.  The 
basic results allude to a reduction in the severity and therefore, impact of 
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prescribing errors; the elimination of some errors but the identification of new 
errors has been reported elsewhere.73 
1.8.5 Summary 
Fifteen studies investigating the impact of an EP system on paediatric 
prescribing errors were identified during the literature review.  Eleven showed 
a decrease in either medication errors or mortality associated with the 
implementation of an EP system and 4 showed an increase.  The significance 
of the changes varied considerably.  Six studies reported a statistically 
significant reduction in error rate or mortality.69, 70, 72, 73, 78, 81  One study 
reported a statistically significant increase in mortality.65  As discussed above 
the authors of this study and subsequent similar work67, 68 have been able to 
show why such a significant increase was seen.   
In general it can be concluded that EP systems reduce the incidence of 
medication errors in the broadest sense, when using the widest possible 
definition and including all error types such as legibility and legality.   
What cannot be concluded, however, is what the impact of EP is on the 
patient.  Studies assessing mortality show some improvement, with the 
exception of Han et al65 as discussed.  Studies that have used error rates as 
their outcome often show a reduction in errors, however, differences in timing 
of the intervention, in error detection methods and the presence or absence of 
CDS make it difficult to draw wider conclusions.   
In relation to error detection, two studies used spontaneous incident 
reporting,66, 70 five used pharmacist interventions72-74, 81, 83 and four used 
retrospective record review.71, 75, 78, 82  Differences between error detection 
methods are summarised in Table 1.4.  There was no correlation between 
error detection method and a positive or negative impact on error rate 
following the intervention.  In addition, statistically significant reductions in 
error rates were observed with all methods of error detection.   
In relation to the level of CDS, six studies described systems with advanced 
CDS71, 72, 74, 75, 78, 81 three had basic CDS66, 70, 73 and in two studies the CDS 
was not adequately described.82, 83  Of the five studies that reported a 
statistically significant reduction in ME, three had advanced CDS72, 78, 81 and 
two had basic CDS.70, 73  The lack of heterogeneity between the reports does 
not allow a full meta-analysis.  A possible trend towards a reduction in ME, 
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seen in the reports, with advanced CDS would require a much larger clearly 
defined study to prove. 
Another aspect to consider when reviewing the literature is the impact of the 
ME on the patient.  Only the four mortality studies and four of the studies 
looking at ME rate included an assessment of the severity of the errors.  
Within these eight studies there is variation as to the overall decrease in either 
mortality or ME and the presence of a decrease in the severity of the errors.  
Four of the studies using error rate as an outcome included an analysis of the 
severity of the errors.66, 73, 74, 83  Two of these studies showed a decrease in 
harmful ADEs,66, 74 but neither was statistically significant.   
It is clear from this body of work that there are advantages in implementing EP 
in the paediatric secondary care setting.  Reductions in ME have been shown 
and these vary depending on the level of CDS and the error detection method.  
However, what is not clear is what the impact EP has on the patient and their 
outcome.  It can be inferred that reducing medication errors will result in a 
reduction in harm but, as the vast majority of MEs result in no harm7 it is not 
possible with current evidence to be confident in this conclusion.  The 
development of a tool specifically dedicated to detecting harmful ME would 
therefore, be an ideal way of addressing this problem.  Prescribing indicators 
are a solution to this problem. 
  
4
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Table 1.6 Characteristics of studies describing the impact of electronic prescribing on paediatric prescribing errors                   continued 
Study 
Author 
Setting Design Error detection 
method 
System  CDS Outcome(s) Denom AP 
Han et al 
2005
65
 
US / General 
Paediatric 
Pre & Post 
Retrospective 
Record Review OTS Basic Mortality Patients No 
Del Beccaro 
et al 2006
67
 
US / PICU Pre & Post 
Retrospective 
Record Review OTS Advanced Mortality Patients No 
Keene et al 
2007
68
 
US / NICU & PICU Pre & Post 
Retrospective 
Record Review OTS Not well 
described 
Basic 
Mortality N/A No 
Longhurst et 
al 2010
69
 
US / General 
Paediatric 
Pre & Post 
Retrospective 
Record Review OTS Yes but 
not 
described 
Mortality per 100 
discharges 
N/A No 
King et al 
2003
70
 
Canada / General 
Paediatric 
Pre & Post 
Retrospective 
Incident Reports OTS Basic but 
linked to 
lab results 
Any event in 
prescribing, dispensing, 
administration or 
monitoring 
Per 1000 bed 
days 
9 Months 
Cordero et al 
2004
71
 
US / NICU 
(VLBW) 
Pre & Post 
Retrospective 
Record Review OTS Advanced Gentamicin dose error 
(+/-10%) 
Patients 
prescribed 
gentamicin 
No 
Potts et al 
2004
72
 
US / PICU Prospective cohort Pharmacist 
Intervention 
HG Advanced All ME 
Incomplete, incorrect or 
inappropriate 
Medication 
Orders 
1 month 
Upperman et 
al 2005
66
 
US / General 
Paediatric 
Pre Retrospective 
and Post 
Prospective 
Incident Reports OTS Basic All Medication errors Medication 
orders 
Not 
Stated 
Holdsworth 
et al 2007
74
 
US / General 
Paediatric  
Pre Retrospective 
and Post 
Prospective 
Pharmacist 
Intervention 
OTS Advanced Actual and potential  
and preventable Injury 
from medicine or lack of 
medicine 
Patients 15 
months 
Walsh et al 
2008
75
 
US / General 
Paediatric 
Pre & Post 
Retrospective 
Record Review OTS Advanced ADEs and MEs 
Actual and preventable 
injury 
Per 1000 
patient days 
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Table 1.6 Characteristics of studies describing the impact of electronic prescribing on paediatric prescribing errors                   continued 
Study 
Author 
Setting Design Error detection 
method 
System  CDS Outcome(s) Denom AP 
Kadmon et al 
2009
78
 
Israel / PICU Pre & Post 
Retrospective 
Record Review OTS Advanced Potential ADEs - An 
incorrect prescription 
that could cause harm.  
Prescribed 
Items 
12 
Months 
Jani et al 
2010
73
 
UK / General 
Paediatric 
Pre & Post 
Prospective 
Pharmacist 
Intervention 
OTS Basic Dosing Errors at 
prescribing stage 
Prescribed 
Items 
Not 
Specified 
Kazemi et al 
2011
81
 
Iran / NICU Pre & Post 
Prospective 
Pharmacist 
Intervention 
OTS Advanced Antibiotics and 
Anticonvulsant 
Erroneous dose or 
frequency. 
Medication 
days (a day 
in which a 
prescribed 
medication 
was 
administered
) 
No 
Sullins et al 
2012
82
 
US / General 
Paediatric 
Pre & Post 
Retrospective 
Record Review OTS Not 
Detailed 
All ME Medication 
orders 
2 months 
O’Meara, 
Shaheen 
2014
83
 
UK / General 
Paediatric 
Pre & Post 
Prospective 
Pharmacist 
Intervention 
OTS Basic Prescribing errors Medication 
orders 
Not 
Stated 
Key:- VLBW = Very Low Birth Weight (Birth weight ≤1.5kg), OTS = Off-the –shelf, HG = Home-grown, Denom = Denominator. AP = Acclimatisation Period, ME = Medication 
Error, PICU  = Paediatric Intensive Care Unit, NICU = Neonatal Intensive Care Unit, ADE = Adverse Drug Event 
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Table 1.7 Summary of results from reports of the impact of electronic prescribing on paediatric prescribing errors 
Study Level of CDS AP 
(months) 
Pre-Int 
data 
Post - Int 
result 
Main outcome 
significance (p) 
Error Severity  
Result 
Notes/Conclusions 
Han et al 2005
65
 Basic No 2.8% 6.57% p<0.001 N/A Significant increase in mortality 
Del Beccaro et al 
2006
67
 
Advanced No 4.22% 3.46% Not reported N/A Assessed mortality pre and post 
intervention. No significant difference 
Keene et al 2007
68
 Not well 
described - Basic 
No 3.16% 2.41% p=0.466 N/A Mortality did not increase 
Longhurst et al 
2010
69
 
Yes but not 
described 
No 1.008 0.716 p=0.03 N/A Significant reduction in mortality 
expressed as deaths per 100 discharges 
King et al 2003
70
 Basic but linked to 
lab results 
9 4.49 3.13 p < 0.001 Not Included 40% reduction compared to control wards 
expressed as ME rate per 1000 bed days 
Cordero et al 2004
71
 Advanced No 12% 0% Not reported Not Included Reduction in gentamicin dose errors 
Potts et al 2004
72
 Advanced 1 39.1% 
 
1.6% p < 0.001 Not Included Potential ADEs reduced from 2.2 to 1.3% 
(p<0.001) 
Upperman et al 
2005
66
 
Basic N/S 3% 3.7% p=0.3 Decrease (not 
significant) 
Insignificant increase in errors 
Holdsworth et al 
2007
74
 
Advanced 15  6.3 3.1 Not reported Decrease (not 
significant) 
RR reported as 0.64 (95%CI:0.43-0.95) 
Walsh et al 2008
75
 Advanced  44.7 50.9  Not Included As per 1000 patient days.  No statistically 
significant difference 
Kadmon et al 2009
78
 Advanced 12 2.5%  2.4 
0.8%*  
0.7%  
p=0.66 
p<0.005 
Not included *Significant decrease associated with 
addition of basic dose range checking. 
Jani et al 2010
73
 Basic N/S 2.2% 1.2% p<0.001 No Change Additional decrease in severity of errors  
Kazemi et al
81
 Advanced No 51% 34% p<0.001 Not Included Addition of CDS showed largest decrease 
Sullins et al 2012
82
 Not Detailed 2  Not 
Given 
Not Given  Not Included Reduction of 13.3% (p=0.24) 
O’Meera, Shaheen
83
 Basic N/S 8.5% 15.7% Not reported No Change Increase in prescribing error rate but no 
change in severity. 
Key: AP=Acclimatisation Period, Int.=Intervention, RR = Risk Ratio, N/S = Not Stated,  ME = Medication Error, ADE = Adverse Drug Event, CDS = Clinical Decision Support
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1.8.6 Prescribing Indicators 
Indicators are: 
…explicitly defined and measurable items relating to the structures, 
processes or outcomes of care.84 
Indicators are often used in healthcare to measure a specific activity, such as 
the immunisation rate or screening rates for prostate cancer.  Quality 
indicators are used to determine the level of quality of care for a specific 
activity and performance indicators may be used to monitor performance in a 
specific area such as health promotion. 
A prescribing indicator, therefore, is a  specific measurable item referring to 
the process of prescribing aimed at identifying specific prescribing practices 
that are likely to cause harm or are easily resolved using an intervention.  
They have the advantage of focussing on a distinct set of criteria and being a 
valid method of measuring or monitoring an area of prescribing where a 
change is expected over time.  Prescribing indicators have been used in many 
different ways in the UK to assess different aspects of prescribing activity.85  
The main focus has been on their use to analyse the cost of prescribing in 
primary care,86 however more recently indicators have been developed to 
analyse the quality and safety of prescribing.87, 88  In primary care, a set of 
indicators has been included in the PINCER tool and shown to be an effective 
method for reducing a range of medication errors.89  In all cases the indicators 
relate to adult care rather than children and infants.  Table 1.6 summarises 
some examples of previously published prescribing indicators. 
Table 1.8 Examples of prescribing indicators 
NSAID = Non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug, IV = Intravenous, DKA = Diabetic Ketoacidosis 
Indicators for use in secondary care have been slower to materialise.  Thomas 
et al90 developed an extensive range of indicators designed to assess the 
Population/indicator type Example Indicator Reference 
Adult Primary Care - 
Performance 
Generic prescribing rate Campbell at al
86
 
Adult Primary Care - 
Performance 
Ratio of co-trimoxazole items to 
trimethoprim items 
Campbell at al
86
 
Adult Primary Care – Quality NSAID in a patient with heart failure Avery et al
88
 
Adult Secondary Care – 
Quality 
Gentamicin prescribed to a patient 
with renal impairment without dose 
adjustment 
Thomas et al
90
 
Paediatric High Acuity 
indications-quality 
% of patients receiving IV fluids within 
60 mins of Emergency Department 
(ED) arrival with DKA 
Stang et al
91
 
 47 
 
impact of EPMA on prescribing errors in the hospital setting.  They used an 
eDelphi approach to gain consensus on 80 indicators.   
To date, no such indicators have been developed for paediatric prescribing.  
Stang et al91 published work on quality indicators for high acuity paediatric 
conditions in 2013.  Using a Rand modified Delphi approached they identified 
indicators related to specific conditions such as diabetic ketoacidosis (DKA), 
anaphylaxis and status epilepticus.  
As has already been described, prescribing for children is significantly 
different to prescribing for adults.  There are differences in the doses used as 
well as the range of drugs.  Therefore, a set of specific paediatric prescribing 
indicators that can be used to assess aspects of electronic prescribing in the 
paediatric population is required.   
1.9 Aim and Objectives 
The aim of this research was to ascertain the effectiveness of current EP 
systems to prevent a specific group of paediatric prescribing errors (identified 
using pre-defined indicators).The objectives were: 
 To develop a set of high risk paediatric prescribing indicators for use 
as an evaluation tool for EP systems  
 To establish the performance of a range of EP implementations in 
preventing specific prescribing errors identified using pre-defined 
indicators. 
 To understand the attributes, level of clinical decision support (CDS) 
and general settings of an EP implementation that can reduce the 
risk of the indicator paediatric prescribing errors. 
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Chapter 2  eDelphi Exploratory Round 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes an overview of the methodology for the indicator 
development.  In addition, it describes in detail:- 
 The development of the initial list of potential prescribing indicators. 
 Recruitment of an expert panel. 
 Creation of a final list of indicators for consensus scoring in Rounds 1 
and 2. 
2.2 The eDelphi Process 
The Delphi technique is method of gaining consensus from an expert panel on 
a question or issue for which little or no high quality evidence exists.  A set of 
41 paediatric prescribing errors was developed using an eDelphi methodology 
to gain consensus from an expert panel.   
There are three common methodologies for determining consensus within 
healthcare: nominal group processes, consensus development panels and the 
Delphi technique.  The nominal group process involves four phases, three of 
which involve face to face presentation and discussion about a set of solutions 
to the proposed problem.  The solutions to the problem under discussion are 
generated anonymously by the panel members for subsequent discussion.  It 
has been used particularly for the appropriateness of interventions in health 
care.92  Consensus development panels are organised conferences or events 
specifically planned to discuss a topic.  They are commonly used to formulate 
policy and strategic plans.  It is a multidisciplinary approach involving a great 
deal of face to face discussion.  Specific methodology is not agreed and the 
logistics and cost involved make it unfeasible for most researchers.93 
The eDelphi method allowed an electronic transfer of a large amount of 
information to each of the expert panel members.  It was chosen as an 
efficient way of conducting multiple rounds of scoring in order to gain 
consensus.  In addition this allowed the opinions of a broad range of both 
medical and paediatric pharmacy experts to be taken into account.  It allowed 
multiple rounds of indicator scoring to be conducted until convergence or 
stability of opinion is gained.  It was also a more efficient and cost effective 
method as it does not require face to face discussion as with the other 
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methods.94  In addition it was used in the development of the adult prescribing 
indicators90 on which this work was based.   
In this work the process was conducted electronically via email, hence the 
eDelphi designation.   
Figure 2.1 is a diagrammatic representation of the eDelphi process used in 
this research, together with explanations of specific methodology and output. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 - Diagrammatic representation of eDelphi process 
2.3 Expert Panel Selection 
A list of potential panellists was generated by the investigator through the 
paediatrician network via the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health 
(RCPCH, http://www.rcpch.ac.uk) and the paediatric pharmacist network via 
the Neonatal and Paediatric Pharmacists Group (NPPG, 
http://www.nppg.org.uk).  Additional contacts were made through research 
links with the National Institute of Healthcare Research (NIHR) programme 
grant research team who had developed the adult indicators.90  Each potential 
panellist was sent an email invitation together with a summary of the proposed 
research (Appendix 2).  Potential panellists were general paediatricians, 
paediatric pharmacists and paediatric pharmacologists from across the UK.  
Following initial contact, each participant was asked to complete a participant 
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details form (Appendix 3) detailing years of relevant experience as well as 
experience of electronic prescribing systems.  Thirty nine potential participants 
were identified using this process of which 15 either did not respond or 
declined to take part following the initial request.  This left 24 participants who 
returned completed participant detail forms.  These individuals were 
subsequently sent the initial indicators for the exploratory round.  This 
achieved the target number of at least 20 panel members, a similar number 
used in other Delphi work.90 
2.4 Identification of Initial Indicators 
The initial set of indicators was developed using five key sources: 
 Adult indicators previously published90 
 Literature search  
 National reporting and learning system data95 
 Local intervention and incident reports 
 National Alerts. 
Figure 2.2 depicts the process followed to generate the initial list of indicators 
for the exploratory round. 
All potential indicators had to adhere to the following inclusion and exclusion 
criteria: 
Inclusion 
 The indicator described a prescribing error relating to a specific drug. 
 The indicator was specific to the hospital paediatric setting. 
Exclusion 
 The indicator described a prescribing practice not routinely 
undertaken in paediatric hospital settings. 
 The indicator described an error that would not be amenable to 
decision support or electronic prescribing. 
 Extraction of data for the indicator from hospital records was not likely 
to be feasible. 
 The indicator described a failure to monitor. 
 The indicator described an error relating to the administration or 
dispensing of a drug 
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Figure 2.2 A diagrammatic representation of the potential prescribing indicator identification 
and development. 
2.4.1 Adult Indicators 
Thomas et al90 published a set of 80 adult prescribing indicators designed to 
assess the impact of electronic prescribing in secondary care.  They used 
similar methodology to that used in the present work to generate them.  
Personal communication with the lead author allowed access to their original 
starting list prior to any eDelphi process.  This list contained 110 indicators 
each of which were assessed against the inclusion and exclusion criteria 
above.  Fifty eight of the adult indicators were excluded.  The most common 
reason for exclusion was that the indicator drug was rarely used in the 
paediatric setting (n=44); examples of specific drugs in this category included 
orlistat, aliskerin, glibenclamide and bisphosphonates.  Other reasons for 
exclusion were: that the indication was rare in paediatrics e.g. type II diabetes 
mellitus, or the indicator related to a co-morbidity that was rare in paediatrics 
e.g. heart failure or Parkinson’s disease.  The remaining 52 indicators were 
included in the final list.  Of these, eight required modification to the wording to 
make them applicable to the paediatric setting, e.g. specific reference to the 
paediatric dose of domperidone rather than the adult dose.  The full table of 
adult indicators and associated outcome is shown in Appendix 4. 
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2.4.2 Literature Search 
An extensive literature search was carried out for paediatric prescribing errors 
using the search strategy listed in Appendix 5.  Papers detailing individual 
case reports of medication errors as well as paediatric medication error 
reviews were identified.28, 29, 96-111  Underlying themes were very similar to 
those already discussed, such as wrong dose.  Where specific drugs were 
identified these were included as a potential indicator for assessment.  In total 
26 indicators were identified using this method (Appendix 6).  Of these, eight 
were included in the exploratory round.  The two main reasons for excluding 
an indicator from this source was that the reports related to administration 
rather than prescribing errors or the drug was rarely used in paediatric setting 
in the UK.  
2.4.3 National Reporting and Learning System Data 
The National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) was set up by the 
Department of Health in 2004.  It contains all patient safety incidents reported 
by all NHS healthcare trusts and organisations in England and Wales.  
Personal communication with the Senior Pharmacist at NHS England allowed 
the sharing of an internal report detailing medication errors in children 
between 1st October 2009 and 30th September 2012.95  During this period a 
total of 45,242 medication errors were reported to the NRLS involving children 
or neonates.  The majority of these (87%) caused no harm.  There were nine 
incidents of severe harm and three reports of death.  The detail relating to the 
high harm errors was included in the report and used to develop indicators for 
inclusion.  Of the three deaths, two were associated with administration errors 
and the third was related to the prescribing of a penicillin containing antibiotic 
to a patient who was allergic to penicillin.  This specific cause of harm had 
been identified with the adult work and was, therefore, already included as an 
indicator.  The moderate harm incidents primarily related to administration 
errors, however, one described a patient prescribed a dose of meropenem too 
low for the indication.  This was included as a potential indicator and was also 
identified when reviewing local interventions.  The themes identified in the 
reports included wrong doses and delayed or omitted medicines.  As the 
specific drugs involved in wrong dose errors were not cited, a general 
documentation error to capture these was developed. Delayed or omitted 
medicines have been excluded from this work as their prevention is not 
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amenable to decision support.  In total five indicators were identified from the 
NRLS data all of which were included in the exploratory round (Appendix 7). 
2.4.4 Local Intervention and Incident Monitoring 
The clinical pharmacy service at University Hospital Southampton NHS 
Foundation Trust (UHS) monitors its intervention activity on an annual basis.  
Pharmacy interventions are defined as any activity in which a member of the 
pharmacy team has had an impact on a patient’s care.  Pharmacist 
intervention monitoring is one of the error detection methods described in 
Chapter 1.  In addition to identifying medication errors, pharmacists also 
provide patient counselling, medicines administration advice and ensure safe 
and secure storage of medicines. 
A review of the paediatric pharmacy interventions in UHS from 2012 and 2013 
was carried out to identify common medication errors.  They were assessed 
against the inclusion and exclusion criteria and then, if suitable, added to the 
initial indicator list. 
In UHS an incident reporting system is in operation similar to the one 
described by Dean et al.112  This database was interrogated for all medication 
errors reported by the paediatric and neonatal departments between 2010 and 
2013.  In total 197 errors were identified.  These were reviewed by the author 
for possible inclusion as an initial indicator.   A total of 27 possible indicators 
were identified (Appendix 8).  One was excluded as it related to a dispensing 
error, leaving 26 for inclusion in the exploratory round. 
2.4.5 National Alerts 
Both the MHRA and the NPSA/NHS England publish medication safety alerts 
as a result of their national surveillance projects.  Alerts pertaining to 
medicines used in children published since 2002 were scrutinised for potential 
inclusion.  Many of these had already been identified by other sources, 
particularly the adult indicators. Specific paediatric examples included the use 
of hypotonic sodium chloride solutions for IV maintenance therapy113 and the 
use of codeine in children under the age of 12.114  In total 11 possible 
indicators were identified using this source.  One was excluded as it related to 
an administration error and one was excluded as it involved a drug rarely used 
in children.  This left nine potential indicators included in the exploratory round 
(Appendix 9).   
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2.5 Documentation Errors 
During review of the indicators with the adult indicator team a group of 
indicators that were clearly going to be difficult to measure using the proposed 
audit tool were identified.  Therefore, a group of non-drug specific errors 
termed “documentation errors” was developed.  The term documentation error 
was used as these errors were not drug specific and could be attributed to any 
drug and the process of writing a prescription by hand.  The documentation 
errors were circulated with each round of scoring so that the expert panel 
were aware of them.  An example of these included “a 10 times overdose”.  In 
this case the indicator was not drug specific and so it would be very difficult to 
assess the likelihood and severity.  However, these types of error do occur in 
paediatric practice and are well documented in the literature.  In order to fully 
assess the impact of an electronic prescribing system, identification of this 
type of error is essential.  These documentation errors would not be subject to 
the eDelphi process as they did not describe an error associated with a 
specific drug; rather they describe an aspect of poor prescribing practice.  An 
initial list of 20 documentation errors was identified (Appendix 10). 
2.6 Initial List of Prescribing Indicators 
Appendices 4 and 6 - 9 contain lists of all the indicators identified using each 
of the above methods together with the decision as to whether they were 
included in the exploratory list. 
For each possible indicator identified from the sources above the following 
elements were recorded. 
 Code Number 
 Description 
 BNF Code 
 Supporting information 
 Reference 
 Error type 
2.7 Exploratory Round 
Appendix 11 shows the final list of 100 prescribing indicators errors that were 
used in the exploratory round together with their sources.  The expert panel 
members were asked to review each of the indicators and recommend 
modifications they deemed necessary.  Panel members were also asked to 
 55 
 
suggest additional indicators at this stage and were provided with a form to 
use for this purpose (Appendix 12).  The responses were assessed by the 
research team against the inclusion and exclusion criteria and available 
evidence of their clinical merit.  The research team consisted of the author and 
a co-researcher who had worked on the adult indicators.90 
The expert panel members were also provided with the list of documentation 
errors (Appendix 10) and asked to amend them as required and suggest 
additions. 
2.8 Results 
2.8.1 Expert Panel  
From the group of 24 participants identified during panel selection, 21(87.5%) 
complete responses for the exploratory round were received.  This expert 
panel consisted of 8 pharmacists with a total of 181 years of experience and 
60 years exposure to electronic prescribing.  There were 13 physicians with a 
total of 243 years of paediatric experience and 31 years of exposure to 
electronic prescribing.  The panellist attributes are summarised in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 Expert panel members, years of experience and their hospital setting 
Position Yrs Exp Yrs Exp Type of Hospital 
Senior Paediatric Pharmacist 35 2 General Teaching 
Clinical Pharmacy Manager 25 3 Specialist Children’s 
Neonatal Pharmacist 32 0 General  
Consultant Pharmacist 26 21 General Teaching 
Medication Safety Pharmacist 20 11 General Teaching 
Clinical Pharmacist 12 5 Specialist Children’s  
Lead Informatics Pharmacist 22 15 General Teaching 
Paediatric Pharmacist 9 3 Specialist Children’s 
Ass Professor of Child Health 18 1 Specialist Children’s 
Consultant Paediatrician 19 1 Specialist Children’s 
Consultant Paediatrician 24 1 Specialist Children’s 
Consultant Neonatologist 19 0 Specialist Children’s 
Specialist Registrar 10 0 Specialist Children’s 
Consultant Paediatrician 30 0 General Teaching 
Sr Lec Paediatric Pharmacology 20 0 Specialist Children’s 
Consultant Paediatrician 20 14 General Teaching 
Consultant Neonatologist 20 0 General 
Consultant Paediatrician 19 10 General 
Consultant Paediatrician 17 4 General 
Consultant Paediatrician 19 0 General 
Consultant Paediatrician 14 0 General 
2.8.2 Exploratory Round 
Responses from each panel member were analysed.  Nine of the original 100 
indicators were rejected by the expert panel either because they would be 
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captured under the documentation errors or because practice across the UK 
varied to such an extent that the indicator was not a useful measure.  In most 
cases participants had included comments against indicators that they felt 
required amendment, either due to typography or minor wording changes.  
Indicators without comment were deemed suitable.  Participants also had the 
opportunity to suggest further indicators.  Of the 21 responses, 15 participants 
provided at least one further indicator with one respondent offering another 10 
indicators.  A total of 74 new unique indicators were suggested from within the 
responses.  Each new indicator was reviewed by the research team and either 
rejected or included for round 1 as either a new prescribing indicator or as a 
new documentation error using the inclusion/exclusion criteria.  Of these 74 
new indicators 34 were approved for inclusion in the round 1, 33 were rejected 
and 7 were approved as documentation errors (Table 2.2)   
Table 2.2 Results of exploratory round 
Outcome Number (n=74) 
Included 34 (46%) 
Rejected 33 (45%) 
Documentation Error 7 (9%) 
Following these amendments the final list of indicators was completed.  It 
contained 125 indicators, 91 from the original list circulated to the expert panel 
and 34 new indicators suggested by the panel (Table 2.5).  In addition seven 
further indicators were included in the list of documentation errors Appendix 
10. 
Table 2.3 summarises the error types that were described by the indicators.  
The error types of the expert panel suggestions are also summarised.  This 
shows a wide variety of error types and also indicates the expert panel’s 
engagement with the process. 
Table 2.3 Error types included in the indicators and those suggested by the expert panel 
Error Type Original Indicators Suggested Total 
Adverse Effect 9 
 
9 
Contraindication 12 1 13 
Wrong Dose 17 11 28 
Dose Frequency 10 5 15 
Dose/rate 2 1 3 
Drug Choice 5 
 
5 
Drug-Disease 0 2 2 
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Drug-Disease Interaction 1 
 
1 
Drug-Drug Interaction 15 3 18 
Drug-Food Interaction 1 
 
1 
Monitoring 4 4 8 
Omitted Drug 3 
 
3 
Other 2 5 7 
Route of Administration 1 0 1 
Therapeutic Duplication 8 1 9 
Treatment Duration 2 
 
2 
Grand Total 91 34 125 
2.8.3 Reasons for Exclusion 
Table 2.4 details the excluded indicators suggested by participants and the 
reasons for exclusion.  The most common reason was that the indicator was 
not specific and would be captured by the documentation errors.  Other 
reasons for exclusion included: description of a system attribute rather than an 
indicator, wide UK variation and an indicator that was not easily auditable. 
Errors of omission were excluded because they were unlikely to be amenable 
to decision support.  The current maturity of EP systems within UK hospitals 
was such that there are limited links between primary and secondary care.  
Only validated and secure links such as these or assessment of co-morbidities 
would make it possible to assess errors of omission on admission.  The need 
to focus on drug specific indicators to make the scoring by the expert panel as 
easy as possible and to identify those high risk errors most likely to be 
prevented by EP was felt to outweigh the addition of a large number of errors 
of omission. 
Table 2.4 Exploratory round - number of indicators excluded and reasons      continued 
Reason for 
Exclusion 
No 
Excluded 
Description Example(s) 
Documentation 
 
11 Indicator will be covered 
by the documentation 
error monitoring 
A “when required”  medication 
prescribed without an 
indication. 
A dose prescribed that is 
impossible to measure without 
further manipulation 
System 
attribute 
 
9 Proposed indicator was a 
desired attribute of an e-
prescribing system rather 
than an error 
Presentation of both adult and 
paediatric prescribing orders 
without filtering based on age 
of patient. 
 
 58 
 
Table 2.4 Exploratory round - number of indicators excluded and reasons      continued 
Reason for 
Exclusion 
No 
Excluded 
Description Example(s) 
Not Easily 
auditable 
6 Indicator no easily 
assessed easily within 
normal ward activity 
Delay in administration of 
vaccinations. 
Vancomycin prescribed 
intravenously for C. difficile 
UK Variation 6 Wide variation of policy 
or practice around UK 
secondary care 
Prescribing anti-convulsant by 
brand name. 
Not specific 
enough 
4 Indicator does not relate 
to a specific drug 
Prescribing based on actual 
weight rather than dosing 
weight 
Cause rather 
than error 
2 Indicator describes the 
cause of an error rather 
than an error 
Prescribing a dose from an 
out-of-date reference source 
Omission 2 Indicator describes an 
error of omission not 
included in study 
Inhalers not prescribed on 
admission 
Trigger 2 Indicator describes a 
trigger event which may 
or may not mean an 
error has occurred 
Strong opioids prescribed 
without naloxone 
Monitoring 2 Indicator describes an 
error in monitoring rather 
than prescribing 
Incorrect timing of digoxin 
levels 
Administration 1 Indicator describes an 
error in drug 
administration rather 
than prescribing 
Timing of IV antibiotics 
changed to awake times 
rather than optimal timings 
Rare use 1 Drug rarely used in the 
UK 
Prescription of triamcinolone 
without reference to the salt 
Poor evidence 1 Poor evidence that 
indicator is a medication 
error 
Phenytoin liquid prescribed to 
be administered concurrently 
with enteral feeds 
Discharge 
error 
1 Indicator relates to error 
occurring only at the 
point of discharge from 
hospital rather than the 
inpatient stay. 
Changing phosphate 
supplement on discharge e.g. 
from sodium 
glycerophosphate to 
Phosphate Sandoz® 
2.8.4 Documentation Errors 
As described above, during the development process for the indicators it 
became clear that non-drug specific error types were important to recognise.  
A group of these was identified during the indicator identification process and 
these are listed in Appendix 10.  The expert panel members were privy to 
these documentation errors during the exploratory round so as to make it clear 
to them that while they were not prescribing indicators, the intention was to 
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collect information on general errors during the evaluation.  Following 
comments from the expert panel, three of the original 20 documentation errors 
were removed either because they were too complex to capture easily, 
duplicated with another documentation error or because it was deemed 
suitable as a specific prescribing indicator.  The expert panel suggested eight 
further documentation errors, seven of which were included in the information 
for the subsequent eDelphi rounds and one was excluded as duplication.  The 
results of this process are also shown in Appendix 10 
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Table 2.5 Final list of indicators used for subsequent rounds of scoring.  Shaded indicators are those suggested by the expert panel.    Continued 
No Indicator BNFC Supporting Information Error Type 
1 Domperidone prescribed at > 1.2mg/kg/day max 
20mg (prolongation of QT interval, sudden 
cardiac death) 
1.3.0 Increased risk of arrhythmias and sudden 
cardiac death 
Dose 
2 Digoxin loading dose or frequency (oral or IV) 
prescribed incorrectly according to BNFC  
2.1.1 Risk of supratherapeutic doses increasing 
risk of adverse effects Dose 
3 Digoxin maintenance dose started too soon or 
too late after completion of loading doses. 
2.1.1 Risk of supratherapeutic doses increasing 
risk of adverse effects Dose 
4 Digoxin dose not reviewed in light of reduced 
renal function 
2.1.1 Risk of supratherapeutic doses increasing 
risk of adverse effects Monitoring 
5 Potassium-sparing diuretic (excluding 
aldosterone antagonists) prescribed to a patient 
also receiving an ACE inhibitor or angiotensin-II 
receptor antagonist (increased risk of severe 
hyperkalaemia) 
2.2.3 Increased risk of severe hyperkalaemia 
Drug-Drug Interaction 
6 Amiodarone prescribed to a patient with 
abnormal thyroid function tests (increased risk of 
thyroid disorders) 
2.3.2 Amiodarone can cause thyroid 
abnormalities 
Adverse Effect 
7 Beta-adrenoceptor blocking drug prescribed to a 
patient with asthma (increased risk of 
bronchospasm and acute deterioration) 
2.4.0 Beta-adrenoceptor blocking drugs are 
known to cause broncho-constriction in 
asthmatics, and can cause acute 
deterioration Adverse Effect 
8 ACE inhibitor or angiotensin-II receptor 
antagonist prescribed to a patient with a 
potassium level >5.0 mmol/litre (can cause or 
exacerbate hyperkalaemia) 
2.5.5 ACE inhibitors and angiotensin-II receptor 
antagonists can cause hyperkalaemia and 
are contraindicated in patients with a 
potassium concentration about the desired 
reference range Adverse Effect 
9 Low molecular weight heparin prescribed to be 
administered concomitantly with unfractionated 
heparin(increased risk of bleeding) 
2.8.1 Increased risk of bleeding 
Therapeutic Duplication 
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Table 2.5 Final list of indicators used for subsequent rounds of scoring.  Shaded indicators are those suggested by the expert panel.    Continued 
No Indicator BNFC Supporting Information Error Type 
10 Low molecular weight heparin prescribed to a 
patient with renal impairment without dose 
adjustment (increased risk of bleeding) 
2.8.1 Increased risk of bleeding with the dose of 
low molecular weight heparin is not adjusted 
for renal function Dose 
11 Low molecular weight heparin prescribed at the 
wrong frequency according to the BNFC or 
product literature 
2.8.1 Risk of supra or subtherapeutic levels of low 
molecular weight heparin 
Dose Frequency 
12 Warfarin prescribed to a patient with a concurrent 
bleeding problem (risk of bleeding) 
2.8.2 High risk of bleeding when warfarin 
prescribed to patients with a past medical 
history of bleeding disorders Contraindication 
13 Warfarin prescribed concomitantly with a NSAID 
(increased risk of bleeding) 
2.8.2 Increased risk of bleeding when co-
prescribed with NSAID Drug-Drug Interaction 
14 NSAID (excluding low dose aspirin) prescribed to 
a patient with chronic renal failure (increased risk 
of deteriorating renal function) 
2.8.2 Sodium and water retention may occur risk 
of decreasing renal function 
Adverse Effect 
15 NSAID prescribed to a patient with a history of 
peptic ulcer disease or gastrointestinal bleeding 
without  anti-secretory drugs or mucosal 
protectants (increased risk of peptic ulceration 
and bleeding) 
2.8.2 Risk of GI ulcer / Reflux 
Adverse Effect 
16 Antiplatelet  prescribed to a patient with a 
concurrent bleeding disorder (increased risk of 
bleeding) 
2.9.0 High risk of bleeding when antiplatelets 
prescribed to patients with a past medical 
history of bleeding disorders Contraindication 
17 Aspirin prescribed to pt <16 without appropriate 
indication (risk of Reye's syndrome) 
2.9.0 Risk of Reye's Syndrome 
Contraindication 
18 Prescribing of intravenous heparin infusion for 
treatment of thromboembolic event using the 
wrong dose or infusion rate based on local 
protocol (risk of toxicity or therapeutic failure) 
2.9.0 Risk of supratherapeutic or subtherapeutic 
dose of heparin 
Dose/rate 
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Table 2.5 Final list of indicators used for subsequent rounds of scoring.  Shaded indicators are those suggested by the expert panel.    Continued 
No Indicator BNFC Supporting Information Error Type 
19 Long-acting beta-2-agonist inhaler prescribed to 
a patient who is not also on an inhaled 
corticosteroid (evidence base - not in line with 
British Thoracic Society guidelines) 
3.1.1 Not in line with British Thoracic Society 
guidelines) 
Omitted Drug 
20 Prescribing of intravenous salbutamol infusion 
using the wrong dose or infusion rate (risk of 
toxicity or therapeutic failure) 
3.1.1 Risk of supratherapeutic or subtherapeutic 
dose of salbutamol 
Dose/Rate 
21 Ivacaftor co-prescribed with an interacting drug 
with no dose adjustment of interacting drug (risk 
of subtherapeutic levels of interacting drug) 
3.7.0 Risk of supratherapeutic or subtherapeutic 
levels of ivacaftor due to enzyme induction 
or inhibition Drug-Drug Interaction 
22 More than one paracetamol-containing product 
prescribed to be administered concomitantly 
(maximum dose exceeded) 
4.7.1 Concomitant prescribing of more than one 
paracetamol containing product can result in 
doses over the daily limit for the age group Therapeutic Duplication 
23 Codeine phosphate prescribed to a patient under 
the age of 12 (contraindicated) 
4.7.1 MHRA guidance restrict use of codeine in 
children due to risk of fatal toxicity Adverse Effect 
24 Tramadol prescribed concomitantly with 
antiepileptics (increased risk of seizures in 
patients with uncontrolled epilepsy) 
4.7.1 Increased risk of seizures 
Drug-Disease Interaction 
25 Two concomitant opiate analgesics that are not 
in line with the WHO pain ladder (injudicious use 
of two opiates risk of toxicity) 
4.7.1 Increased risk of opioid toxicity 
Therapeutic Duplication 
26 Regular opiates prescribed without concurrent 
use of laxatives (risk of severe constipation) 
4.7.2 Risk of severe constipation 
Adverse Effect 
27 Prescribing of incorrect or inequivalent morphine 
(opiate) dose via multiple routes. (risk of toxicity) 
4.7.2 Oral and intramuscular doses are not 
equivalent, risk of therapeutic failure or 
toxicity Therapeutic Duplication 
28 Phenytoin dose not reviewed in light of low 
albumin (potential for toxicity) 
4.8.1 Increased risk of phenytoin toxicity 
Monitoring 
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Table 2.5 Final list of indicators used for subsequent rounds of scoring.  Shaded indicators are those suggested by the expert panel.    Continued 
No Indicator BNFC Supporting Information Error Type 
29 Failure to increase dose of anticonvulsant in line 
with weight for epilepsy (increased risk of 
seizure) 
4.8.1 Increased risk of seizures 
Dose 
30 Prescribing an incorrect starting dose of 
lamotrigine when used in combination with 
sodium valproate (increased risk of ADR) 
4.8.1 Increased risk of adverse reaction in 
particular rashes 
Adverse Effect 
31 Clonazepam prescribed when clobazam required 
or vice versa 
4.8.1 Risk of incorrect dose of the wrong drug and 
subsequent toxicity or therapeutic failure Drug Choice 
32 Prophylactic  antimicrobials and treatment 
antimicrobials prescribed to be administered 
concomitantly (increased risk of resistance) 
5.0.0 Risk of antimicrobial resistance  
Therapeutic Duplication 
33 Penicillin containing compound prescribed to a 
penicillin allergic patient without reasoning (e.g. a 
non-allergy such as diarrhoea or vomiting 
entered as an allergy where the indication for 
penicillin is compelling) (risk of hypersensitivity 
reactions) 
5.1.1 Contraindicated in pts with history of 
penicillin allergy. Risk of hypersensitivity 
reaction 
Contraindication 
34 Dose change for metronidazole not made when 
switching from an IV dose >400mg to oral (risk of 
overdose) 
5.1.11 Increased risk of supratherapeutic dose of 
metronidazole 
Dose 
35 Quinolone antibiotic prescribed to a patient who 
is also receiving theophylline (possible increased 
theophylline level ) 
5.1.12 Possible increased theophylline level 
Drug-Drug Interaction 
36 Quinolone antibiotic prescribed to a patient with 
epilepsy (increased risk of seizure threshold 
being reduced) 
5.1.12 Quinolone antibacterials lower the seizure 
threshold 
Contraindication 
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Table 2.5 Final list of indicators used for subsequent rounds of scoring.  Shaded indicators are those suggested by the expert panel.    Continued 
No Indicator BNFC Supporting Information Error Type 
37 Oral quinolone antibacterial prescribed at the 
same time as iron (reduced absorption of 
quinolones) 
5.1.12 Iron reduces the absorption of quinolone 
antibacterials. At last 4 hours should 
separate the administration of a quinolone 
and iron Drug-Drug Interaction 
38 Oral Quinolones and enteral feeds prescribed 
concomitantly (risk of treatment failure with 
quinolone) 
5.1.12 Reduced absorption of quinolone 
Drug-Food Interaction 
39 Intravenous ciprofloxacin prescribed twice daily 
instead of three times a day in children over 1 
month old (risk of therapeutic failure) 
5.1.12 Risk of subtherapeutic levels of 
ciprofloxacin 
Dose Frequency 
40 Nitrofurantoin prescribed to a patient with renal 
impairment, avoid if eGFR <60ml/minute/1.73m2 
(risk of peripheral neuropathy and inadequate 
concentration in urine) 
5.1.13 Risk of peripheral neuropathy and reduced 
therapeutic effect 
Contraindication 
41 Ceftriaxone prescribed at a total daily dose of 
50mg/kg instead of 80mg/kg for severe 
infection/sepsis in a patient > 1 month of age 
(risk of under dosage) 
5.1.2 Potential subtherapeutic dose for severe 
infection/sepsis 
Dose 
42 Meropenem prescribed at a dose of 20mg/kg 
instead of 40mg/kg  for meningitis or respiratory 
exacerbation of CF (potential under treatment) 
5.1.2 Potential subtherapeutic dose for severe 
infection/sepsis 
Dose 
43 Co-prescribing of meropenem with sodium 
valproate (increased risk of seizure) 
5.1.2 Reduction in valproate levels leading to 
increased risk of seizure Drug-Drug Interaction 
44 Gentamicin prescribed to a patient with  at least 
mild renal impairment without dose frequency 
adjustment (increased risk of toxicity) 
5.1.4 Increased risk of toxicity 
Dose 
45 Gentamicin prescribed at a dose exceeding 
maximum stated in local protocol e.g. 
7mg/kg/day to a child > 1month (risk of toxicity) 
5.1.4 Increased risk of toxicity 
Dose 
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Table 2.5 Final list of indicators used for subsequent rounds of scoring.  Shaded indicators are those suggested by the expert panel.    Continued 
No Indicator BNFC Supporting Information Error Type 
46 Gentamicin dose calculated based on actual 
body weight rather than ideal body weight in an 
obese patient (risk of excessive dosing and 
toxicity) 
5.1.4 Risk of excessive dosing and toxicity 
Dose 
47 Gentamicin prescribed at a dose exceeding 
5mg/kg/dose to a neonate (risk of toxicity) 
5.1.4 Increased risk of toxicity 
Dose 
48 Macrolide antibacterial prescribed concomitantly 
with warfarin without appropriate dose 
adjustment or increased INR monitoring 
(increased risk of bleeding) 
5.1.5 Macrolide antibacterials can reduce the 
metabolism of warfarin, causing an increase 
in the INR and an increased risk of bleeding 
Drug-Drug Interaction 
49 Co-prescribing of macrolides with interacting drug 
(QT prolongation) 
5.1.5 Risk of prolongation of QT interval and 
ventricular arrhythmia Drug-Drug Interaction 
50 Co-prescribing of a macrolide with domperidone 
(QT prolongation) 
5.1.5 Risk of prolongation of QT interval and 
ventricular arrhythmia Drug-Drug Interaction 
51 Co-prescribing of a macrolide with an 
anticonvulsant (risk of toxicity or subtherapeutic 
levels) 
5.1.5 Risk of supratherapeutic or subtherapeutic 
levels of anticonvulsant 
Drug-Drug Interaction 
52 Co-prescribing of a macrolide with ciclosporin or 
tacrolimus (increases plasma levels of anti-
rejection agent) 
5.1.5 Increased plasma concentration of 
ciclosporin 
Drug-Drug Interaction 
53 Co-prescribing of a macrolide with midazolam 
(risk of sedation) 
5.1.5 Increased risk of sedation 
Drug-Drug Interaction 
54 Vancomycin prescribed intravenously to a patient 
with at least mild renal impairment without dose 
adjustment (increased risk of toxicity) 
5.1.7 Increased risk of toxicity 
Dose 
55 Vancomycin prescribed intravenously over less 
than 60 minutes (rapid infusion of vancomycin 
can cause severe reactions) 
5.1.7 Increased risk of infusion reactions 
Adverse Effect 
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Table 2.5 Final list of indicators used for subsequent rounds of scoring.  Shaded indicators are those suggested by the expert panel.    Continued 
No Indicator BNFC Supporting Information Error Type 
56 Rifampicin co-prescribed with an interacting drug 
with no dose adjustment of interacting drug (risk 
of subtherapeutic levels of interacting drug) 
5.1.9 Risk of subtherapeutic levels of interacting 
drug due to enzyme induction 
Drug-Drug Interaction 
57 Fluconazole prescribed more frequently than 
every 72 hours for a neonate < 14 days old (risk 
of toxicity) 
5.2.1 Increased risk of toxic effects, Neonates 
have a 72 or 48 hour frequency based on 
age. Dose Frequency 
58 Fluconazole prescribed as standard dose from 
day 2 of treatment in a patient with an estimated 
GFR of < 50 ml/min/1.73m2 (risk of toxicity, 
normally halve dose after first day) 
5.2.1 Increased risk of toxic effects. Patients with 
renal failure <50ml/min/1.73m2 have 
standard dose for one dose then halved. 
Dose Frequency 
59 Fluconazole prescribed more frequently than 
every 48 hours for a neonate between 14 and 28 
days old (risk of toxicity) 
5.2.1 Increased risk of toxic effects.  Neonates 
have a 72 or 48 hour frequency based on 
age. Dose Frequency 
60 Amphotericin B prescribed without additionally 
stating both brand name and the dose in mg/kg 
(risk of fatal overdose due to confusion between 
lipid based and non-lipid)  
5.2.3 Specification of brand name to reduce risk 
of wrong formulation being administered 
and resulting toxicity 
Other 
61 Failure to adjust dose or frequency of ganciclovir 
in the presence of altered renal function (risk of 
toxicity or treatment failure) 
5.3.2 Risk of supratherapeutic or subtherapeutic 
levels of ganciclovir 
Dose Frequency 
62 Soluble insulin prescribed to a patient on a when 
required basis (increased risk of serious 
episodes of hypoglycaemia and nocturnal 
hypoglycaemia post dose) 
6.1.1 Increased risk of serious episodes of 
hypoglycaemia and nocturnal 
hypoglycaemia especially if given more than 
1 stat dose. Not managing the long-term 
condition Dose Frequency 
63 Insulin prescribed to a patient at an inappropriate 
time, allowing for an administration without food 
(except once daily long-acting insulins) 
(increased risk of hypoglycaemia) 
6.1.1 Insulin should be prescribed at meal times 
to avoid the risk of hypoglycaemia 
Dose Frequency 
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Table 2.5 Final list of indicators used for subsequent rounds of scoring.  Shaded indicators are those suggested by the expert panel.    Continued 
No Indicator BNFC Supporting Information Error Type 
64 Oral prednisolone and intravenous 
hydrocortisone prescribed to be administered 
concomitantly simultaneously (risk of toxicity) 
6.3.2 Increased risk of adverse effects  
Therapeutic Duplication 
65 Oral prednisolone and steroid inhalers prescribed 
to be administered concomitantly (risk of toxicity) 
6.3.2 Increased risk of adverse effects  
Therapeutic Duplication 
66 Prednisolone EC prescribed for patient with 
Inflammatory Bowel Disease (reduced absorption 
of prednisolone) 
6.3.2 Reduced absorption of predinsolone 
Contraindication 
67 Desmopressin prescribed for nocturnal enuresis 
at any other time than at bedtime (risk of fluid 
overload) 
6.5.2 Risk of over hydration 
Dose Frequency 
68 Dose reduction of immunosuppressant not made 
despite low White Cell Count (risk of 
neutropenia) 
8.0.0 Increased risk of neutropenia and 
subsequent infection, (list of common 
immunosuppressants will be included during 
data collection) Monitoring 
69 Failure to prescribe folinic acid rescue therapy 
following high dose methotrexate chemotherapy 
(risk of methotrexate toxicity) 
8.1.0 Risk of methotrexate toxicity 
Omitted Drug 
70 Failure to prescribe mesna for patients receiving 
alkylating agents (risk of toxic symptoms) 
8.1.0 Risk of bladder toxicity 
Omitted Drug 
71 Methotrexate prescribed to a patient with a 
clinically significant drop in white cell count or 
platelet count (risk of bone marrow suppression) 
8.1.3 Risk of bone marrow suppression 
Monitoring 
72 Oral methotrexate prescribed to a patient with an 
inappropriate frequency (increased risk of 
toxicity) 
8.1.3 Oral methotrexate should be dosed ONCE 
WEEKLY, and the prescription clear as to 
which day of the week this should be Dose Frequency 
73 Methotrexate prescribed to a patient with 
abnormal liver function tests (risk of liver toxicity) 
8.1.3 Risk of liver toxicity 
Contraindication 
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Table 2.5 Final list of indicators used for subsequent rounds of scoring.  Shaded indicators are those suggested by the expert panel.    Continued 
No Indicator BNFC Supporting Information Error Type 
74 Methotrexate prescribed concomitantly with 
trimethoprim (increased risk of haematological 
toxicity) 
8.1.3 Trimethoprim suppresses activity of 
dihydrofolate reductase - potential for 
additive effect to produce folate deficiency. 
Increased risk of haematological toxicity 
when methotrexate given with trimethoprim 
(including trimethoprim containing 
compound - co-trimoxazole) Contraindication 
75 Methotrexate prescribed to be administered on 
the same day as folic acid (reduced efficacy of 
methotrexate) 
8.1.3 Concomitant administration of folic acid with 
methotrexate will reduce efficacy of 
methotrexate Contraindication 
76 Allopurinol prescribed concomitantly with 
azathioprine (allopurinol enhances effect of 
azathioprine and increases risk of toxicity) 
8.1.3 Increased risk of toxicity and enhanced 
effects of azathioprine when given 
concomitantly.  The dose of mercaptopurine 
should be one quarter of usual dose Drug-Drug Interaction 
77 Allopurinol prescribed concomitantly with 
mercaptopurine (allopurinol enhances effect of 
mercaptopurine and increases risk of toxicity) 
8.1.3 Increased risk of toxicity and enhanced 
effects of mercaptopurine when given 
concomitantly.  The dose of mercaptopurine 
should be one quarter of usual dose Drug-Drug Interaction 
78 Tacrolimus prescribed without reference to brand 
name (variation in pharmacokinetics and dosing) 
8.2.2 Risk of subtherapeutic levels due to 
differences in pharmacokinetics Other 
79 Calcium resonium prescribed when the 
potassium concentration is within the desired 
reference range (3.5–5.3 mmol/litre) (risk of 
hypokalaemia) 
9.2.1 Calcium resonium should be stopped when 
the potassium concentration is within the 
desired reference range, as it continues to 
work for a few days once discontinued Treatment Duration 
80 Potassium chloride supplements continued for 
longer than is required  (based on age 
appropriate local reference ranges approx 3.5–
5.3 mmol/litre) (increased risk of hyperkalaemia) 
9.2.1.1 Failure to act on potassium chloride 
monitoring and continuing treatment for 
longer than required risks hyperkalaemia 
Treatment Duration 
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Table 2.5 Final list of indicators used for subsequent rounds of scoring.  Shaded indicators are those suggested by the expert panel.    Continued 
No Indicator BNFC Supporting Information Error Type 
81 Prescribing of sodium chloride 0.18% with 
glucose 4% solutions as post-operative 
intravenous fluid (risk of cerebral oedema) 
9.2.2 Risk of cerebral oedema 
Drug Choice 
82 Potassium chloride infusions exceeding 40 
mmol/litre prescribed to administered via the 
peripheral route (peripheral administration risks 
venous pooling, which can lead to sudden high 
concentrations of potassium chloride being 
delivered to the heart provoking an arrhythmia)  
9.2.2 Intravenous administration of potassium 
chloride solutions exceeding 40mmol/litre 
should be prescribed via the central route to 
avoid arrhythmias 
Route of Administration 
83 Incorrect stock parenteral nutrition bag 
prescribed based on local protocol 
9.3.0 Risk of inappropriate nutrition 
Drug Choice 
84 More than one NSAID prescribed to a patient at a 
time (increased risk of bleeding) 
10.1.1 Increased risk of bleeding when more than 
one NSAID is prescribed.  Therapeutic Duplication 
85 Baclofen dose not reduced in response to 
decreased renal function (eGFR < 90 
ml/min/1.73m2) 
10.2.2 Increased risk of toxic effects 
Dose 
86 Live vaccine prescribed to an 
immunosuppressed patient, including those on 
corticosteroids (increased risk of reaction or 
infection) 
14.0.0 Risk of reaction/infection 
Contraindication 
87 Prescribing the incorrect vaccines for childhood 
immunisation based on the current vaccination 
guidelines (risk of serious childhood infection) 
14.1.0 Lack of immunity for serious  childhood 
infections  
Drug Choice 
88 Midazolam prescribed for procedural sedation at 
a dose inappropriate for the route of 
administration 
15.1.4 Risk of supratherapeutic or subtherapeutic 
dose of midazolam 
Dose 
89 Acetylcysteine prescribed at a dose inconsistent 
with the product literature for paracetamol 
poisoning 
General Risk of sub or supratherapeutic doses with 
treatment failure or toxicity 
Dose 
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Table 2.5 Final list of indicators used for subsequent rounds of scoring.  Shaded indicators are those suggested by the expert panel.    Continued 
No Indicator BNFC Supporting Information Error Type 
90 Dose change for ciprofloxacin not made when 
switching from IV to oral (risk of overdose) 
5.1.12 Risk of supratherapeutic dose of 
ciprofloxacin Dose 
91 A prescription for a drug for a patient with a 
known allergy to that drug (risk of anaphylaxis) 
General Risk of anaphylaxis 
Contraindication 
92 Dose of paracetamol prescribed inappropriate for 
route of administration (potential overdose due to 
change in route or misreading of BNFC) 
4.7.1 Risk of paracetamol overdose 
Dose 
93 Amiodarone prescribed to a patient on digoxin 
without review of the digoxin dose 
2.3.2 Risk of digoxin toxicity 
Drug-Drug Interaction 
94 Caffeine citrate maintenance dose prescribed to 
start too soon or too late after loading dose 
(should be 24 hours) 
3.5.1 Risk of sub or supra therapeutic dose 
Dose Frequency 
95 Oral quinolone prescribed to be administered at 
the same time as an oral calcium 
5.1.12 Risk of treatment failure 
Drug-Drug Interaction 
96 Ceftriaxone prescribed at a dose greater than 
50mg/kg in a patient < 1month old 
5.1.2 Risk of supratherapeutic dose of 
Ceftriaxone Dose 
97 Aciclovir prescribed to a patient with at least mild 
renal impairment without dose adjustment 
5.3.2 Increased risk of toxicity 
Monitoring 
98 Desmopressin nasal formulation prescribed for 
nocturnal enuresis (increased incidence of side 
effects) 
6.5.2 Risk of toxicity due to increased 
bioavailability of nasal formulation 
Contraindication 
99 Dose of cefotaxime exceeding  200mg/kg/day in 
patients <4 weeks old 
5.1.2 Risk of toxicity 
Dose 
100 Amiodarone loading dose prescribed incorrectly 
according to BNFC 
2.3.2 Risk of sub or supra therapeutic dose 
Dose 
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Table 2.5 Final list of indicators used for subsequent rounds of scoring.  Shaded indicators are those suggested by the expert panel.    Continued 
No Indicator BNFC Supporting Information Error Type 
101 Aciclovir prescribed at a dose of 250mg/m2 
instead of 500mg/m2 for herpes simplex 
encephalitis in patients aged between 3 months 
and 12 years 
5.3.2 Risk of treatment failure 
Dose 
102 Thiopurines (azathioprine and 6MP) prescription 
in presence of abnormal liver function tests (LFTs 
will be defined) 
8.1.3 Increased risk of toxicity 
Monitoring 
103 Intravenous aminophylline prescribed without 
appropriate monitoring or adjustment of dose in 
relation to theophylline levels 
3.1.3 Risk of sub or supra therapeutic levels 
Monitoring 
104 Ranitidine dose not altered when switching 
between oral and IV routes 
1.3.1 Risk of sub or supra therapeutic doses 
Dose 
105 IV cefuroxime prescribed using the oral dose 
(20mg/kg/dose twice daily) 
5.1.2 Subtherapeutic dose leading to potential 
treatment failure Dose 
106 Gabapentin prescribed without gradually 
increasing the dose 
4.8.1 Increased risk of toxicity 
Dose 
107 Theophylline prescribed without reference to the 
brand 
3.1.3 Risk of sub or supratherapeutic doses and 
subsequent treatment failure or toxicity Other 
108 Furosemide prescribed twice daily in neonates < 
31 weeks gestational age 
2.2.2 Risk of toxicity 
Dose Frequency 
109 Prescription for beclometasone inhaler without 
reference to the brand 
3.2.0 Difference in bioavailability between Qvar 
and Clenil brands.  Risk of toxicity or 
treatment failure Other 
110 Prescription for Intramuscular ceftriaxone without 
co-prescription of lidocaine for reconstitution 
5.1.2 Lidocaine used to prepare ceftriaxone and 
reduce pain at injection site.   Other 
111 Concomitant prescription of 
ibuprofen/indometacin and hydrocortisone in 
neonatal patient 
2.14.0 Risk of spontaneous gastrointestinal 
perforation 
Drug-Drug Interaction 
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Table 2.5 Final list of indicators used for subsequent rounds of scoring.  Shaded indicators are those suggested by the expert panel.    Continued 
No Indicator BNFC Supporting Information Error Type 
112 Co - prescribing of nebulised tobramycin and 
intravenous tobramycin in CF patients 
5.1.4 Risk of toxicity 
Therapeutic Duplication 
113 Prescription of NSAIDS in suspected toxic shock 
syndrome (contraindicated but patients are 
pyrexial) 
10.1.1 Risk of enhanced cytokine release 
contributing to shock, organ failure etc 
Drug-Disease 
114 Regular prescription of anti-pyretic in paediatric 
oncology patients 
4.7.1 Risk of masking neutropenic sepsis 
Drug-Disease 
115 Maintenance fluids prescribed such that >3litres 
of fluid would be administered in 24 hours 
9.2.2 Exceeds maximum adult maintenance fluid 
Dose/Rate 
116 Failure to increase of hydrocortisone to “sick day 
doses” from “maintenance” doses in those 
adrenally suppressed 
6.3.2 Reduces risk of shock 
Dose 
117 Prescription of mycophenolate with no reference 
to salt or brand 
8.2.2 Risk of sub or supratherapeutic levels 
Other 
118 Failure to increase dose of prophylactic 
trimethoprim with increasing weight 
5.1.13 Risk of sub therapeutic levels and treatment 
failure Dose 
119 Failure to increase frequency of IV 
benzylpenicillin over the first 5 weeks of life 
5.1.1 Risk of treatment failure 
Dose Frequency 
120 Failure to increase frequency of oral or IV 
flucloxacillin over the first 4 weeks of life  
5.1.1 Risk of treatment failure 
Dose Frequency 
121 Failure to increase the frequency of IV 
cefotaxime over the first 4 weeks of life 
5.1.2 Risk of treatment failure 
Dose Frequency 
122 Sodium supplements continued for longer than is 
required  (based on age appropriate local 
reference ranges approx 135 - 145 mmol/litre) 
(increased risk of hypernatraemia) 
9.2.1 Risk of hypernatraemia 
Monitoring 
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Table 2.5 Final list of indicators used for subsequent rounds of scoring.  Shaded indicators are those suggested by the expert panel.    Continued 
No Indicator BNFC Supporting Information Error Type 
123 Prescribing caffeine using base rather than salt 
i.e. caffeine rather than caffeine citrate (risk of 
sub-therapeutic dosing) 
3.5.1 Risk of subtherapeutic dosing 
Other 
124 Dose value of alfacalcidol in nanograms 
expressed as micrograms 
9.6.4 Risk of 1000 time overdose 
Dose 
125 Prescribing a fluid containing dextrose rather 
than glucose 
9.2.2 Risk of confusion at drug 
selection/administration stage  Drug Choice 
BNFC = British National Formulary for Children, ACE – Angiotensin Converting Enzyme, NSAID = Non-Steroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drug, WHO = World Health Organization, 
ADR = Adverse Drug Reaction, CF = Cystic Fibrosis, GFR = Glomerular Filtration Rate, EC = Enteric Coated, 6MP = 6-Mercaptopurine 
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2.9 Discussion 
This chapter has described the process of development of a list of prescribing 
indicators that were subsequently reviewed by an expert panel for both 
severity and likelihood (as reported in Chapter 3).  The process of 
development involved the generation of an initial list of indicators from a range 
of sources and the additional comments and suggestions from the expert 
panel who reviewed this initial list.  The resulting list contained 125 indicators. 
The inclusion and exclusion criteria for the indicators meant that they had to 
relate to specific drugs.  In the paediatric setting the most common prescribing 
error is widely reported as being wrong dose. It is impossible to capture all 
wrong dose prescribing errors using specific prescribing indicators as this 
would require an indicator for every possible drug; however, it is important to 
be able to identify these errors as easily as possible when studying the impact 
of an electronic prescribing system.  This problem was resolved by the 
development of the documentation errors.  Providing the expert panel with the 
assurance that general dosing errors would be captured using these 
documentation errors enabled them to focus on drug specific indicators that 
were likely to cause harm.  The indicators did include wrong dose errors, but 
these were attributed to drugs such as gentamicin, enoxaparin, and the 
antimicrobials which had been identified during the development process. 
Table 2.3 shows the distribution of the indicators by error type.  The most 
common error type was wrong dose.  This is to be expected as it has been 
widely reported that the most common prescribing error type in paediatrics is 
wrong dose.30, 39, 96  Interestingly, it was also the most common new indicator 
suggested by panel members, implying experience of this type of error is 
relatively common.  The next most common error types were drug-drug 
interactions (n=18), dose frequency (n=15) and contraindication (n=13).  In the 
case of interactions and contraindications the majority of these indicators 
came from the adult work.90  The relatively high number of dose frequency 
errors could be accounted for by two reasons.  Firstly, it may be difficult to 
separately categorise wrong dose errors from dose frequency errors and as 
stated above wrong dose errors are very common in children.  Secondly, dose 
frequencies change more often in paediatrics.  This is shown in several of the 
indicators relating to the neonatal period where the frequency (but not dose) 
of benzylpenicillin and flucloxacillin increases over the first four weeks of life. 
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2.10 Limitations 
One possible limitation of this exercise is that not all possible prescribing 
indicators have been identified.  The risk of this was minimised by using a 
combination of sources for potential indicators including both adult and 
paediatric literature as well as information from the NRLS which included 
60,000 medication errors.39  In order to further extend the scope of the 
indicators the expert panel members were asked to provide further indicators.  
It is clear from the results that the panel were entirely engaged by this process 
with 15 of them suggesting at least one new indicator and altogether 74 new 
indicators of which 34 were included in the final list.  
Another limitation was the exclusion of indicators that were not amenable to 
decision support.  The most common indicator suggested by the expert panel 
of this type were errors of omission.  Reasons for excluding this type of 
indicator include the fact that they are unlikely to be amenable to decision 
support.  As EP systems evolve it is likely that they will become advanced 
enough to identify these types of errors.  The indicators should be reviewed at 
regular periods taking into account both the maturity of EP systems and newly 
identified prescribing errors or drugs. 
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Chapter 3 eDelphi Scoring and Consensus 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the methodology and results obtained from the eDelphi 
process using the indicator list described in Chapter 2.  The aim was to 
develop a set of high risk paediatric prescribing indicators for use as an 
evaluation tool for EP systems. 
3.2 Method 
The development of the initial indicator list, execution of the exploratory round 
and subsequent results is described in Chapter 2.  This resulted in a list of 125 
prescribing indicators (Table 2.5).  Figure 3.1 shows the eDelphi process in 
full together with a timeline. 
 
Figure 3.1 - Diagrammatic representation of eDelphi process 
3.2.1 Research Approval 
The method used in this work was exactly the same as that used by the team 
who developed the adult indicators.  In that case ethical approval was not 
required as the project was not deemed to be research.  Retrospective 
assessment using the HRA online tool confirmed this.  At the time the study 
took place the HRA were not in existence.  
 77 
 
3.2.2 Round 1 
An Excel spreadsheet containing a list of all the indicators developed from the 
exploratory round was circulated via email to each panel member (see Table 
2.1  for constituency of panel) together with a set of clear instructions on how 
to rate each indicator (Appendix 13) . 
Panellists were asked to rate each indicator for its likelihood of occurrence 
and severity of harm should it occur.  The scoring system used was based on 
the National Patient Safety Agency scale in common use in UK hospitals.115 
The indicators defined in Chapter 2 described specific circumstances where a 
prescribing error might occur, rather than describing an actual error.  The 
respondents were asked to consider the likelihood of the prescribing error 
defined by the indicator to occur and the subsequent severity of the resulting 
harm. 
Likelihood scoring – Table 3.1 shows the scoring for degrees of likelihood 
from rare to almost certain.  Panellists were asked to decide how likely it was 
for a specific prescribing indicator to occur. 
Table 3.1 Likelihood scoring and descriptors
115
 
Likelihood 
Score 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Description 
Rare 
This will 
probably 
never occur 
Unlikely 
Do not 
expect it to 
occur but it 
is possible it 
may do so 
Possible 
This might 
occasionally 
occur 
Likely 
This will 
probably 
occur 
 
Almost 
Certain 
This will 
undoubtedly 
occur, possibly 
frequently 
Severity Scoring - Table 3.2 shows the scoring for various degrees of severity 
from insignificant to catastrophic.  Panellists were asked to score each 
indicator based on the severity of the consequences to the patient, should the 
prescribing error reach the patient. 
Table 3.2 Severity scoring and descriptors
115
 
Severity 
Score 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Description 
Insignificant 
No risk of 
patient injury 
or harm and 
no intervention 
required 
Minor 
Minor injury 
or illness 
requiring 
minor 
intervention 
Moderate 
Moderate 
injury 
requiring 
intervention 
Major 
Major 
injury or 
illness 
leading to 
long-term 
incapacity / 
disability 
Catastrophic 
Leads to 
death, multiple 
permanent 
injuries or 
irreversible 
health effects 
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On receipt of each panellist’s scores the results were entered onto a second 
spreadsheet for analysis.  Each indicator had two scores one for likelihood 
and one for severity.  These were then combined to produce a risk score 
between 1 and 4 using the risk assessment table (Table 3.3).  For example a 
likelihood score of 2 and a severity score of 4 would give a risk score of 3 
(high risk).  This table was used to simplify all the possible combinations of 
likelihood and severity into four grades of risk.  
Table 3.3 - Risk scoring matrix.  Key: 1 = low, 2= medium, 3 = high, 4 = extreme. 
  Severity 
Likelihood 1 2 3 4 5 
5 2 3 4 4 4 
4 2 3 3 4 4 
3 1 2 3 3 4 
2 1 2 2 3 3 
1 1 1 1 2 2 
A risk score from each panellist for each indicator was calculated in this way.   
The median risk scores for each indicator were then calculated, allowing the 
indicators to be divided into risk groups, based on their median risk scores.   
3.2.3 Round 2 
For Round 2 an individualised Excel spreadsheet was created for each 
panellist.  It contained the same list of indicators from Round 1, the individual 
panel member’s severity and likelihood scores and the median severity and 
likelihood scores from Round 1.  Panel members were then asked to review 
their original scores in light of the median scores of the group.  Following 
receipt of the Round 2 scores, the same process was undertaken with the 
scores to create a risk score and median severity and likelihood scores. 
3.2.4 Consensus 
Level of consensus was determined by analysing the median risk scores.  
Indicators with a median risk score of 3 or 4 and at least 80% consensus i.e. 
80% of respondents were in agreement, were considered to have achieved an 
adequate level of consensus.  This level of agreement was chosen as it had 
been previously used in the work published by Thomas et al90 and was also 
described by Nair et al116 as one of the methods of determining consensus 
particularly when quantitative data was being collected rather than qualitative. 
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3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Round 1 
The first round of scoring was completed by 21 panel members.  Seventy four 
of the indicators achieved high risk scores (3 or 4).  There were 11 indicators 
that had achieved at least 80% consensus of which 8 were in the high risk 
group. 
3.3.2 Round 2 
The second round of scoring was completed by all 21 panellists.  Eighty six of 
the indicators achieved high risk scores.  There were 57 indicators that 
achieved at least 80% consensus of which 41 were also considered high risk; 
these are summarised in Table 3.4.  None of the indicators were assessed as 
extreme risk by the panellists.  A full list of all 125 indicators and their 
consensus scores are shown in Appendix 14. 
The 41 indicators included 34 different drugs or classes from the following 
therapeutic groups: gastrointestinal (n=1), cardiovascular (n=7), respiratory 
(n=1), central nervous system (n=3), antimicrobials (n=10), endocrine (n=2), 
immunosuppression (n=6), fluids and electrolytes (n=1), musculoskeletal 
(n=2) and anaesthesia (n=1).  
The most frequent error type identified as high risk was dosing (n= 19) with 
drug-drug interactions (n=7) and clinical contraindications (n=6) the next two 
most frequent error types. 
  
8
0 
Table 3.4 Final list of 41 paediatric prescribing indicators with high risk and greater than 80% consensus              continued 
Indicator Possible Outcome Therapeutic Class Error Type 
Level of 
Consensus 
 
Domperidone prescribed at > 1.2mg/kg/day max 
20mg (prolongation of QT interval, sudden 
cardiac death) 
Increased risk of arrhythmias and 
sudden cardiac death 
Gastrointestinal Dosing 86% 
Prescription of NSAIDS in suspected toxic 
shock syndrome (contraindicated but patients 
are pyrexial) 
Risk of enhanced cytokine release 
contributing to shock, organ failure etc 
Musculoskeletal Clinical 
Contraindicatio
n 
81% 
Baclofen dose not reduced in response to 
decreased renal function (eGFR < 90 
ml/min/1.73m2) 
Increased risk of toxic effects Musculoskeletal Dosing 90% 
Midazolam prescribed for procedural sedation at 
a dose inappropriate for the route of 
administration 
Risk of supratherapeutic or 
subtherapeutic dose of midazolam 
Anaesthesia Dosing 81% 
Digoxin dose not reviewed in light of reduced 
renal function 
Risk of supratherapeutic doses 
increasing risk of adverse effects 
Cardiovascular Dosing 95% 
Potassium-sparing diuretic (excluding 
aldosterone antagonists) prescribed to a patient 
also receiving an ACE inhibitor or angiotensin-II 
receptor antagonist (increased risk of severe 
hyperkalaemia) 
Increased risk of severe hyperkalaemia Cardiovascular Drug-Drug 
Interaction 
90% 
Amiodarone prescribed to a patient on digoxin 
without review of the digoxin dose 
Risk of digoxin toxicity Cardiovascular Drug-Drug 
Interaction 
81% 
Beta-adrenoceptor blocking drug prescribed to 
a patient with asthma (increased risk of 
bronchospasm and acute deterioration) 
Beta-adrenoceptor blocking drugs are 
known to cause bronchoconstriction in 
asthmatics, and can cause acute 
deterioration 
Cardiovascular Clinical 
Contraindicatio
n 
81% 
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Table 3.4 Final list of 41 paediatric prescribing indicators with high risk and greater than 80% consensus              continued 
Indicator Possible Outcome Therapeutic Class Error Type 
Level of 
Consensus 
 
Low molecular weight heparin prescribed to a 
patient with renal impairment without dose 
adjustment (increased risk of bleeding) 
Increased risk of bleeding with the dose 
of low molecular weight heparin is not 
adjusted for renal function 
Cardiovascular Dosing 86% 
Antiplatelet  prescribed to a patient with a 
concurrent bleeding disorder (increased risk of 
bleeding) 
High risk of bleeding when antiplatelets 
prescribed to patients with a past 
medical history of bleeding disorders 
Cardiovascular Clinical 
Contraindicatio
n 
81% 
Prescribing of intravenous heparin infusion for 
treatment of thromboembolic event using the 
wrong dose or infusion rate based on local 
protocol (risk of toxicity or therapeutic failure) 
Risk of supratherapeutic or 
subtherapeutic dose of heparin 
Cardiovascular Dosing 86% 
Prescribing of intravenous salbutamol infusion 
using the wrong dose or infusion rate (risk of 
toxicity or therapeutic failure) 
Risk of supratherapeutic or 
subtherapeutic dose of salbutamol 
Respiratory Dosing 81% 
Two concomitant opiate analgesics that are not 
in line with the WHO pain ladder (injudicious 
use of two opiates risk of toxicity) 
Increased risk of opioid toxicity CNS Therapeutic 
Duplication 
86% 
Dose of paracetamol prescribed inappropriate 
for route of administration (potential overdose 
due to change in route or misreading of BNFC) 
Risk of paracetamol overdose CNS Dosing 81% 
Prescribing of incorrect or inequivalent 
morphine (opiate) dose via multiple routes. (risk 
of toxicity) 
Oral and intramuscular doses are not 
equivalent, risk of therapeutic failure or 
toxicity 
CNS Dosing 81% 
Phenytoin dose not reviewed in light of low 
albumin (potential for toxicity) 
Increased risk of phenytoin toxicity CNS Dosing 86% 
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Table 3.4 Final list of 41 paediatric prescribing indicators with high risk and greater than 80% consensus              continued 
Indicator Possible Outcome Therapeutic Class Error Type 
Level of 
Consensus 
 
Penicillin containing compound prescribed to a 
penicillin allergic patient without reasoning (e.g. 
a non-allergy such as diarrhoea or vomiting 
entered as an allergy where the indication for 
penicillin is compelling) (risk of hypersensitivity 
reactions) 
Contraindicated in pts with history of 
penicillin allergy. Risk of 
hypersensitivity reaction 
Anti-Microbial Allergy 81% 
Nitrofurantoin prescribed to a patient with renal 
impairment, avoid if eGFR <60ml/minute/1.73m2 
(risk of peripheral neuropathy and inadequate 
concentration in urine) 
Risk of peripheral neuropathy and 
reduced therapeutic effect 
Anti-Microbial Dosing 80% 
Ceftriaxone prescribed at a total daily dose of 
50mg/kg instead of 80mg/kg for severe 
infection/sepsis in a patient > 1 month of age 
(risk of under dosage) 
Potential subtherapeutic dose for 
severe infection/sepsis 
Anti-Microbial Dosing 90% 
Meropenem prescribed at a dose of 20mg/kg 
instead of 40mg/kg  for meningitis or respiratory 
exacerbation of CF (potential under treatment) 
Potential subtherapeutic dose for 
severe infection/sepsis 
Anti-Microbial Dosing 86% 
Gentamicin prescribed to a patient with  at least 
mild renal impairment without dose frequency 
adjustment (increased risk of toxicity) 
Increased risk of toxicity Anti-Microbial Dosing 81% 
Gentamicin dose calculated based on actual 
body weight rather than ideal body weight in an 
obese patient (risk of excessive dosing and 
toxicity) 
Risk of excessive dosing and toxicity Anti-Microbial Dosing 100% 
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Table 3.4 Final list of 41 paediatric prescribing indicators with high risk and greater than 80% consensus              continued 
Indicator Possible Outcome Therapeutic Class Error Type 
Level of 
Consensus 
 
Macrolide antibacterial prescribed concomitantly 
with warfarin without appropriate dose 
adjustment or increased INR monitoring 
(increased risk of bleeding) 
Macrolide antibacterials can reduce the 
metabolism of warfarin, causing an 
increase in the INR and an increased 
risk of bleeding 
Anti-Microbial Drug-Drug 
Interaction 
90% 
Co-prescribing of macrolides with interacting 
drug (QT prolongation) 
Risk of prolongation of QT interval and 
ventricular arrhythmia 
Anti-Microbial Drug-Drug 
Interaction 
86% 
Co-prescribing of a macrolide with ciclosporin or 
tacrolimus (increases plasma levels of anti-
rejection agent) 
Increased plasma concentration of 
ciclosporin 
Anti-Microbial Drug-Drug 
Interaction 
86% 
Vancomycin prescribed intravenously over less 
than 60 minutes (rapid infusion of vancomycin 
can cause severe reactions) 
Increased risk of infusion reactions Anti-Microbial Administration 81% 
Amphotericin B prescribed without additionally 
stating both brand name and the dose in mg/kg 
(risk of fatal overdose due to confusion between 
lipid based and non-lipid) 
Specification of brand name to reduce 
risk of wrong formulation being 
administered and resulting toxicity 
Anti-Microbial Drug Name 90% 
Failure to adjust dose or frequency of 
Ganciclovir in the presence of altered renal 
function (risk of toxicity or treatment failure) 
Risk of supratherapeutic or 
subtherapeutic levels of ganciclovir 
Anti-Microbial Dosing 80% 
Aciclovir prescribed at a dose of 250mg/m2 
instead of 500mg/m2 for herpes simplex 
encephalitis in patients aged between 3 months 
and 12 years 
Risk of treatment failure Anti-Microbial Dosing 90% 
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Table 3.4 Final list of 41 paediatric prescribing indicators with high risk and greater than 80% consensus              continued 
Indicator Possible Outcome Therapeutic Class Error Type 
Level of 
Consensus 
 
Soluble insulin prescribed to a patient on a 
when required basis (increased risk of serious 
episodes of hypoglycaemia and nocturnal 
hypoglycaemia post dose) 
Increased risk of serious episodes of 
hypoglycaemia and nocturnal 
hypoglycaemia especially if given more 
than 1 stat dose. Not managing the 
long-term condition 
Endocrine Clinical 
Contraindicatio
n 
85% 
Failure to increase of hydrocortisone to “sick 
day doses” from “maintenance” doses in those 
adrenally suppressed 
Reduces risk of shock Endocrine Dosing 95% 
Dose reduction of immunosuppressant not 
made despite low White Cell Count (risk of 
neutropenia) 
Increased risk of neutropenia and 
subsequent infection, (list of common 
immunosuppressant will be included 
during data collection) 
Immunosuppressant Dosing 90% 
Failure to prescribe folinic acid rescue therapy 
following high dose methotrexate chemotherapy 
(risk of methotrexate toxicity) 
Risk of methotrexate toxicity Immunosuppressant Drug Omission 80% 
Methotrexate prescribed to a patient with a 
clinically significant drop in white cell count or 
platelet count (risk of bone marrow suppression) 
Risk of bone marrow suppression Immunosuppressant Clinical 
Contraindicatio
n 
90% 
Oral methotrexate prescribed to a patient with 
an inappropriate frequency (increased risk of 
toxicity) 
Oral methotrexate should be dosed 
ONCE WEEKLY, and the prescription 
clear as to which day of the week this 
should be 
Immunosuppressant Dosing 100% 
Methotrexate prescribed to a patient with 
abnormal liver function tests (risk of liver 
toxicity) 
Risk of liver toxicity Immunosuppressant Clinical 
Contraindicatio
n 
85% 
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Table 3.4 Final list of 41 paediatric prescribing indicators with high risk and greater than 80% consensus              continued 
Indicator Possible Outcome Therapeutic Class Error Type 
Level of 
Consensus 
 
Methotrexate prescribed concomitantly with 
trimethoprim (increased risk of haematological 
toxicity) 
Trimethoprim suppresses activity of 
dihydrofolate reductase - potential for 
additive effect to produce folate 
deficiency. Increased risk of 
haematological toxicity when 
methotrexate given with trimethoprim 
(including trimethoprim containing 
compound - co-trimoxazole) 
Immunosuppressant Drug-Drug 
Interaction 
85% 
Allopurinol prescribed concomitantly with 
mercaptopurine (Allopurinol enhances effect of 
mercaptopurine and increases risk of toxicity) 
Increased risk of toxicity and enhanced 
effects of mercaptopurine when given 
concomitantly.  The dose of 
mercaptopurine should be one quarter 
of usual dose 
Immunosuppressant Drug-Drug 
Interaction 
80% 
Potassium chloride supplements continued for 
longer than is required  (based on age 
appropriate local reference ranges approx 3.5–
5.3 mmol/litre) (increased risk of hyperkalaemia) 
Failure to act on potassium chloride 
monitoring and continuing treatment for 
longer than required risks 
hyperkalaemia 
Nutrition Dosing 81% 
Potassium chloride infusions exceeding 40 
mmol/litre prescribed to administered via the 
peripheral route (peripheral administration risks 
venous pooling, which can lead to sudden high 
concentrations of potassium chloride being 
delivered to the heart provoking an arrhythmia)  
Intravenous administration of potassium 
chloride solutions exceeding 
40mmol/litre should be prescribed via 
the central route to avoid arrhythmias 
Nutrition Administration 86% 
A prescription for a drug for a patient with a 
known allergy to that drug (risk of anaphylaxis) 
Risk of anaphylaxis General Allergy 100% 
BNFC = British National Formulary for Children, ACE – Angiotensin Converting Enzyme, NSAID = Non-Steroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drug, WHO = World Health Organization, 
ADR = Adverse Drug Reaction, CF = Cystic Fibrosis, GFR = Glomerular Filtration Rate, EC = Enteric Coated, 6MP = 6-Mercaptopurine 
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3.4 Discussion and Conclusion 
The eDelphi process identified 41 high risk prescribing indicators for the 
paediatric hospital setting.  They can potentially be used to monitor the impact 
of electronic prescribing or clinical decision support tools.  To the authors’ 
knowledge, this is the first set of prescribing indicators for paediatric patients 
in the hospital setting.   
The consensus process used to derive the indicators involved a panel of 
experts consisting of 21 paediatricians and paediatric pharmacists all of whom 
complete two rounds of scoring, limiting any bias introduced by missing 
responses.  
The scoring system used in the eDelphi process was a five point scale.  This 
was chosen as it directly correlated with the well recognised risk assessment 
scoring system published by the NPSA117 which is used in all NHS Trusts in 
England.  A 9 point scale could have been chosen to allow participants to 
respond with a finer degree of detail, however, this was discounted because 
of the absence of clear descriptors for a nine point scale.  The five point scale 
used included a descriptor for each of the points in relation to both likelihood 
and severity and therefore was felt to be easier and more intuitive for 
respondents. 
The number of rounds of scoring was limited to 2 because this had produced 
41 indicators which covered a range of prescribing error types.  In addition it 
was felt that a further round of scoring would not have derived any greater 
degrees of consensus and was unlikely to be completed in a timely manner by 
all participants.  The missing data from a third and subsequent rounds would 
make the degree of consensus less robust  In a review of consensus methods 
Waggoner et al118 concluded that two rounds of scoring was the optimum and 
that to have more would need to be justified on the basis that adequate 
consensus had not been achieved and the possible reasons for this  
The panel size in this study was similar in size to that used in the work by 
Thomas et al90 where a panel of 20 participants was used.  Waggoner et al118 
reviewed consensus methods and concluded that for all methods a panel of 5 
to 11 members was beneficial.  In conventional Delphi studies the arguments 
proposed for which consensus is required are proposed by a facilitator.  In this 
work the a larger panel was used because, in addition to obtaining consensus 
the expertise of the panel was used to review the indicators proposed and 
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provide suggestions for other indicators that may have been overlooked by 
the author.  This allowed for the development of a more robust list of 
indicators. 
Nearly half (n = 19) of the final 41 indicators related to dosing errors.  This is 
not surprising since dose errors account for the majority of the indicators 
identified for rounds 1 and 2.  This is likely to be influenced by the fact that 
dosing errors are the most common error type reported in paediatrics.7, 30, 96  
Drugs with known risks such as gentamicin, phenytoin and methotrexate were 
included in the dosage indicators; however, “lower risk” drugs such as 
meropenem, ceftriaxone and domperidone are also present.  This may reflect, 
in the case of the antimicrobials, the relatively serious clinical indications in 
which these drugs are used and the need to prescribe the correct dose to 
avoid treatment failure as well as heightened awareness as a result of 
antimicrobial stewardship; or in the case of domperidone the relatively recent 
publicity relating to adverse reactions.119   
Previously published work has identified high-alert medicines within 
paediatrics.  Maaskant et al120 published a list containing fourteen specific 
drugs and 4 medication classes of high-alert medications. Comparing this with 
the author’s prescribing indicators shows that 10 of the individual drugs and 
three of the drug classes are duplicated. The four high-alert drugs not 
identified in the author’s prescribing indicators are all infusions commonly 
used in intensive care areas, such as dopamine and noradrenaline.  
Reference to errors involving infusions was excluded from the present 
research because the reported incidents all related to errors occurring as a 
result of incorrect administration or infusion preparation rather prescribing.   
The high-alert drug class from the Masskant et al120 report that is not included 
in the author’s prescribing indicators relates to parenteral nutrition.  Errors 
reported relating to parenteral nutrition concerned administration or 
preparation errors rather than prescribing.  This possibly reflects UK practice 
in terms of these medications where standard prescriptions and electronic 
systems for parenteral nutrition have been developed to prevent errors at the 
prescribing stage.   
Stockwell et al121 published a list of paediatric triggers developed using an 
eDelphi technique and an international panel.  From their list of 21 triggers 
relating to medicines, 11 also appear in the present paediatric prescribing 
indicator list.  The triggers describe adverse events that could result from any 
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incorrect use of a medicine.  For example the administration of Digibind® could 
be triggered by an error in the prescribing, dispensing, administration or 
monitoring of digoxin.  This is an appropriate way of identifying an adverse 
event after it has occurred.  The indicators identified in this research, however, 
are specific for the prescribing process and can be used to identify errors at 
the prescribing stage, which may be in advance of the medicine being 
administered.  This can tell us whether quality improvement interventions such 
as ePrescribing can prevent the ‘potential’ for harm occurring. 
Many of the paediatric indicators for the exploratory round were derived from 
the adult indicators previously published.90  The final list of 41 paediatric 
indicators contains 28 indicators modified from the research conducted in 
adult medicine.  Many of the remaining indicators were related to specific 
paediatric settings or medicines not usually classed as high risk in adults as 
such as meropenem, as discussed above.   
Reports of the incidence of prescribing errors in the paediatric setting vary 
between 7 and 13%.30, 31  This is partly because there is no standard definition 
of what and how to collect information about errors.  Studies use different data 
collection methods and different definitions of medication error.122  This lack of 
standardisation makes comparison between reports difficult to assess. 
Prescribing indicators can be used to assess the impact of a safety 
improvement intervention by standardising both pre- and post-implementation 
data collection.  The objective nature of these data would allow comparisons 
and conclusions to be drawn and provide more robust evidence across 
healthcare settings.  The standardisation means that for the first time, 
comparisons can be made between hospitals and different initiatives. 
The indicators can also be used to optimise the capability of electronic 
prescribing systems, such as with the provision of complex clinical decision 
support to highlight and avert such errors at the point of prescribing. This also 
has the potential to focus alerts on high risk areas, with the advantage of 
reducing alert fatigue.123 
While the paediatric indicators described here are focused on the secondary 
care setting, many could be applicable to general practice.  There are 
currently no primary care related exclusive paediatric trigger tools published in 
the literature. 
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3.4.1 Limitations 
The initial list of indicators was derived from an extensive literature search and 
therefore, unpublished cases of medication errors would not have been 
included.  However, the author aimed to reduce this effect by including the 
exploratory round so panellists had the opportunity to propose indicators or 
errors they see in practice. 
One of the limitations cited in the work by Thomas et al90 was that the 
indicators provided to the expert panel in the exploratory round were already 
high risk indicators.  In their work the initial list had been derived from a 
combination of personal experience and the literature.  They did not have 
access to pharmacy interventions or NRLS data.  Their initial list contained 
210 indicators which was limited to 130 by the research team prior to the first 
exploratory round because they were neither prescribed at a reasonable 
frequency or considered to be sufficiently high risk.  This review process 
meant that the list of indicators presented in their first exploratory round  
already contained high risk indicators.  A similar process took place in this 
work but the majority of exclusions prior to the exploratory round were 
because the indicator drug was rarely prescribed in paediatric practice.  This 
may account for the lower proportion of indicators that achieved consensus in 
this work when compared with the adult indicators. 
The paediatric indicator work presented here is entirely UK based and as 
such, may not have applicability in other global settings.  Lastly, as new 
evidence emerges and new drugs begin to be used, other potential indicators 
may become relevant.  The adult indicators previously cited are currently 
under review and if the paediatric indicators described here become 
extensively utilised a program of periodic review will be necessary. 
No specific definition of a prescribing error was provided to respondents, in 
fact the terminology used within the instructions used both the term indicator 
and error.  It is possible that this lack of definition may have led to confusion in 
the way in which respondents scored the indicators.  This was thought to be 
unlikely due to the fact that the respondents were involved in the development 
of the indicators in the first place and were able to clarify specific points with 
the author during the scoring process. 
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3.4.2 Conclusion 
Paediatric prescribing errors with the potential to cause harm have been 
identified by an expert panel.  The indicators provide an objective tool that can 
be used to test the ability of an EP system to prevent the prescribing errors 
described in the indicators.  They could also be used to refine alerting systems 
used in electronic prescribing to target warnings and alleviate alert fatigue.  A 
description of how the indicators were used to evaluate a range of EP systems 
is described in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4  Paediatric Prescribing Error Simulation 
4.1 Introduction 
It is clear from the literature that prescribing errors in secondary care are 
common and probably more frequent in paediatric patients.28  The evidence 
relating to the effectiveness of electronic prescribing (EP) in reducing 
medication errors in children was reviewed in Chapter 1.  The conclusion was 
that EP reduced medication errors however, the effectiveness of EP to reduce 
harm to patients from errors was not clear.  Furthermore where studies have 
included harm within their analyses only those systems with clinical decision 
support (CDS) have been shown to have any impact.  This programme of 
work has sought to identify a specific set of paediatric prescribing indicators 
that, by consensus, described errors that are highly likely to cause harm if 
they reach the patient.  They can, therefore, be used prospectively to assess 
the impact of an EP implementation within a hospital.  Indeed the All Wales 
Prescribing group has recently agreed to use both the paediatric indicators 
developed here together with the adult indicators developed elsewhere90 to 
assess the impact of an EP system for Wales.124  Pre- implementation data 
collection has recently started.  The indicators can also potentially be used to 
test a system already in place for its ability to reduce the risk of the errors 
known to cause harm and, therefore, provide an understanding of the 
likelihood that a specific EP system will reduce harm. System administrators 
can review their systems in light of the results.  Going forward, system 
vendors could use the indicators to show the relative safety of their system 
and even compare it to other systems, providing a degree of competition 
between vendors which may, in the longer term, increase patient safety. 
This chapter describes the use of the paediatric prescribing indicators that 
were developed in the first part of this project (see Chapter 3) to ascertain the 
effectiveness of current EP systems in use in paediatric patients in NHS 
England Hospitals to help to prevent the errors described by the indicators. 
4.2 Aim 
The aim of this research was to ascertain the effectiveness of current EP 
systems to prevent a specific group of paediatric prescribing errors (identified 
using pre-defined indicators). 
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4.2.1 Objectives 
 To develop a set of high risk paediatric prescribing indicators for use 
as an evaluation tool for EP systems (reported in Chapters 2 and 3) 
 To establish the performance of a range of EP implementations in 
preventing specific prescribing errors identified using pre-defined 
indicators. 
 To understand the attributes, level of clinical decision support (CDS) 
and general settings of an EP implementation that are able to trap the  
paediatric prescribing errors. 
4.3 Background 
CDS is functionality within an electronic prescribing system designed to help a 
prescriber’s decision-making.  This can occur in numerous ways including 
organisation of pertinent data, computerised resources or guidelines, alerts, 
treatment recommendations, dose range checking and co-morbidity data 
evaluation.  There are a variety of different CDS functionalities ranging from 
simple allergy checking to complex guideline and co-morbidity data 
evaluation.125  Stultz et al64 reviewed a range of CDS functionalities and 
designs that were reported to be utilised within the paediatric setting.  They 
concluded that certain CDS functionalities such as dose calculators had 
shown benefit in medication prescribing and others such as therapeutic 
duplication alerts had resulted in high override rates and inconsistent or 
unknown impact on patient care. 
The paediatric prescribing indicators developed in the first part of this 
project126 (Chapter 3) were agreed by an expert panel as having a high 
likelihood of causing harm should the described error occur.  The phase of 
work described here was designed to test individual prescribing systems for 
their ability to trap or prevent the prescribing errors identified in the first part of 
the project.  This process will be referred to as error simulation in this chapter.   
There are several different EP systems available in the UK with others under 
development.  As such there are a number of variables which may confer 
different abilities to trap the errors: 
 The EP system (from different vendors); 
 The level of decision support included within each system; 
 The level of decision support invoked at a specific hospital based on 
local set up and preferences; 
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 The attributes of the hospital environment (teaching hospital, 
specialty hospital); 
 The paediatric case mix for the hospital (age groups, specialties); 
By simulating the prescribing errors in individual hospitals an assessment of 
the performance of the system to prevent harmful errors can be made.   
4.4 Method 
4.4.1 Study Design 
A semi structured questionnaire/survey.   
4.4.2 Identifying Participants/Sites 
Hospitals were identified using data from the results of the digital maturity 
project undertaken by Digital Technology Dept, NHS England in 2015.127  The 
local paediatric pharmacist was contacted via email by the author at each site 
to confirm whether or not the site was suitable based on the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria shown below. 
4.4.3 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
Sites were included if they were in a secondary care setting that had 
implemented EP in a paediatric setting.  Sites were excluded if they did not 
care for paediatric patients or did not have an EP system in place. 
4.4.4 Research Approval 
As no direct patient consent was required the research protocol was reviewed 
by the University of Portsmouth, Science Faculty Ethics Committee.  It gave a 
favourable opinion on 16/2/2017.  As a research project involving NHS staff, 
Health Research Authority (HRA) approval was required.  The investigator 
completed the Integrated Research Application System (IRAS) on 3/3/2017 
and received HRA approval on 4/4/2017.  
4.4.5 Survey Development 
A survey was designed which incorporated all the previously identified 
indicators (Appendix 15).  An Excel spreadsheet was used as the most 
efficient and convenient way of collecting the data.  The design mimicked the 
style used for the indicator consensus work and was reviewed by two 
colleagues; a previous collaborator on the eDelphi work and the NHS Digital 
Lead Pharmacist.  In addition, the survey was piloted by the local e-
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prescribing lead at UHS and the local lead paediatric pharmacist.  This 
provided an estimate of the time needed to complete the survey and 
additional comments to include in the explanatory notes.  In the final version 
participants were asked to simulate each of the errors in the prescribing 
process in their own EP systems and provide the following information: 
 Was the error prescription permitted? – Y/N.  The participant 
recorded whether or not the error  could be prescribed. 
 Was any decision support triggered during the prescribing process? 
 A description of the decision support, if triggered, descriptors for the 
five possible levels of CDS are shown in Table 4.1. 
 Explanatory notes – to enable the participant to give further 
comments if needed. 
The descriptors for the levels of decision support were derived from work that 
was being undertaken at the time by a research team which included one of 
the previously cited collaborators, at the University of Birmingham and 
subsequently reported128.  In Chapter 1 of this report, CDS was described as 
either basic or advanced.  This was to allow a simple comparison of the 
literature being reviewed.  In this part of the work a more detailed description 
of CDS was required to allow respondents to choose the option that best 
described the CDS they invoked when attempting to prescribe the errors.  The 
descriptions used (Table 4.1) have a natural hierarchy in terms of their ability 
to prevent an error from occurring.  This ranges from “restricted” where an 
incorrect entry or prescription cannot be entered, to “none” where no CDS is 
present. 
In addition to providing details about the decision support, the participant was 
also asked to give their view on two further points using a five point likert 
scale.  Firstly the likelihood of the prescribing error being prescribed and 
secondly, if it was successfully prescribed, whether or not it could reach the 
patient.  While it is clear EP with CDS has the ability to prevent some errors, 
there are also practical post-prescribing steps which could trap or prevent an 
error.  These include regular prescription monitoring by a clinical pharmacist 
and double checking by nursing staff prior to administration.  The specific 
questions posed were:- 
 Using your current EP system what, in your opinion, is the likelihood 
of THIS prescribing error occurring i.e. passing through any alerts or 
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barriers and being available for administration?  On a scale of 1-5 
where 1 is never and 5 certain 
 Using your EP system if THIS prescribing error occurs, what in your 
opinion, is the likelihood of it reaching the patient i.e. passing through 
the current system of post-prescribing checks?  On a scale of 1-5 
where 1 is never and 5 is certain 
Each participant was also asked to complete a series of questions related to 
their EP system and how some of the basic prescribing processes took place 
(Appendix 16) 
 
Table 4.1 Clinical decision support levels and descriptions 
Decision Support Level Description 
Restricted Error is prevented by the system as 
prescriber cannot proceed 
Guided Default fields are pre-populated 
encouraging the prescriber to accept and 
continue 
Permitted (with input) An alert where a reason needs to be given 
to override 
Alert (without input) An alert where no reason needs to be 
given 
None No interruptive Clinical Decision Support 
Five of the original 41 indicators were split into two or more questions to 
enable the question posed to participants to be unambiguous.  For example 
the original indicator for domperidone stated: 
Domperidone prescribed at > 1.2mg/kg/day max 20mg (prolongation of QT 
interval, sudden cardiac death) 
This was split into two discrete questions for the simulation exercise relating to 
having a dose greater than 1.2mg/kg/day and having a dose exceeding 20mg. 
This resulted in a total of 49 discrete errors relating to the original 41 
indicators. 
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4.4.6 Data Analysis 
There was no specific hypothesis in relation to the expected data, rather an 
explorative approach to the data that was obtained to identify trends and 
themes using descriptive statistics.  The numbers of errors allowed and type 
of CDS alert by each EP system were calculated and compared using 
descriptive statistics.  Comparisons of the responses for different types of 
error and therapeutic class of the target drug were also made using 
descriptive statistics.  Qualitative responses were used to clarify answers and 
provide detail as well a basic analysis for any emerging themes. 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Response Rate 
Twenty-two NHS trusts were identified as having electronic prescribing in 
paediatric patients.  Responses were received from 15 of these sites giving a 
response rate of 68%. Table 4.2 summarises the types of hospital sites that 
responded.  One site did not provided 13 responses to the simulation 
questions and three sites did not provide responses to the Likert scale 
questions. 
4.5.2 Sites 
Table 4.2 details the basic attributes of the participating sites 
Table 4.2 Attributes of participating sites 
Attribute Result 
Hospital Type  
General Hospital 10(67%) 
General Teaching 3 (20%) 
Specialist Children’s 2 (13%) 
Mean number of beds 
80 
(range = 11-355) 
Mean spread of EP within 
paediatrics (% of beds using EP) 
91% (range = 70-
100%) 
Mean length of use(yrs) 
4.4 
(range = 0.7 – 22) 
 
 97 
 
In five of the sites there was 100% spread of EP.  In sites where spread was 
less than 100% the most common area where EP was not in use were 
intensive care areas with neonatal intensive care being the most common (5 
sites). 
4.5.3 Electronic Prescribing Systems 
Seven different EP systems were in use across the 15 sites.  Table 4.3 details 
the name of the EP system in use and the number of sites using that system 
as well as a code letter for use during the remainder of this thesis. 
Table 4.3 Electronic prescribing systems tested 
EP System System 
Code 
Number of sites (%) 
Epic A 1 (7) 
JAC B 7 (47) 
Cerner Millennium C 2 (13) 
Meditech D 2 (13) 
iCM E 1 (7) 
Medichart F 1 (7) 
CSC G 1 (7) 
4.5.4 System Settings 
Sites were asked a range of questions designed to obtain an understanding of 
the basic system settings and safety features within their EP system; results 
are shown in Table 4.4 
Table 4.4 Details of system setting responses 
 System Setting Yes 
(%) 
No (%) 
1 Does the system use abbreviations to describe drugs 
(e.g. AZT) rather than approved names? 
0 
15 
(100) 
2 Does the system allow prescribers to enter drugs as 
free-text prescriptions? 
8 (53) 7(47) 
3 Can doses be entered by the prescriber using a 
trailing zero after a decimal point (e.g. 5.0mg)? 
7 (47) 8 (53) 
4 Does the system require a weight to be entered 
before any prescribing can take place? 
5 (33) 10 (67) 
5 Does the system check if a weight is out of date 
based on internal rules? 
8 (53) 7 (47) 
6 Does the system allow a drug that is usually 
prescribed by weight to be prescribed without the 
presence of an up-to-date weight (defined by internal 
rules if present). 
12 (80) 3 (20) 
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7 Does the system calculate BSA if so please describe 
how? 
13 (87) 2 (13) 
8 For drugs that are prescribed by BSA does the 
system allow the drug to be prescribed without the 
presence of an up to date BSA value (based on 
internal rules if present). 
13 2 
9 Does the system round doses to measurable 
amounts.  
4 (27) 11 (73) 
10 Does the system abbreviate units by using "u" or "iu" 
0 
15 
(100) 
11 Does the system support 18 hr or 36 hr dosing 13 (87) 2 (13) 
12 Does the system abbreviate microgram and 
nanogram? 
1 (7) 14 (93) 
BSA = Body Surface Area,  
None of the EP systems used abbreviations to describe drugs rather than their 
approved names; one system, however allowed a search by abbreviation.   
Eight of the systems allowed the entry of a free text drug; in seven of these 
sites this occurred by utilising a “dummy drug” which allowed the user to 
prescribe a dose and frequency and describe the drug within a note assigned 
to the dummy drug. 
Trailing Zeros – in all sites that allowed the entry of a trailing zero the final 
displayed dose or numeral had the trailing zero truncated i.e. entry of 5.0mg 
would display as 5mg. 
Entry of Patent’s Weight – in five sites a weight was mandatory prior to any 
prescribing taking place.  There were six sites where the weight was used to 
calculate a small range of doses and if the original weight was not already 
entered, then the prescriber would be prompted for a weight in these cases.  
Five of these sites used drug bundles in which the weight was used to 
calculate the dose.  In one of these sites there was an option for the 
prescriber to enter a dose in mg/kg and the system would perform the 
calculation based on the weight. In nine sites a weight was not required prior 
to prescribing. 
Weight checking – in eight sites there were internal rules within the system 
that would check if a weight was out of date.  In most cases this was based on 
internal rules which changed with increasing age i.e. for patients between 0 
and 6 months old, the weight would need to be recorded weekly; from 6 
months to 2 years the weight would be recorded monthly. 
Body Surface Area (BSA) – the majority of sites had EP systems that would 
calculate BSA if the weight and the height were entered – thereby using the 
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Dubois formula.129  In one site the system used weight only to calculate BSA 
based on the work by Sharkey et al.130 
Rounding doses – three systems performed dose rounding and in all cases 
this only occurred for specific groups of drugs such as injections or those 
where a bundle had been pre-programmed.  Worryingly in one site the dose 
rounding was based on adult rules where some antibiotic injections were 
rounded to the nearest 200mg (Site 8). 
None of the systems abbreviated “units” to “u.” or “i.u.”; this is extremely 
important for drugs such as insulin and heparin where doses are expressed in 
units.  If handwritten these abbreviations have been miss-read as a zero 
resulting in 10 times the dose of insulin being administered.131  Maintaining 
this convention within an EP system might help to reinforce incorrect practice 
in handwritten records. 
Support of 18 hourly and 36 hourly dosing intervals was reported in the 
majority of systems; this is important when prescribing gentamicin for neonatal 
patients or those with severely diminished renal function where extended 
dosing is required to achieve appropriate plasma concentrations.  In the two 
sites that answered no for this question, one stated it would use “stat” doses 
for these drugs and paper prescriptions; the other had a system that could 
support 36 hourly dosing but not 18 hourly. 
Abbreviation of microgram and nanogram – all but one site had systems that 
did not abbreviate these terms.  In the site where abbreviation did occur (Site 
3) the abbreviations that were displayed were “mcg” and “ng”.  There are 
several reported cases of prescribing errors where handwritten abbreviations 
have been misread resulting in large overdoses.132, 133  While there are no 
reports of this occurring with electronically displayed abbreviations the 
concern would be that handwritten records in, for example, medical notes 
would mimic the electronic abbreviations and increase the likelihood of error. 
4.5.5 Error Simulation Permittedness 
In the context of this work the term permittedness is used to describe whether 
or not an EP system allows (or permits) a prescribing error to be made.  The 
more errors the EP system permits the more likely a prescribing error is to be 
made.  A total of 699 responses to the 49 simulation questions were received.  
Fourteen sites answered all 49 simulations and one site answered 13 
simulations. 
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A total of 629 errors were permitted i.e. the errors were able to be prescribed 
on the EP system and 29 were prevented.  In 41 instances the question was 
not applicable to the individual site; the common reason being the error 
related to an intravenous drug that was prescribed on a paper chart rather 
than the EP system.  Table 4.5 summarises these results.  Appendix 17 
contains a table with full detailed answers for each error. 
Table 4.5 Number of errors permitted by the systems studied 
Error Permitted Number (%) 
Yes 629 (90.0%) 
No 29 (4.1%) 
Not Applicable 41 (5.8%) 
Total 699 
Table 4.6 shows the number of errors permitted by each EP system using the 
designations described in Table 4.3.  This shows that all systems had errors 
that were permitted; one system (G) had no errors that were prevented.  
System A had the largest proportion of errors that were not permitted (8.2%).  
System B, used by the largest number of sites (7) had only a 2.6% non-
permissible rate. 
Table 4.6 Number of errors permitted by specific electronic prescribing systems 
EP System 
(No) 
Error Permitted 
Y (%) N (%) N/A (%) 
A (1) 45 (91.8%) 4 (8%) 0 (0%) 
B (7) 277 (90.2%) 8 (2%) 22 (7%) 
C (2) 90 (91.8%) 7 (7%) 1 (1%) 
D (2) 88 (89.8%) 6 (6%) 4 (4%) 
E (1) 40 (81.6%) 3 (6%) 6 (12%) 
F (1) 44 (89.8%) 1 (2%) 4 (8%) 
G (1) 45 (91.8%) 0 (0%) 4 (8%) 
Total 629 29 41 
Figure 4.1 show the errors by error type and whether they were permitted by 
the EP systems investigated. 
A proportion of each of the error types was permitted by the EP systems.  The 
one drug name error in the study was most commonly prevented by the EP 
systems that were studied.  Allergy and therapeutic duplication errors were the 
next most commonly prevented errors followed by dosing errors.  Figure 4.1 
shows the differences between the error types and the ability of the EP 
system to prevent them.  None of the systems were able to prevent any of the 
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following error types: duration, omission, intravenous rate, and drug-drug 
interactions. 
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Figure 4.1 Error type and level of permittedness 
Table 4.7 shows the errors by therapeutic area and whether they were 
permitted or not.  The most commonly prevented errors were those related to 
anaesthetic agents and the general error which described the prescribing of a 
drug (excluding penicillin) to which the patient was allergic.  Antimicrobial and 
immunosuppressant errors featured most commonly with 14 and 12 errors 
respectively.  For both of these categories there were errors that were 
prevented by the EP systems.  For four of the categories: gastrointestinal, 
cardiovascular, respiratory and musculoskeletal, none of the errors were 
prevented. 
Table 4.7 Therapeutic area of error and number permitted by the electronic prescribing systems 
studied 
Therapeutic Area (no of 
errors of that type) 
errorPermitted 
Y (%) N (%) N/A (%) 
Gastrointestinal (2) 30 (100) 0 0 
Cardiovascular (8) 108 (91) 0 11 (9) 
Respiratory (1) 6 (40) 0 9 (60) 
Central Nervous System (5) 67 (94) 4 (6) 0 
Antimicrobial (14) 184 (93) 9 (5) 4 (2) 
Endocrine (2) 24 (86) 1 (4) 3 (10) 
Immunosuppressant (12) 157 (94) 6 (4) 5 (3) 
Nutrition (2) 18 (64) 1 (4) 9 (32) 
Anaesthetic (1) 10 (71) 4 (29) 0 
General (1) 11 (73) 4 (27) 0 
Musculoskeletal (1) 14 (100) 0 0 
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4.5.6 Detail of Errors Prevented and Not Applicable 
Table 4.8 details all the errors where at least one system prevented them from 
being prescribed.  Out of the 49 errors, only 9 (18.3%) were prevented by at 
least one EP system.  The error which was most commonly prevented was 
error 22 which relates to the way in which amphotericin is prescribed.   
Table 4.8 Detail of errors prevented 
Error Ref Error Error Type 
No. of sites at 
which error 
prevented (%) 
10 
Prescribing of incorrect or inequivalent 
morphine (opiate) dose via multiple 
routes. (risk of toxicity) e.g. morphine 
10mg IV/PO/SC 
Therapeutic 
Duplication 3 (20%) 
12 
Penicillin containing compound prescribed 
to a penicillin allergic patient (please 
describe in the notes whether symptoms 
of reaction can be added and hence 
whether a reason for prescribing can be 
made clear) Allergy 1 (7%) 
22 
Amphotericin B prescribed without 
additionally stating both brand name and 
the dose in mg/kg (risk of fatal overdose 
due to confusion between lipid based and 
non-lipid) Drug Name 8 (53%) 
24 
Soluble insulin prescribed to a patient on 
a when required basis (increased risk of 
serious episodes of hypoglycaemia and 
nocturnal hypoglycaemia post dose) 
Clinical 
Contraindication 1 (7%) 
28 
Oral methotrexate prescribed to a patient 
with an inappropriate frequency 
(increased risk of toxicity) Dosing 6 (40%) 
33 
Potassium chloride infusions exceeding 
40 mmol/litre prescribed to be 
administered via the peripheral route 
(peripheral administration risks venous 
pooling, which can lead to sudden high 
concentrations of potassium chloride 
being delivered to the heart provoking an 
arrhythmia)  Route 1 (7%) 
35 
Midazolam prescribed for procedural 
sedation at a dose inappropriate for the 
route of administration (e.g. oral dose 
prescribed via buccal route) Dosing 4 (27%) 
36 
A prescription for a drug for a patient with 
a known allergy to that drug (risk of 
anaphylaxis) excluding penicillin Allergy 4 (27%) 
37 
Dose of paracetamol prescribed 
inappropriate for route of administration Dosing 1 (7%) 
 
Table 4.9 lists the errors where there was at least one site where the error 
was deemed not applicable.  There were various reasons cited as to why 
these errors were not applicable.  Errors 7,8 and 33 were intravenous 
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infusions with variable dosing, i.e. the dose is altered based on the response 
of the patient.  This type of treatment represents a complicated prescribing 
process which many systems are not able to achieve in a safe way.  In all 
these sites, prescribing was performed using paper charts commonly cross 
referenced within the EP system.   
Error 26 was deemed not-applicable in 5 sites; in all of these cases this 
specific treatment was not given at these sites.  The use of high dose IV 
methotrexate in oncology patients only occurs in specialist centres. 
In the sites where these errors were relevant, there were only two instances 
where the error was prevented.  In one site error 24 was prevented by the 
system not allowing the insulin to be prescribed in a “PRN” fashion.  In the 
second case error 33, potassium infusions, was prescribed using a pre-
defined order sentence where the concentration and route of potassium 
infusion was stipulated and not editable.  
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Table 4.9 Errors deemed "Not Applicable" in at least one site 
Error Ref No Error Error Type 
Number of sites 
where deemed 
not applicable 
(%) 
7 
Prescribing of intravenous heparin 
infusion for treatment of thromboembolic 
event using the wrong dose or infusion 
rate based on local protocol (risk of 
toxicity or therapeutic failure) Dosing 11 (73%) 
8 
Prescribing of intravenous salbutamol 
infusion using the wrong dose or infusion 
rate (risk of toxicity or therapeutic failure) Dosing 9 (60%) 
16 
Gentamicin prescribed to a patient with  
at least mild renal impairment without 
dose frequency adjustment according to 
local policy (increased risk of toxicity) Dosing 1 (7%) 
17 
Gentamicin dose calculated based on 
actual body weight rather than ideal 
body weight in an obese patient (risk of 
excessive dosing and toxicity) Dosing 1 (7%) 
21 
Vancomycin prescribed intravenously 
over less than 60 minutes (rapid infusion 
of vancomycin can cause severe 
reactions) 
Intravenous 
Rate 2 (13%) 
24 
Soluble insulin prescribed to a patient on 
a when required basis (increased risk of 
serious episodes of hypoglycaemia and 
nocturnal hypoglycaemia post dose) 
Clinical 
Contraindication 3 (20%) 
26 
Failure to prescribe folinic acid rescue 
therapy following high dose 
methotrexate chemotherapy (risk of 
methotrexate toxicity) Omission 5 (33%) 
33 
Potassium chloride infusions exceeding 
40 mmol/litre prescribed to be 
administered via the peripheral route 
(peripheral administration risks venous 
pooling, which can lead to sudden high 
concentrations of potassium chloride 
being delivered to the heart provoking an 
arrhythmia)  Route 9 (60%) 
4.5.7 Error Simulation – Degree of Clinical Decision Support 
Sites were asked about the levels of clinical decision support offered to 
prescribers when simulating each of the errors.  The range of CDS options are 
listed above in Table 4.1.  There were a total of 699 responses across all 49 
errors.  Totals for each CDS level are shown in Table 4.10 and Figure 4.2.  In 
the majority of cases (74.2%) no decision support was offered to the 
prescriber.  Conversely in 25.8% of errors across all 15 sites, some form of 
CDS was provided to the prescriber.  The most common level of CDS was 
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“permitted (with input)” where the prescriber is warned of a potential error and 
must provide some form of input to either acknowledge this or override it. 
Table 4.10 Total clinical decision support level responses 
CDS Level 
Responses 
n=699 (%) 
Restricted 25 (3.6%) 
Guided 23 (3.3%) 
Permitted (with input) 97 (13.9%) 
Alert (without input) 35 (5.0%) 
None 519 (74.2%) 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Frequency of various levels of clinical decision support 
Table 4.11 shows the level of CDS offered by the different systems.  Systems 
A and E offered the largest number of restricted errors and system C utilised 
the highest proportion of guided CDS.  In terms of alerting CDS, system A 
utilised the highest proportion of CDS requiring input and systems F and G 
had the highest proportion of alerts without input.  System C recorded the 
highest proportion of errors where no CDS was presented.  Interestingly 
system B which is the most popular system in use across the sites did not 
utilise CDS in 77.9% of cases which was the second highest proportion. 
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Table 4.11 Level of clinical decision support offered by each system 
EP 
System 
Restricted 
(%) 
Guided 
(%) 
Permitted(with 
Input) (%) 
Alert 
(without 
Input) (%) None (%) 
Total 
Responses 
A 3 (6) 4 (8) 15 (30) 0 (0) 27 (55) 49 
B 10 (3) 1 (0.3) 41 (13) 16 (5) 239 (77) 307 
C 3 (3) 9 (9) 5 (5) 0 (0) 81 (82) 98 
D 5 (5) 4 (4) 17 (17) 1 (1) 71 (72) 98 
E 3 (6) 1 (2) 11 (22) 0 (0) 34 (69) 49 
F 1 (2) 3 (6) 5 (10) 9 (18) 31 (63) 49 
G 0 (0) 1 (2) 3 (6) 9 (18) 36 (73) 49 
Table 4.12 shows the levels of CDS provided by the systems based on the 
error types.  The allergy errors had some form of CDS in all cases and were 
the only error type where this was the case.  In most cases prescribers were 
presented with a warning which requires an input to either acknowledge or 
override.  This shows that all systems have at the very least, a basic level of 
CDS which includes allergy checking.  Drug-Drug interactions and therapeutic 
duplications were the error types most commonly associated with some form 
of CDS.  In the case of therapeutic duplication only 21.4% of responses 
indicated that there was no CDS for this error type.  The types of error where 
there was least likely to be any CDS were: dosing (90.4%), omission (100%), 
duration (100%) and clinical contradiction (94%).   
Table 4.12 Levels of clinical decision support based on error type 
Error Type (No of Errors) 
Restricted 
(%) 
Guided 
(%) 
Permitted 
(with 
Input) (%) 
Alert 
(without 
Input) (%) None (%) Total 
Dosing (24) 9 (2) 11 (3) 10 (3) 3 (1) 310 (90) 343 
Drug-Drug Interaction (9) 0 (0) 0 (0) 47 (37) 27 (21) 54 (42) 128 
Clinical Contraindication (7) 1 (1) 3 (3) 2 (2) 0 (0) 94 (94) 100 
Therapeutic Duplication (2) 2 (7) 3 (11) 14 (50) 3 (11) 6 (21) 28 
Allergy (2) 3 (10) 1 (3) 24 (80) 2 (7) 0 (0) 30 
Intravenous Rate (1) 0 (0) 3 (21) 0 (0) 0 (0) 11 (77) 14 
Omission (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 14 (100) 14 
Duration (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 14 (100) 14 
Route (1) 1 (7) 1 (7) 0 (0) 0 (0) 12 (86) 14 
Drug Name (1) 9 (64) 1 (7) 0 (0) 0 (0) 4 (28) 14 
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Table 4.13 shows the levels of CDS reported from all sites using the most 
common system tested (system B).  The variation in both the number of errors 
permitted and the types of CDS invoked between different sites using the 
same EP system. 
Table 4.13 Levels of clinical decision support reported from all sites using electronic 
prescribing system B 
Site Restricted Guided 
Permitted 
(with 
Input) 
Alert 
(without 
Input) None 
10 0 0 3 0 46 
5 2 1 3 0 43 
9 2 0 10 2 35 
15 2 0 11 0 36 
18 2 0 0 0 11 
12 2 0 1 13 33 
22 0 0 13 1 35 
 
Table 4.14 lists all the dosing errors in detail and the level of decision support 
invoked for each one.  The errors shaded are the ones where at least one site 
has CDS for that specific error.  This, therefore, shows the detail of the dosing 
errors where no CDS was invoked. 
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Table 4.14 Detail of all dosing errors and level of clinical decision support.  (Dosing errors with at least one level of CDS response are shaded).    
Continued 
Error Ref 
Error Description Restricted Guided 
Permitted 
(with input) 
Alert (no 
input) 
None 
(%) 
1a 
Domperidone prescribed at > 1.2mg/kg/day (prolongation of QT 
interval, sudden cardiac death) 0 1 1 0 13 
1b 
Domperidone prescribed at a dose exceeding 20mg per day (max 
BNFC dose) 0 1 1 0 13 
2 
Digoxin dose not reviewed in light of reduced renal function (less 
than 50ml/min/1.73m
2
) 0 0 0 0 15 
5 
Low molecular weight heparin prescribed to a patient with renal 
impairment without dose adjustment (<30ml/min/1.73m2) 
(increased risk of bleeding) 0 1 0 0 14 
7 
Prescribing of intravenous heparin infusion for treatment of 
thromboembolic event using the wrong dose or infusion rate 
based on local protocol (risk of toxicity or therapeutic failure) 0 1 1 0 13 
8 
Prescribing of intravenous salbutamol infusion using the wrong 
dose or infusion rate (risk of toxicity or therapeutic failure) 0 0 1 0 14 
11 
Phenytoin dose not reviewed in light of low albumin (potential for 
toxicity) 0 0 0 0 15 
13 
Nitrofurantoin prescribed to a patient with renal impairment, avoid 
if eGFR <60ml/minute/1.73m
2
 (risk of peripheral neuropathy and 
inadequate concentration in urine) 0 0 0 0 14 
14 
Ceftriaxone prescribed at a total daily dose of 50mg/kg instead of 
80mg/kg for severe infection/sepsis in a patient > 1 month of age 
(risk of under dosage) 0 0 0 0 14 
15 
Meropenem prescribed at a dose of 20mg/kg instead of 40mg/kg  
for meningitis or respiratory exacerbation of CF (potential under 
treatment) 0 0 0 0 14 
16 
Gentamicin prescribed to a patient with  at least mild renal 
impairment without dose frequency adjustment according to local 
policy (increased risk of toxicity) 0 0 0 0 14 
17 
Gentamicin dose calculated based on actual body weight rather 
than ideal body weight in an obese patient (risk of excessive 
dosing and toxicity) 0 0 1 0 13 
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Table 4.14 Detail of all dosing errors and level of clinical decision support.  (Dosing errors with at least one level of CDS response are shaded).    
Continued 
Error Ref 
Error Description Restricted Guided 
Permitted 
(with input) 
Alert (no 
input) 
None 
(%) 
23 
Failure to adjust dose or frequency of ganciclovir in the presence 
of altered renal function (less than 70ml/min/1.73m
2
) (risk of 
toxicity or treatment failure) 0 0 0 0 14 
25a 
Dose reduction of ciclosporin not made despite low white cell 
count (Less than 3.5 x 10
9
/L) (risk of neutropenia)   0 0 0 0 14 
25b 
Dose reduction of tacrolimus not made despite low white cell 
count (Less than 3.5 x 10
9
/L) (risk of neutropenia)   0 0 0 0 14 
25c 
Dose reduction of mycophenolate not made despite low white cell 
count (Less than 3.5 x 10
9
/L) (risk of neutropenia) 0 0 0 0 14 
25d 
Dose reduction of azathioprine not made despite low white cell 
count (Less than 3.5 x 10
9
/L) (risk of neutropenia)  0 0 0 0 14 
25e 
Dose reduction of mercaptopurine not made despite low white cell 
count (Less than 3.5 x 10
9
/L) (risk of neutropenia)   0 0 0 0 14 
28 
Oral methotrexate prescribed to a patient with an inappropriate 
frequency (increased risk of toxicity) 6 2 2 2 2 
34 
Baclofen dose not reduced in response to decreased renal 
function (eGFR < 90 ml/min/1.73m
2
) 0 0 0 0 14 
35 
Midazolam prescribed for procedural sedation at a dose 
inappropriate for the route of administration (e.g. oral dose 
prescribed via buccal route) 3 3 0 0 8 
37 Dose of paracetamol prescribed inappropriate for route of admin. 0 2 3 1 8 
39 
Aciclovir prescribed at a dose of 250mg/m2 instead of 500mg/m
2 
for herpes simplex encephalitis in patients aged between 3 
months and 12 years 0 0 0 0 14 
41 
Failure to increase of hydrocortisone to “sick day doses” from 
“maintenance” doses in those adrenally suppressed 0 0 0 0 14 
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Table 4.15 shows the CDS responses related to the therapeutic class of the 
error.  All the therapeutic types had some form of CDS in at least one of the 
sites.  No specific conclusions could be drawn form these results.   
Table 4.15 Therapeutic class of errors and level of clinical decision support response 
 Therapeutic Class 
(number of errors) 
Restricted 
(%) 
Guided 
(%) 
Permitted 
(with 
Input) (%) 
Alert 
(without 
Input) 
(%) None (%) 
Total 
Responses 
Gastrointestinal (2) 0 (0) 2 (7) 2 (7) 0 (0) 26 (87) 30 
Cardiovascular (8) 0 (0) 2 (2) 20 (17) 7 (6) 90 (76) 119 
Respiratory (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (7) 0 (0) 14 (93) 15 
Central Nervous 
System (5) 2 (3) 5 (7) 17 (24) 4 (6) 43 (61) 71 
Antimicrobial (14) 10 (5) 4 (2) 34 (17) 15 (8) 134 (68) 197 
Endocrine (2) 1 (4) 3 (11) 0 (0) 0 (0) 24 (86) 28 
Immunosuppressant 
(12) 6 (4) 2 (1) 12 (7) 8 (5) 140 (93) 168 
Nutrition (2) 1 (4) 1 (4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 26 (93) 28 
Anaesthetic (1) 3 (21) 3 (21) 0 (0) 0 (0) 8 (57) 14 
General (1) 2 (13) 1 (7) 11 (73) 1 (7) 0 (0) 15 
Musculoskeletal (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 14 (100) 14 
4.5.8 Error Likelihood Scoring 
In addition to simulating the errors within their EP system, respondents were 
asked two questions relating to the likelihood of the error occurring.  Firstly, 
how likely they thought a prescriber would make the error using the EP 
system; this gives an indication of the respondents view of the likely 
knowledge and experience of the prescriber and therefore, the likelihood they 
may make the prescribing errors described.  Secondly respondents were 
asked to consider how likely the error would then reach the patient; the 
intention here was to gain an understanding of the likelihood that post-
prescribing checks might prevent an error from reaching the patient. All of the 
respondents were paediatric pharmacists using the system in their hospitals.   
The median Likert scores with inter-quartile ranges for each error for both of 
these questions are shown in Figures 4.3 and 4.4.  For reference the error 
descriptions and full results are tabulated in Appendix 17. 
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Figure 4.3 Median and interquartile ranges for Likert scores for likelihood of prescribing error and of reaching the patient (Errors 1 - 22) 
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Figure 4.4 Median and interquartile ranges for Likert scores for likelihood of prescribing error and of reaching patient (Errors 23-41) 
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Figures 4.5 – 4.8 take the results shown in Fig 4.4 and 4.5 above specifically 
relating to the likelihood of the prescribing error to be made and attempt to 
show a relationship between this and the levels of CDS.  Four specific errors 
have been isolated to help illustrate this.   In each case the x-axis in each 
figure shows the level of CDS followed by a Likert score option.  The natural 
hierarchy of CDS is maintained from left to right with the highest possible level 
“restricted” on the left and “none” on the right.  For example “Guided/2” 
denotes the number of responses where the error offered Guided CDS (left 
hand bar) and the number of respondents who scored “2” on the Likert scale 
(right hand bar) for this error.  In each figure the number of responses for the 
left hand bar varies according to the number of responses received. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Level of clinical decision support and Likert responses for error 1a 
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Figure 4.6 Level of clinical decision support and Likert responses for error 12 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Level of clinical decision support and Likert responses for error 15 
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Figure 4.8 Level of clinical decision support and Likert responses for error 28 
These Figures (4.5 – 4.8) were chosen to illustrate the relationship between 
the levels of CDS and the perceived likelihood of the error being prescribed.  
Out of the 49 simulated errors they represent examples to illustrate possible 
relationships between the Likert scoring and CDS.  In the case of errors 1a 
and 15 there was very little CDS offered to the prescriber; indeed for error 15 
there was none.  In both these cases the perceived likelihood of the error 
being prescribed was high possible linked to greater numbers of answers at 
level 5 (no CDS) on the Likert scale. 
Errors 12 and 28 had the greatest level of CDS invoked during the simulation.  
In both these cases the Likert scoring is at a lower level with increased 
frequency of scores 1 and 2, possibly indicating a link to a reduction in the risk 
of the error being prescribed and the higher levels of CDS. 
4.6 Discussion 
In this research a range of EP systems were tested using a set of errors 
previously developed as part of this project.  The errors were agreed by 
consensus to have a high likelihood of causing harm should they reach the 
patient.  Development of the errors is fully described in Chapter 2 and 
published by Fox et al.126  The tests showed that in only 4.1 % of cases the 
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error was prevented by the EP system, and that in 74.2% of cases no warning 
or support was presented to the prescriber. 
Fifteen sites conducted the simulations using a variety of different EP 
systems.  None of the systems prevented or indeed provided warning to the 
prescriber about all the errors. 
Responses to the system settings questions were varied but in general 
provided a positive view of the way systems had been set up to accommodate 
paediatric prescribing.  Probably the most concerning finding was that in nine 
sites, there was no requirement for a weight to be entered prior to prescribing.  
The majority of prescribing for infants and children is based on weight and in 
the case of infants, weight increases rapidly over time.  For chronic medicines 
this can result in under dosing (in mg/kg) as the weight increases. 
Out of the 49 errors, only 9 (18.3%) were prevented by at least one EP 
system.  The error which was most commonly prevented was error 22 which 
relates to the way in which amphotericin is prescribed.  In 2007 the NPSA 
issued an alert highlighting incidents that had caused harm due to confusion 
between non-lipid and lipid based formulations of injectable amphotericin.134  It 
is encouraging to see that the potential risk of this specific error has been 
reduced by the use of EP.  Certainly EP lends itself well to preventing this type 
of error with the minimum of CDS, as the naming conventions can be agreed 
during system set up, which precludes the use of ambiguous names.  In all 
cases where explanatory notes were provided from sites, this error was 
prevented by only having the lipid formulation listed on the system.  However, 
the availability of a “Free-Text” drug entry option, allowing a prescriber to type 
any drug into the system together with a dose could override this safety 
feature.  In this case only one site where this error was prevented also 
disallowed “free-text” prescriptions. 
Error 28 had six sites where it was prevented.  This specific error is included 
in the NHSE Never Event framework135 and was the subject of an NPSA alert 
in 2004.136  So despite a relatively high level of professional and public 
awareness of the potential harm from oral methotrexate, there were 9 sites 
where this error was permitted within the EP system.  Indeed the risk to these 
sites of triggering a “Never Event” is higher, as the definition was altered in 
2015 whereby only those sites using EP were considered having the ability to 
prevent the error.  Sites that were able to prevent this error utilised pre-filled 
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frequencies as part of a prescribable bundle which were not editable, leaving 
the prescriber just to enter the dose. 
When considering all the errors in Table 4.9, with the exception of error 35 
they are all adult based errors and were originally identified in the eDelphi 
study described previously.90  Error 35 relates to a situation most commonly 
encountered in the paediatric population where midazolam is used by different 
routes for procedural sedation.  Only four of the sites were able to prevent this 
specific error, in the most part by use of pre-filled order sentences where the 
route of administration could not be altered.  It could of course be argued that 
the wrong order sentence could be selected for a route that was not intended; 
however, the dose for this route would still be correct within the order 
sentence meaning the patient would receive the correct dose if the 
prescription is followed. 
This result also suggests that systems have not been developed with 
paediatric patients in mind; several of the errors were paediatric specific and 
only one was prevented. 
Error 22 was not permitted in eight of the sites and as such is the most likely 
of the tested errors to be prevented.  This error lends itself well to being 
prevented by EP because the drug names are pre-populated in the system.  
The prescriber does not have to remember to add detail to the drug name 
about the formulation because it is already included.  However, EP systems 
can contribute to drug choice errors because the usual prescribing process 
involves picking the required drug from a drop down list.  Errors have been 
reported where the wrong drug is selected, particularly where they begin with 
similar letters137 and specifically with Slow-K® and Slow Na®.138 
CDS was available in all systems being tested and in 25.8% of the error 
simulations, some form of CDS was triggered to provide a warning to the 
prescriber. All of the CDS invoked could be described as basic i.e. allergy, 
drug-drug interaction and therapeutic duplication checking.    
Along with drug-drug interactions; therapeutic duplications were the most 
commonly provided CDS and represented a basic level of CDS.  These two 
types of error require a similar level of information within a system in order for 
them to present a warning to the prescriber.  Commonly, EP systems have 
drug interaction databases included as part of the installation.  These 
databases are usually provided and updated by a third party under licence by 
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the vendor of the EP system.  This means that if a drug is prescribed that has 
a link within the database to a drug with which it interacts or is therapeutically 
similar, an alert can be presented to the prescriber.  The results show that this 
type of CDS was common among the systems investigated.  However, in the 
case of drug-drug interactions, not all systems alerted the prescribers to all 
interactions.  This is because interactions are assigned a level of severity, 
usually between 1 and 4, where 4 is the most likely to cause harm.  System 
administrators can set a system to show alerts for interactions of certain levels 
and above.  This is illustrated in Table 4.14 which shows the results of the 
CDS levels from all sites using the same system (B).  There was variation in 
the number of “permitted with input” and “alert no input” warnings that were 
presented to the prescriber between different sites.  This was because some 
sites chose to switch drug-drug interactions alerting off completely, while 
others had only alerts for levels 3 and 4 presented to the prescriber.  The 
balance that system administrators must keep is between providing useful and 
meaningful alerts while not providing too many and risking alert fatigue. 
Where dosing errors did have CDS there was a range of CDS levels (Table 
4.15).  In the case of dosing errors prevented by guided CDS (1a, 1b, 5, 7, 28, 
35, 37), the systems all utilised a pre-filled order that provided the prescriber 
with default doses, calculated using the weight of the patient.  One site 
accounted for five of these responses, utilising a particular EP system which 
allowed this kind of CDS to be set up easily.  Two sites used this system and 
interestingly, the other site did not provide similar responses.  This again 
would indicate differences in system level set up options.  Error 37 had three 
sites (20%) where guided CDS was used; this probably reflects both the ease 
of set up and the high frequency of paracetamol prescribing, where the time 
required setting up guided CDS, if available, has the greatest potential impact.   
Out of the 24 dosing error types, nearly a third of them (15/62.5%) had no 
CDS.  Closer scrutiny revealed a difference within the dosing error types.  
Those where CDS was present, lend themselves to a level of decision support 
that could be described as internal, i.e. an attribute directly related to the 
inputs made at the time of entering the prescription in the system.  For 
example, errors 1a and 1b relate to the dose of domperidone that the 
prescriber would enter or have calculated based on the patient’s weight.  This 
prescription does not require any information from outside of the prescribing 
system.  However, the errors where no CDS was available all required 
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information generally outside of a prescribing system, such as clinical 
condition, renal function and blood cell counts.  To enable warnings to be 
provided to the prescriber for example, about a patient’s renal function, data 
including serum creatinine and urea are required.  This information is often 
held on a different electronic system within the hospital used by the pathology 
dept and without an interface, the ability to present these data is reduced. 
Furthermore, simple presentation of this data, whilst clearly an improvement, 
would not necessarily lead to any CDS being triggered.  For this to happen the 
system would need to recognise that, for example, an estimated creatinine 
clearance of 30ml/min in an adult is classed as mild renal failure; the system 
would then need to assimilate this and present an appropriate dose to the 
prescriber.  In some cases it can be more complicated than a single value.  
When reviewing liver function tests for a patient on methotrexate (Error 29), a 
trend in the results over time might need to be considered rather than a single 
result.  There may also be a requirement to compare these results with the 
patient’s baseline results rather than a recognised normal value.  This 
represents an advanced level of CDS which has not been shown in any of the 
systems used by the sites in this study.   
Clinical contraindication error types also require external information, relating 
to co-morbidities, to enable CDS to be provided to the prescriber.  There were 
seven error types of this nature and only six instances of any level of decision 
support across the 15 sites, involving errors 4 and 24.  In two sites, error 4 
triggered the “permitted with input” CDS level; in both cases this occurred only 
if the patient was also prescribed salbutamol and, therefore, the alert was 
triggered by virtue of a drug-drug interaction.  In one of these sites it was 
possible to set a rule that reviewed the co-morbidities of the patient and 
provided “notices” which could work for this error; however, this was not 
currently utilised.  Error 24 had three responses of guided CDS and one 
response of restricted CDS.  In these cases insulin was prevented from being 
prescribed “when required” by system restrictions on this type of prescribing 
for this specific drug. 
There was only one error type each for duration and omission where none of 
the systems provided any CDS.  The omission error 26 relates to the co-
prescribing of folinic acid for patients receiving high dose methotrexate.  High 
dose methotrexate was not used in all sites, and in other sites, chemotherapy 
was prescribed on a separate, dedicated prescribing system.  In some cases 
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the folinic acid was prescribed on the chemotherapy system in others the 
prescribing was separate.  During the eDelphi work, previously described (see 
Chapter 2), most doses of omission were removed during the exploratory 
round because they were not preventable by the use of EP.  This specific 
error was included because of its potential severity and the need for folinic 
acid being directly related to high dose methotrexate; therefore making it 
preventable by EP.  However, it is clear from the responses that this particular 
error is unlikely to be resolved while different systems are in use without any 
interface. 
The most advanced CDS that was described was the use of “quicklists” or 
“bundles”.  These are pre-programmed order sets which guide the prescriber 
to the correct dose by virtue of the patient’s weight and choice of route.  The 
ability to set these up is dependent on the EP system; not all systems have 
this functionality.  One system utilised maximum dose checking and this was 
based on weight, however, this was not set up for all drugs within the errors.  
Order sets can be developed to include more than one drug.  An example of 
this would be a post-operative pain order set which might contain morphine, 
paracetamol, an anti-emetic and naloxone.  These allow prescribers a short 
cut to the most commonly used combinations.  CDS will present alerts for 
individual drugs within an order set or bundle. 
Similar work has been published by Schiff et al139 and Slight et al140  They 
reviewed 10,060 medication errors reported to the national database in the 
US which had CPOE as a contributory factor in the error.  From these mainly 
adult errors they identified 21 error scenarios.  These scenarios were then 
tested on a range of EP systems available in the US.  The testing was carried 
out by prescribers who were asked to undertake the prescribing and were 
observed by an investigator.  In their attempts to prescribe the prescribers 
were allowed to use any workaround they were aware of in order to prescribe 
the erroneous scenario.  The ability of the system to prevent the error and the 
level of workarounds used were recorded.  Interestingly, as in the work 
presented here, not all errors were able to be tested, mainly due to formulary 
constraints or other design limitations.  Similarly all the testers were familiar 
with the systems in use; indeed in the work reported here two original contacts 
passed the tests on to staff that were more familiar with the system. 
The results showed that 79.5% of the erroneous orders could be prescribed 
on the EP systems.  This is comparable to the 90% permitted errors in the 
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work presented here.  Schiff el al139 reported that 28.0% of the errors were 
placed “easily” where the order was accepted with no extra steps or warnings.  
This is far better than the results reported here where 74.2% of the errors had 
no CDS and therefore, could be placed without extra steps or warnings, or in 
the terminology used by Schiff et al “easily”.139 
The test patients used in this study were adults and the majority of the test 
scenarios related to adult specific drugs.  However, the error types described 
in the tests were similar to those used here.  In addition, the errors were 
identified purely from spontaneously reported medication errors making it 
difficult to draw conclusions about the relative frequency of the specific 
problems.  The work described here specifically relates to errors that are likely 
to cause harm in children and the errors were derived from not only 
spontaneous reports but pharmacist interventions and the expertise and 
experience of the expert panel. 
Importantly this work identifies the importance of other post prescribing 
barriers which prevent prescribing errors from reaching the patient.  The 
potential for the errors described to reach the patient should it be prescribed, 
was assessed by the respondents and results shown in Figures 4.3 and 4.4.  
The prescribing error score gives an indication of how likely a prescriber using 
the system might make the error.  It is not just a consideration of the EP 
system but also the interaction of the prescriber with the system and that 
prescriber’s knowledge of the patient, drug and indication.  In other words the 
whole of the prescribing process as described previously (Chapter 1). 
Eight errors achieved a score of greater than 4 for this question suggesting 
these are the most likely prescribing errors (errors 2,5,6,11,13,14,15 and 39).  
In all cases these errors had no CDS in any of the systems.  In addition they 
are all errors which refer to information that would either be in another system 
or part of the knowledge of the prescriber.  For example error 39 which had 
the highest score, relates to the wrong dose of IV aciclovir for herpes simplex 
encephalitis.  In order for an EP system to provide an alert or warning it would 
need to know the indication being treated.  A low level CDS could warn 
prescribers that if they are prescribing for encephalitis, then a specific dose 
must be chosen; however, this would need to be presented for every 
prescription for aciclovir, possibly reducing its overall impact of the warning. 
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Four errors (23, 24, 37 39) had the greatest drop in score between the 
likelihood of the error being prescribed and the likelihood of it reaching the 
patient.  This suggests that these were most likely to be detected by post-
prescribing checks.  Two cases, IV ganciclovir (23) and folinic acid (24) relate 
to drugs which are routinely prepared in the pharmacy rather than at ward 
level; this may provide a higher level of local scrutiny.  In the case of 
paracetamol (37), probably the most common prescription for children in a 
hospital setting, nursing staff will routinely check and re-calculate doses.  Error 
39 relates to IV aciclovir and is discussed above. 
Seven errors received low scores of 2 or less.  These were errors 12, 21, 22, 
24, 28, 35 and 36.  All of these errors had relatively high levels of CDS when 
compared to other errors.  In all cases the likelihood of the error reaching the 
patient also scored low, which suggests the CDS is helping to prevent the 
error from reaching the patient. 
In all cases the scores for the likelihood of the error reaching the patient are 
less than or equal to the prescribing error scores.  This is reassuring as it 
would suggest that all sites utilise post prescribing checks to reduce the risk of 
errors reaching the patient. 
 
It is clear from the results that there are few barriers within the EP systems in 
use in the UK to prevent errors that are known to cause harm and therefore, 
the post-prescribing checks remain vital to prevent it.  Four examples of errors 
had their Likert response scores combined with the CDS level scores in an 
attempt to see if there was a possible relationship.  These results illustrate that 
there were errors that were, in the opinion of the respondents, likely to be 
prescribed on an EP system.  Where these errors invoked a higher level of 
CDS there was a suggestion from these examples that the error was less 
likely to be prescribed. 
4.7 Limitations 
There are a number of possible limitations to consider with this work.  Firstly, 
not all of the original 21 sites identified completed the survey.  This may mean 
that a unique EP system in use in the UK was not subjected to the test. 
Error simulation was performed by paediatric pharmacists rather than 
prescribers.  In the Schiff et al139 work, prescribers were asked to try and 
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prescribe the error for a test patient using any means possible including work-
arounds.  It could therefore, be argued that this work did not simulate the true 
electronic prescribing process.  However, the results do give an insight into 
the ability for the EP systems, currently in use, to help prevent a specific group 
of errors.  Future work should take this into account. 
The Likert scoring was performed only by pharmacists originally contacted to 
complete the survey.  It is possible that their views of whether a prescribing 
error is likely to occur are different from prescribers.  It was assumed that all 
sites had a clinical pharmacy service to the paediatric specialties and 
therefore, the respondents would be familiar with the prescribing practices in 
their sites. 
A proportion of the errors were deemed not applicable as paper prescribing 
was used.  This reduced the number of responses for these errors making 
specific conclusions difficult.  In most sites the use of a paper prescription is 
usually cross referenced within the EP system by using a dummy drug file,  
e.g. “Heparin Infusion – see paper chart” which was quoted by some sites for 
error 7.  While the use of a dummy drug on the EP system was not fully 
investigated, the author’s experience is that they can be tagged within the EP 
system to a target drug and therefore, provide appropriate warning where 
applicable.  So in the heparin example, if a patient was already prescribed an 
oral anticoagulant, the prescriber would be presented with a therapeutic 
duplicate warning when prescribing the heparin dummy drug.  Of course this 
does assume that the prescriber will prescribe on both EP and paper, which in 
the prescriber’s eyes could be construed as a duplication of effort.  This 
presents its own challenges in terms of the prescribing process. 
4.8 Conclusion 
The EP systems in use in the UK do not prevent the majority of harmful errors 
from being prescribed to paediatric patients.  Levels of CDS and warning 
provided to prescribers vary considerably. 
None of the systems were specifically designed for use with paediatric 
patients and they were all commercially available systems rather than home-
grown developments.  The author is aware of a system which, at the time of 
writing, has gone live.  It has been designed specifically for a Children’s 
Hospital.  So as part of further work it will be fascinating to compare this 
system with those already studied. 
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Chapter 5 Overall Discussion and Conclusions 
5.1 Introduction 
To the author’s knowledge, this is the first work undertaken in the UK to test 
electronic prescribing systems that are used for paediatric patients in hospital, 
for their ability to prevent errors likely to cause harm.  The work described in 
this thesis has created new knowledge concerning the way electronic 
prescribing systems are utilised in the paediatric setting in UK hospitals.  The 
original aims and objectives have been achieved and the work has stimulated 
and identified the need for further research.  This chapter brings together the 
research and reviews and makes conclusions.  Limitations of the work will 
also be discussed and ideas for further work postulated. 
5.2 Literature Review 
A review of the literature pertaining to the use of EP in paediatric hospital 
settings was undertaken.  This showed that EP systems could clearly reduce 
the incidence of prescribing errors and in some cases, a reduction in errors 
that could cause harm.  However, it also highlighted a range of definitions for 
medication errors and different methods for identifying them.  This makes 
comparison of data very difficult and does not allow researchers to make any 
clear conclusions. 
5.3 Prescribing Indicators 
Prescribing indicators were chosen as a means of providing a clear definition 
of a prescribing error, i.e. by describing a set of very specific errors.  These 
could then form the basis of an easily reproducible method of evaluating an 
EP system.  Other tools such as the trigger tool have been used to identify 
errors, but they currently rely on retrospective analysis of notes.61, 141  
A set of 41 paediatric prescribing errors was developed using an eDelphi 
methodology to gain consensus from an expert panel.  The eDelphi method 
allowed an electronic transfer of a large amount of information to each of the 
expert panel members.  This was an efficient way of conducting multiple 
rounds of scoring in order to gain consensus.  It was used in the development 
of the adult prescribing indicators90 on which this work was based.   
There are three common methodologies for determining consensus within 
healthcare: nominal group processes, consensus development panels and the 
Delphi technique.  The nominal group process involves four phases, three of 
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which involve face to face presentation and discussion about a set of solutions 
to the proposed problem.  The solutions to the problem under discussion are 
generated anonymously by the panel members for subsequent discussion.  It 
has been used particularly for the appropriateness of interventions in health 
care.92  Consensus development panels are organised conferences or events 
specifically planned to discuss a topic.  They are commonly used to formulate 
policy and strategic plans.  It is a multidisciplinary approach involving a great 
deal of face to face discussion.  Specific methodology is not agreed and the 
logistics and cost involved make it unfeasible for most researchers.93 
A recent review of the three methods by Waggoner et al118 outlined the 
advantages and disadvantages of each method.  It made recommendations 
specifically on Delphi studies in terms of panel size, number of rounds, 
definition of “expert” and statistical analysis.  The recommended panel size 
was 5-11 members; however, this is based on face to face discussion rather 
than the electronic process used in this work.  The optimal number of rounds 
was two, which was also used in the work (excluding the exploratory round).  
A definition of expert was not considered in this work.  The panel was 
identified through the author’s own professional networks within paediatrics 
and paediatric pharmacy.  It might have been prudent to insist on a minimum 
number of years’ experience during the selection process.  However, the 
resulting panel of 21 members had a total of 424 years of paediatric 
experience, with the minimum being nine.   
The initial list of indicators was developed from a range of sources including 
the expert panel itself.  Consensus was achieved on a group of 41 indicators 
which had the potential to cause harm if they were prescribed and 
subsequently reached the patient.  This work was subsequently published in 
the British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology.126  
The indicators, while relating to potential errors for a specific drug, also 
included a range of error types such as wrong dose, contraindication and 
allergy.  They therefore, can provide not just a measure relating to specific 
drugs but also general measures to reduce the risk of these error types.   
The second phase of this research involved the identification of hospitals 
currently using EP for their paediatric patients.  The paediatric pharmacist at 
each of the sites was asked to simulate the prescribing indicators and provide 
a description as to whether the indicator was permitted by their system and 
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what level of clinical decision support (CDS), if any, was provided to the 
prescriber.  A detailed description of this work is provided in Chapter 4. 
In summary, the majority of the errors described in the indicators could be 
prescribed on the eight different EP systems that were studied (90%).  In 
addition, in only 28.2% of cases was a warning provided to the prescriber to 
help prevent the error from being prescribed. 
While warnings and alerts were provided to the prescriber for specific drugs, 
the results suggest that only basic levels of CDS are in place.  This did not 
come as a surprise as it is the experience of the author in his local centre. 
There are a number of reasons for this, some of which have already been 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
5.4 Paediatric Versus Adult. 
At all sites the EP system had been designed for use in a general clinical 
setting rather than specifically for paediatric prescribing.  There is a clear 
organisational advantage of having a single EP system across a single 
organisation, such as a reduction in licence costs and administrative support.  
However, this means that compromises in the way the system works across 
all patient types may have to be made.  Cordero et al71 showed the benefit of 
having a system specifically designed for paediatric and neonatal patients 
where, despite having a basic EP system there were significant decreases in 
errors. 
The dual setting issue was highlighted specifically in one site (site 8) where 
adult based dose ranges and rounding were present in the system.  
Specifically, for indicator 14 the dose was rounded to the nearest 200mg.  
This is perfectly acceptable for this drug in adult patients and indeed some 
older children, as ceftriaxone has a relatively wide therapeutic range.  It also 
means that drug preparation for nursing staff is made simpler.  However, 
ceftriaxone is licensed for use in children from as young as 4 weeks who may 
only weigh 4kg.  A 200mg dose adjustment for a 4kg patient represents a 
dose change of 50mg/kg which is far in excess of the normal dosing limits for 
this drug. One of the studies reviewed in Chapter 175 used a system designed 
for adults with adult dosing ranges and this was cited as one of the reasons 
the reduction in prescribing errors in the paediatric setting was not as great as 
that seen with adults. 
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There were a number of indicators that were not specific to the paediatric 
setting; for example indicator 28 which relates to the frequency of dosing of 
methotrexate.  This indicator was originally identified during indicator 
development from an NPSA alert136 and the Never Event framework135 it was 
also included in the adult indicators previously published.90  Methotrexate is 
prescribed for children but not as commonly as for adults and one could argue 
that it does not represent a common prescribing error in children.  It was 
included in the original list because of the high potential for harm and because 
the frequency error should lend itself to being prevented by EP.  Following the 
eDelphi process it did become one of the final 41 indicators.  It was reassuring 
to see that this indicator, which has had a relatively high level of publicity, had 
one of the highest rates of CDS.   
5.5 Acclimatisation 
The literature review also highlighted the importance of taking into account an 
acclimatisation period following implementation of an EP system.  Users need 
time to become accustomed to their system, understand how it works and get 
used to changes in their work flows.  This can itself contribute to more errors 
in the initial period after implementation.  All of the sites which undertook 
indicator simulation had been using their system for enough time for 
acclimatisation (mean: 4.4 years; range: 8 months – 22 years).  The 
pharmacists who undertook the simulation, therefore, were familiar with the 
systems, removing any concern about unfamiliarity. 
5.6 Use of Indicators 
The indicators are suitable for continued assessment of an EP system over 
time.  Kadmon et al78 showed the impact of the evolution of an EP system 
over time.  With increasing levels of CDS added to their system, there were 
further reductions in prescribing errors.  As the use of EP systems in the UK 
develops, hospitals will be looking to change or upgrade their systems.  The 
indicators can be used to evaluate any upgrade either prospectively within a 
test environment, or prospectively in real prescribing situations.  To aid 
evaluation of either a first implementation or an upgrade, both the adult and 
paediatric indicators have been incorporated into a web based data collection 
tool.142  This is available free for any UK trust wishing to undertake an 
evaluation.  Data from sites using the tool will be collected centrally by the 
University of Birmingham.  This will allow data to be analysed nationally to 
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compare systems and sites as implementation occurs.  The author will be 
involved in the analysis of paediatric data in the future. 
It would be tempting to compare systems by virtue of the number of indicators 
that were permitted.  This represents a very simplified and crude measure of 
what is actually happening.  Rather, the presence or absence of some form of 
CDS for each of the indicators represents a more nuanced way of comparing 
systems.   
It could be argued that three of the indicators should not be permitted: allergy, 
methotrexate frequency and amphotericin preparation.  These indicators lend 
themselves easily to a basic level of CDS.  Indeed, the results show that these 
indicators commonly triggered warnings to the prescriber.  However, it is 
necessary, in some cases to be able to override the system constraints.  This 
is particularly the case in relation to allergies.  Patients often cite an allergy to 
penicillin but this is not always a true allergic reaction; it may have been an 
adverse effect such as nausea or diarrhoea which is miss-construed as an 
allergy.  If one of these patients requires a penicillin containing antibiotic, the 
prescriber is faced with a decision.  Penicillin and penicillin containing 
antimicrobials are contra-indicated in patients with a true allergy.  The EP 
system, however, may not be advanced enough to distinguish between a true 
allergy and a sensitivity or previous adverse effect.  Furthermore, the EP 
system may not have a field in which the symptom or severity of the allergic 
reaction can be recorded.  In this case it may be acceptable to override any 
alerts provided to the prescriber. 
This highlights the impact and importance of the underlying information that 
becomes part of a patient’s record within an EP system. 
In the case of amphotericin the need to distinguish between plain and lipid 
formulations is vital and there are no clinical situations in which this needs to 
be overridden.  Not all EP systems in the study were able to prevent this 
specific indicator – indeed some of the sites had taken a policy decision to 
remove plain amphotericin from the hospital completely, thereby preventing 
the potential, for this error. 
5.7 Alert Variation 
There was a wide variation between sites in the number and type of warnings 
presented to prescribers in an attempt to prevent the prescribing errors.  Drug-
drug interactions and therapeutic duplications were the most common error 
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types that invoked a warning.  The reasons for this have previously been 
discussed in Chapter 4 along with the differences between sites.  A wide 
variation in high priority drug interaction alerts was also reported in the US by 
McEvoy et al.143  Variety in the use of order sets or “bundles” has also been 
described.144 
The inference is that all the indicators should invoke at least some form of 
alert to the prescriber.  However, this is likely to result in an increase in the 
number of alerts shown to prescribers, which raises the spectre of alert 
fatigue. 
5.8 Alert Fatigue 
Alert fatigue is the phenomenon whereby a prescriber gets used to certain 
levels of alerts and begins to ignore them or regard them as a nuisance.  
Prescribers will try and find a work-around in their processes, which may or 
may not result in fewer alerts.  A study of medication dose alerts presented to 
prescribers in a US hospital was published in 2013.145  It reported an 8.5% 
acceptance rate for dose range alerts and 5.5% for informational alerts.   In 
addition to the direct consequences of ignoring alerts,146 there are indirect 
consequences of the impact of distractions on clinical decision making.147 
Horsky et al148, 149 have reviewed best practices for CDS, specifically for 
prescribing interventions.  They made several recommendations specifically 
about alerts such as tiered severity levels, concise text and meaningful use of 
colour.  Just as importantly they described desirable system attributes such as 
consistent terminology, workflow integration and density of information on the 
screen.  They also highlighted the importance of integrating contextual patient 
data into the decision logic. The results of the work presented here clearly 
show that these elements are lacking in the EP systems in use in the UK.  The 
poor specificity of alerts leads to a lowering of the perceived signal to noise 
ratio and therefore, increases the risk of critical or dangerous prescribing 
errors. 
One possible solution would be to build a system which alerted the prescriber 
only when prescribing the errors described in the paediatric prescribing 
indicators developed in this research.  In order to achieve this, a very high 
degree of specificity would need to be included in the system.  For example, 
the system would need to alert the prescriber only when the specific drug 
interactions involved in the list of indicators were being prescribed, and ignore 
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all other interactions.  The same argument would apply to the other error 
types.  While it could be possible to program a system only to alert the 
prescriber when the drugs in the indicators are being prescribed at the wrong 
dose; would this make the system safe?  The indicators were developed in 
order to identify errors likely to cause harm, in an effort to develop a tool to 
measure the effectiveness of an EP system to prevent harm.  They represent 
errors likely to cause significant harm.  However, there are, of course, 
numerous other specific wrong dose errors that could cause harm in children 
(see Chapter 1).  It was impossible to include all of them in the indicator list.  
By including a range of error types such as dosing errors, interactions and 
contra-indications, it has been possible to obtain a general sense of how safe 
a system is.  More specifically, in the case of wrong dose errors, the ability to 
prevent the indicator errors gives an indication of the ability of the system to 
identify dosing errors generally by using a form of dose range checking.  Very 
few of the systems tested in the study had the ability to do this.  In the ones 
that did, the dose range checking was used in only a limited number of drugs. 
5.9 “Free-text” Prescriptions 
All EP systems rely on a database of drugs and medications from which the 
prescriber can choose.  Not all medicines will be included in this list.  In this 
case the prescriber may be able to use a free-text option when prescribing.  If 
so it is likely that none of the CDS available in the system will be applied to 
this prescription, including allergy checking.  This clearly has safety 
implications and, in general free-text prescribing, should be kept to a 
minimum, by maintaining the drug database within the system.  A recent 
review by Tolley et al150 identified the need to use free-text prescriptions due 
to the lack of available dosing options as a system design attribute linked to 
prescribing errors in paediatrics  In the simulation work described in this 
report, it was assumed that the prescriber would not choose to write each drug 
up using a free-text option.  In the author’s experience this process requires 
several extra key strokes which means prescribers are more inclined to 
search for the correct drug.  Conversely, having a long list of similar products 
to choose from in a drop-down list can increase the likelihood of picking 
errors.137 
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5.10 Organisational aspects 
One organisational aspect of EP is the general IT strategy adopted by the 
organisation.  Some sites, as in the researcher’s own, adopt a “best of breed” 
approach, whereby systems specifically developed to undertake a function 
within a hospital setting, are purchased or commissioned.  This results in 
discrete systems for prescribing: pharmacy, pathology, radiology and critical 
care for example.  While these systems individually may be excellent and 
achieve the original specification, there may not be appropriate interfaces 
between them.  This was highlighted in Chapter 4 with indicators that related 
to information about the patient’s blood tests and co-morbidities.  There was 
no CDS in any of the systems that warned the prescriber the patient may have 
a low white blood cell count.  This would have required a link to the blood 
tests for that patient. 
Some organisations (particularly in the US) adopt a single hospital-wide 
system that does everything.  Implementation of these systems is much more 
arduous and expensive than individual systems.  While links between 
departments and information can easily be made, the specifications for each 
area may not be fully met.  The systems tend to be cumbersome and are less 
likely to be customisable for a specific organisation.  Support from the vendor 
may also be a consideration. 
5.11 Post- Prescribing Checks 
As previously discussed, the indicators represent prescribing errors which are 
likely to cause harm.   As such they provide a measure of the level of harm 
that can be avoided if the errors are prevented by an EP system.  However, as 
we have seen, a large number of the errors are not prevented or their risk 
mitigated by CDS.  The respondents were asked to give their opinion on 
whether a specific prescribing error was likely to be made and then if made, 
how likely it would be to reach the patient.  The results show that even if 
prescribed, in many cases the error would be picked up before it reached the 
patient.  For the EP systems seen in this work, with relatively basic CDS, the 
importance of these post prescribing checks is clear.  It is reassuring to see 
that these checks are in place and it highlights the importance of other health 
care professionals in the system and their contribution to keeping patients 
safe. 
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5.12 Limitations of this Research 
The prescribing indicators were developed with the express intention of 
evaluating whether or not an EP system would prevent them.  They included a 
range of error types and as we have seen, EP systems showed a variety of 
performance in the tests.   
As EP systems become more widely used in secondary care, and certainly in 
the US where they are in more common use, there is an increasing interest in 
errors that occur as a result of EP or where EP is a contributory factor.  The 
vulnerability testing by Schiff et al139 discussed in Chapter 4 was designed to 
evaluate EP systems against a test formulated from incident reports that cited 
EP as a contributory factor.   
In addition to the testing detailed by Schiff et al139 the Leapfrog group also has 
a CPOE testing process used in the US.151  The Leapfrog system requires 
hospitals to register and attempt to order a series of test prescriptions for a 
group of test patients.  The results are recorded online and the hospital given 
a score.  The test is used for benchmarking hospitals across the US.152  
The prescribing indicators described in this work were not designed 
specifically to identify errors caused by EP systems.  However, they do 
describe errors which could be prevented by an EP system that took into 
account the issues described in the review.  Apart from the adult nature of the 
tests developed by Schiff et al139 the range of error types are the same.  
Future work could include reference to the impact of EP as a contributory 
factor to the error to ensure the indicators provide a comprehensive test of a 
system. 
The researcher who conducted this work is an experienced paediatric 
pharmacist.  It is important to consider what effect he may have had on the 
research.  The simulation exercise was carried out by a different paediatric 
pharmacist in the researcher’s own local centre.  As a paediatric pharmacist 
with 24 years’ experience, the researcher is well aware of the risk of 
medication errors in children and indeed the wider population.  The evidence 
of the impact of medication errors in paediatrics has been presented and is 
clear.  Despite that, it is possible that a bias towards paediatric care could 
have had an impact on the way the research was carried out and reported.  
However, it is precisely because of this experience that the research was 
focussed on the paediatric population and has enabled the conclusions to be 
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made from the data collected.  The results have been presented to show the 
specific concerns around prescribing errors in children, but reference to the 
impact of this with adult patients has been alluded to.  The researcher’s 
experience has meant that the data can be analysed and reviewed in the 
context of paediatric prescribing and appropriate conclusions made.   
5.13 Future Research 
The use of the indicators to assess the impact of the implementation of an EP 
system has already been alluded to.  Data are currently being collected by the 
All Wales Quality and Patient Safety Group (AWQ&PS) using both adult and 
paediatric indicators.124  The author has been involved in the development of 
an electronic data collection tool which includes the paediatric indicators 
developed in this work.  The tool allows ward based pharmacists to collect 
information on prescribed medicines and possible triggers related to the 
indicators.  This is in advance of the implementation of the Welsh Hospital 
Electronic Prescribing, Pharmacy and Medicines Administration (WHEPPMA) 
system.  The implementation of WHEPPMA is likely to be at least two years 
away, so this gives ample opportunity to collect data on both paediatric and 
adult prescribing errors.  The researcher will remain involved in the data 
analysis for this work. 
Brown et al153 published  a systematic review of prescribing errors generated 
from computerised provider order entry systems in primary and secondary 
care.  They included 34 studies from a range of countries.  Eight themes 
associated with EP related prescribing errors emerged from this review: 
computer screen display, drop-down menus and auto-population, wording, 
default settings, non-intuitive or inflexible ordering, repeat prescriptions and 
automated processes, users’ work processes and CDS systems.  While CDS 
was cited as one of the themes which has been explored in the work 
presented here, the importance of the other themes must not be overlooked.  
It is possible that vendors apply a greater level of emphasis on CDS to 
prevent prescribing errors rather than taking into account the design and 
flexibility of a system. 
In this work the indicators were simulated by the paediatric pharmacist at the 
site.  One possible option for the future would be to get prescribers to 
undertake the simulation as in the work reported by Schiff et al.139  The 
advantages of this would be that observing the prescribers would allow a 
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better understanding of how they interact with the EP system and the 
workarounds that might be used.  In addition an assessment as to how easy it 
is to prescribe the errors could be made.  Socio-technological issues could 
then be qualitatively analysed using the themes described by Brown et al153  
The indicators may need to be updated as both the range of drugs used in the 
paediatric population changes, and EP systems become more advanced.  
However, this is unlikely to be required in the next five years.  Paediatric drug 
therapy does not alter as rapidly as adult drug therapy.  New treatments are 
rarely licensed for the paediatric population.  In addition, the prescribing 
indicators cover a range of prescribing error types which in themselves, are 
unlikely to change.   
Errors can occur at any point in the drug use process.  Administration errors 
are also a concern and have been reported to occur at higher rates than 
prescribing errors in the paediatric setting.30  EP systems, certainly in the UK, 
are combined with an electronic administration record as well, often termed 
electronic prescribing and medicines administration (EPMA) systems.  
Currently, methods to evaluate administration errors rely on observational 
techniques or spontaneous event recording, as discussed in Chapter 1.  It 
may be feasible to develop and test a set of administration indicators that 
could be used in a similar way to test EPMA systems for their ability to prevent 
such errors. 
5.14 Future Practice 
The results of this work clearly show that EP systems do not currently prevent 
the majority of potentially harmful paediatric prescribing errors.  In terms of 
future practice there are two workstreams that could be undertaken as a 
consequence.   
Firstly, it is possible that prescribers faced with using a new EP system have a 
specific set of expectations in the system’s ability to prevent prescribing 
errors.  Managing these expectations is vital throughout the whole of the 
implementation and ongoing management of an EP system.  A recent report 
by Puaar et al154 detailed a qualitative evaluation of the impact of an inpatient 
prescribing system on prescribing errors.  One of the themes detailed related 
to expectations of decision support.  There was an expectation that the 
system would prevent certain errors such as duplications and incorrect doses, 
when it did not.  A detailed understanding of the EP system and the CDS, 
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provided by use of the indicators, could help to provide detailed evidence and 
support to prescribers rather than allowing them to find out during training or 
routine use. 
Secondly, the results highlight the importance of the post prescribing check in 
preventing errors from reaching patients.  Hospital staff involved in these 
processes such as pharmacists, nurses and midwives also need an 
understanding of the constraints within their EP system.  This will allow them 
to target their activity in such a way as to make the most of their, possibly 
limited, resources. 
5.15 Conclusion 
The aim of this programme of research was to evaluate the ability of electronic 
prescribing systems to prevent prescribing errors known to cause harm in the 
secondary care paediatric setting.  In order to achieve this, a set of 41 
paediatric prescribing indicators were developed by consensus with an expert 
panel.126  The indicators were subsequently used in a simulation test of eight 
different EP systems across 15 different NHS trusts in the UK. 
The majority of errors were not prevented by the EP system under test.  Post 
prescribing checks by pharmacy and nursing staff were identified as barriers 
to the error reaching the patient. 
Suggestions for the development of EP and CDS systems and the way they 
are set up within care settings can be made from these results; for EP 
systems specifically, the need for warnings relating to the dose based on the 
diagnosis, and the functionality to link or provide other clinical data at the point 
of prescribing.  For system set up, the utilisation of functionality to assist 
prescribers to prevent prescribing errors, while providing an appropriate level 
of meaningful warnings during the prescribing process.  Lastly, there is a clear 
requirement to understand the differences in prescribing for children and for 
EP systems to have the appropriate functionality to accommodate these 
differences. 
This is the first such work to be carried out in the paediatric patient population 
in the UK.  It has highlighted the current shortcomings of EP and CDS 
systems and can influence and direct future work in this field to continue to 
help reduce the risk of prescribing errors in our paediatric hospital settings. 
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 Appendix 1 – Literature Review Search Strategy 
 
1. EMBASE; *MEDICATION ERROR/; 
2. EMBASE; "prescribing error".ti,ab;  
3. EMBASE; "dispensing error".ti,ab;  
4. EMBASE; "administration error".ti,ab; 
5. EMBASE; 1 OR 2 OR 3 OR 4; 6611  
6. EMBASE; 5 [Limit to: Human and English Language and Publication Year 1999-2014]; 
7. EMBASE; *ELECTRONIC PRESCRIBING/; 
8. EMBASE; "electronic prescribing".ti,ab; 
9. EMBASE; "e-prescribing".ti,ab; 395 results. 
10. EMBASE; *COMPUTERIZED PROVIDER ORDER ENTRY/; 
11. EMBASE; 7 OR 8 OR 9 OR 10; 
12. EMBASE; 11 [Limit to: Human and English Language and Publication Year 1999-2014]; 
 
 
Databases searched – Embase, Medline and CINAHL.  Appropriate related terms 
used in Medline and CINHAL based on thesaurus. 
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 Appendix 2 – Email Invitation 
 
Email invitation to potential expert panel members 
 
 
 
An evaluation of the impact of electronic prescribing on paediatric 
prescribing errors in a secondary care setting. 
 
Participant Information 
Background 
Prescribing safety indicators have been developed for primary and secondary care settings 
for the adult population88, 90.  This project aims to develop a set of prescribing indicators for 
the paediatric population in secondary care by gaining consensus from a range of experts 
on the likelihood and chance of significant harm in secondary care.  I will then use the 
indicators to evaluate the impact of electronic prescribing on the incidence of frequent or 
high risk prescribing errors likely to cause harm. 
 
The eDelphi Process 
I am using electronic Delphi (eDelphi) technique to gain consensus on the opinions of 
experts through a series of questionnaires. The technique has been used previously in 
healthcare research to establish consensus.  I have derived an initial list of 122 prescribing 
safety indicators through literature searching and clinical experience for consideration by 
the panel of experts.    
 
The eDelphi will be conducted in three rounds and all data received and exchanged via 
email. 
 
Round 1 
(Exploratory) 
A list of indicators will be sent out to participants, who will be asked to 
suggest critical indicators that they think are missing.  Also to suggest any 
changes to wording or terminology. 
 
Round 2 Responses from Round 1 will be analyzed and collated into a second 
revised, list of indicators, which will be sent by email to participants. This 
spreadsheet will have a scoring functionality, where participants will score 
the likelihood of the error occurring and the seriousness of the error should 
it occur using a 5-point Likert scale. 
 
Round 3 Participants will receive a second spreadsheet containing their initial score 
and the median score for each indicator. Participants will be asked if they 
want to change their score in response to the groups median value. A 
comments section will allow respondents to justify/comment on their 
scoring decision. 
 
 
Participants are asked to respond within two weeks for each round of the process. 
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If you have any further questions please do not hesitate to contact me. 
 
Andy Fox 
Director – Southampton Pharmacy Research Centre(023 8120 4201) 
eDelphipaed@uhs.nhs.uk 
 
References 
1. Thomas SK, McDowell SE, Hodson J, Nwulu U, Howard RL, Avery AJ, et al. Developing consensus on 
hospital prescribing indicators of potential harms amenable to decision support. British Journal of Clinical 
Pharmacology. 2013;76(5):797-809. 
2. Avery AJ, Dex GM, Mulvaney C, Serumaga B, Spencer R, Lester HE, et al. Development of prescribing-
safety indicators for GPs using the RAND Appropriateness Method. Br J Gen Pract. 2011 Aug;61(589):e526-36. 
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 Appendix 3 – Participant Details Form 
 
 
 
An evaluation of the impact of electronic prescribing on paediatric prescribing 
errors in a secondary care setting using prescribing indicators 
 
Participant Application Information 
 
 
If you would like to take part in the research project please complete the following details 
 
 
Name  
Hospital Address 
 
 
 
 
Email  
Job Title  
Qualifications  
Years of clinical experience (post 
qualification) 
 
Years of experience with electronic 
prescribing systems (does not have to be 
paediatric) 
 
 
 
If you require any further information please do not hesitate to contact me. 
 
 
 
Andy Fox 
Director – Southampton Pharmacy research Centre 
eDelphipaed@uhs.nhs.uk 
023 8120 4201 
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 Appendix 4 – Adult Indicators 
Adult indicators previously published90 – results of review for consideration as paediatric indicators.          continued 
 
Indicator Original Adult Descriptor Include 
Y=Yes 
N=No 
M=Modified  
Notes and cross 
reference to 
final list 
Proton-pump inhibitors prescribed at the same time 
as antacid formulations (therapeutic effect of the 
proton-pump inhibitor reduced) 
Timing of antacid and proton-pump inhibitor 
dosing should be separated 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Diphenoxylate, loperamide, or codeine phosphate 
prescribed as antidiarrhoeal agents for treatment of 
diarrhoea of unknown cause (increased risk of 
exacerbating constipation with overflow diarrhoea) 
Risk of delayed diagnosis, may exacerbate 
constipation with overflow diarrhoea, may 
precipitate toxic megacolon in inflammatory bowel 
disease, may delay recovery in unrecognised 
gastroenteritis 
N Rare indication in 
paediatrics 
Diphenoxylate, loperamide, codeine phosphate 
prescribed as antidiarrhoeal agents for treatment of 
severe infective gastroenteritis (e.g. bloody diarrhoea, 
high fever, or severe systemic toxicity) (increased risk 
of exacerbation or protraction of infection) 
Risk of exacerbation or protraction of infection N Rare indication in 
paediatrics 
Digoxin prescribed at a dose >125 micrograms daily 
to a patient with renal impairment (increased risk of 
digoxin toxicity) 
Risk of digoxin toxicity when given at doses >125 
micrograms in patients with renal impairment  
M Combined into 
single digoxin 
indicator (4) 
Digoxin prescribed at a dose of >125 micrograms 
daily to a patient with heart failure who is in sinus 
rhythm (increased risk of digoxin toxicity) 
Risk of digoxin toxicity when given at doses >125 
micrograms in patients with heart failure 
M Combined into 
single digoxin 
indicator(4) 
Digoxin prescribed concomitantly with a diuretic (risk 
of hypokalaemia and subsequent digoxin toxicity) 
Risk of potassium below 4 mmol/litre - increased 
risk of sensitising the myocardium to digoxin 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
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Adult indicators previously published90 – results of review for consideration as paediatric indicators.          continued 
 
Indicator Original Adult Descriptor Include 
Y=Yes 
N=No 
M=Modified  
Notes and cross 
reference to 
final list 
Statins prescribed concomitantly with macrolide 
antibacterials (increased risk of myopathy) 
Macrolide antibacterials can increase the 
concentration of statins 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Thiazide diuretic prescribed to a patient with a history 
of gout (increased risk of exacerbating symptoms in 
pre-existing gout) 
Thiazide diuretics can cause hyperuricaemia and 
gout, and can therefore exacerbate symptoms in 
pre-existing gout 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Two loop diuretics prescribed concomitantly 
(increased risk of adverse effects) 
Increased risk of adverse effects N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Thiazide prescribed to a patient with chronic kidney 
disease (CKD) stage 3 (eGFR< 45/ml/min/1.73m2) or 
above (increased risk of side effects) 
No clinical benefit and may get adverse effects N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Potassium-sparing diuretic (excluding aldosterone 
antagonists) prescribed to a patient also receiving an 
ACE inhibitor or angiotensin-II receptor antagonist 
(increased risk of severe hyperkalaemia) 
Increased risk of severe hyperkalaemia Y (5) 
Amiodarone prescribed to a patient with abnormal 
thyroid function tests (increased risk of thyroid 
disorders) 
Amiodarone can cause thyroid disorders Y (6) 
Amiodarone prescribed concomitantly with 
simvastatin 40 mg or above (increased risk of 
myopathy) 
Stain concentration increased by amiodarone, 
increasing risk of myopathy 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Non-cardioselective beta-adrenoceptor blocking drug 
prescribed to a patient  with COPD (increased risk of 
bronchospasm) 
Beta-adrenoceptor blocking drugs can cause 
bronchospasm.  A cardio-selective form should be 
prescribed if one is essential for a co-existing 
condition 
N Indication not 
applicable in 
paediatrics 
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Adult indicators previously published90 – results of review for consideration as paediatric indicators.          continued 
 
Indicator Original Adult Descriptor Include 
Y=Yes 
N=No 
M=Modified  
Notes and cross 
reference to 
final list 
Beta-adrenoceptor blocking drug prescribed to a 
patient with asthma (increased risk of bronchospasm 
and acute deterioration) 
Beta-adrenoceptor blocking drugs are known to 
cause bronchoconstriction in asthmatics, and can 
cause acute deterioration 
Y (7) 
ACE inhibitor or angotensin-II receptor antagonist 
prescribed to a patient with a potassium level >5.0 
mmol/litre (can cause or exacerbate hyperkalaemia) 
ACE inhibitors and angiotensin-II receptor 
antagonists can cause hyperkalaemia and are 
contraindicated in patients with a potassium 
concentration about the desired reference range 
Y (8) 
Aliskiren prescribed concomitantly with ACE inhibitors 
or angiotensin-II receptor antagonists (increased risk 
of serious adverse cardiovascular and renal 
outcomes) 
The combination of aliskiren with ACE inhibitors 
or ARBs has been associated with serious 
adverse cardiovascular and renal outcomes 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Aliskiren prescribed to a patient with severe renal 
impairment - GFR< 30ml/min/1.73m2 (risk of 
hyperkalaemia) 
Use of aliskiren (either as monotherapy or in 
combination with other medicines) is no longer 
recommended in patients with severe renal 
impairment (ie, eGFR <30mL/min per 1.73 m2) 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Verapamil prescribed to a patient with NYHA Class III 
or IV heart failure (risk of precipitating heart failure, 
exacerbating conduction disorders and causing 
significant deterioration) 
Diltiazem and verapamil can precipitate heart 
failure, exacerbate conduction disorders and 
cause significant deterioration 
N Rare indication in 
paediatrics 
Verapamil prescribed to a patient concomitantly a with 
beta-adrenoceptor blocking drug (increased risk of 
adverse cardiovascular effects) 
Asystole, severe hypotension and heart failure 
when verapamil and beta-blockers prescribed 
concomitantly 
N Rare indication in 
paediatrics 
Low molecular weight heparin omitted to be 
prescribed for prophylaxis (increased risk of 
thrombosis) 
All patients should be assessed for VTE risk on 
admission to hospital and prophylaxis prescribed 
if indicated 
N Error of omission 
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Adult indicators previously published90 – results of review for consideration as paediatric indicators.          continued 
 
Indicator Original Adult Descriptor Include 
Y=Yes 
N=No 
M=Modified  
Notes and cross 
reference to 
final list 
Low molecular weight heparin prescribed without the 
patient's weight being used to calculate the treatment 
dose (risk of subtherapeutic or supratherapeutic 
dosing) 
The patient's weight should be used as the basis 
for calculating the required treatment dose 
M Too drug specific 
modified for 
documentation 
error (D) 
Low molecular weight heparin prescribed at a dose 
exceeding the maximum as stated in the product 
literature (risk of bleeding increased) 
Increased risk of bleeding when the dose is 
prescribed above the recommended limit for the 
indication 
M Too drug specific 
modified for 
documentation 
error(D) 
Low molecular weight heparin prescribed to a patient 
with renal impairment without dose adjustment 
(increased risk of bleeding) 
Increased risk of bleeding with the dose of low 
molecular weight heparin is not adjusted for renal 
function 
Y (11) 
Warfarin prescribed concomitantly with a NSAID 
(increased risk of bleeding) 
Concomitant anticoagulants and NSAIDs increase 
the risk of bleeding  
Y (14) 
Warfarin prescribed to a patient with a concurrent 
bleeding disorder (increased risk of bleeding) 
High risk of bleeding when warfarin prescribed to 
patients with a past medical history of bleeding 
disorders 
Y (13) 
Aspirin prescribed to a patient with a past medical 
history of peptic ulcer disease without antisecretory 
drugs or mucosal protectants (increased risk of peptic 
ulceration, and risk of bleeding) 
Increased risk of peptic ulceration, and risk of 
bleeding 
N Rare co-morbidity 
Antiplatelet  prescribed to a patient with a concurrent 
bleeding disorder (increased risk of bleeding) 
High risk of bleeding when antiplatelets 
prescribed to patients with a past medical history 
of bleeding disorders 
Y (17) 
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Adult indicators previously published90 – results of review for consideration as paediatric indicators.          continued 
 
Indicator Original Adult Descriptor Include 
Y=Yes 
N=No 
M=Modified  
Notes and cross 
reference to 
final list 
Clopidogrel prescribed to a patient concomitantly with 
a NSAID (excluding aspirin)(increased risk of 
bleeding) 
Increased risk of bleeding when clopidogrel 
prescribed concomitantly with NSAIDs 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Clopidogrel prescribed to a patient concomitantly with 
omeprazole or esomeprazole (antiplatelet effect of 
clopidogrel potentially reduced) 
Antiplatelet effect of clopidogrel potentially 
reduced 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Cholestyramine prescribed to a patient at the same 
time as any other medication (risk of poor clinical 
effect owing to reduced absorption of medications) 
Absorption of concomitant medication can be 
impaired, causing a lack of efficacy 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Long-acting beta-2-agonist inhaler prescribed to a 
patient who is not also on an inhaled corticosteroid 
(evidence base - not in line with British Thoracic 
Society guidelines) 
Not in line with British Thoracic Society (BTS) 
guidelines 
M Modified 
according to 
paediatric BTS 
guidance (20) 
Long-acting inhaled antimuscarinic prescribed 
concomitantly with a short acting nebulised 
antimuscarinic (increased risk of additive adverse 
effects) 
Long-acting antimuscarinics should be omitted 
during short courses of nebulised therapy to avoid 
additive adverse effects 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Benzodiazepines prescribed long-term (i.e. more than 
2–4 weeks) (risk of dependence and withdrawal 
reactions) 
Dependence and withdrawal reactions after long-
term use; duration of use 2-4 weeks, incl. Dose 
tapering phase 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Benzodiazepine or benzodiazepine-like drug 
prescribed long-term to a patient with depression (risk 
of dependence and withdrawal reactions) 
Risk of dependence after long-term use; duration 
of use 2-4 weeks 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
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Adult indicators previously published90 – results of review for consideration as paediatric indicators.          continued 
 
Indicator Original Adult Descriptor Include 
Y=Yes 
N=No 
M=Modified  
Notes and cross 
reference to 
final list 
Benzodiazepine or benzodiazepine-like drug 
prescribed to a patient with COPD (risk of respiratory 
depression) 
Risk of respiratory depression N Rare co-morbidity 
Benzodiazepine-like drug (e.g. Zopiclone) prescribed 
long-term (i.e. more than 2–4 weeks) (risk of 
dependence reactions) 
Risk of dependence after long-term use; duration 
of use 2–4 weeks 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Antipsychotic, other than risperidone, prescribed to a 
patient for the management of the behavioural and 
psychological symptoms of dementia (increased risk 
of stroke) 
Antipsychotics, other than risperidone, should be 
avoided in patients with dementia owing to the 
increased risk of stroke 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Antipsychotic prescribed long-term (i.e. > 1 month) to 
a patient with parkinsonism  (increased risk of 
worsening of extra-pyramidal side effects) 
Likely to worsen extra-pyramidal side effects N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Lithium dose not adjusted or omitted in a patient with 
a lithium concentration above the therapeutic range  
(> 1.0 mmol/litre)  (risk of lithium toxicity) 
Risk of lithium toxicity N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Lithium therapy prescribed in conjunction with newly 
prescribed NSAIDs without dose adjustment or 
increased monitoring (increased risk of toxicity) 
Risk of lithium toxicity with concomitant 
prescribing of NSAIDs even within the usual 
normal therapeutic range 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Lithium therapy prescribed in conjunction with newly 
prescribed  loop or thiazide diuretics without dose 
adjustment or increased monitoring (increased risk of 
toxicity) 
Risk of lithium toxicity with concomitant 
prescribing of loop and thiazide diuretics even 
within the usual normal therapeutic range 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
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Adult indicators previously published90 – results of review for consideration as paediatric indicators.          continued 
 
Indicator Original Adult Descriptor Include 
Y=Yes 
N=No 
M=Modified  
Notes and cross 
reference to 
final list 
Tricyclic antidepressant prescribed to a patient with 
dementia (increased risk of worsening cognitive 
impairment) 
Risk of worsening cognitive impairment N Rare co-morbidity 
Tricyclic antidepressants prescribed at the same time 
as monoamine oxidase inhibitors (increased risk of 
serotonin syndrome) 
Risk of serotonin syndrome when tricyclic 
antidepressants and monoamine oxidase 
inhibitors prescribed concomitantly 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Tramadol prescribed concomitantly with monoamine 
oxidase inhibitors (increased risk of serotonin 
syndrome) 
Risk of serotonin syndrome when tramadol and 
monoamine oxidase inhibitors prescribed 
concomitantly 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitor prescribed  to a 
patient with epilepsy (increased risk of seizure 
threshold being reduced) 
Selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitors lower the 
seizure threshold 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitor prescribed to a 
patient with a history of clinically significant 
hyponatraemia (non-iatrogenic , sodium 
<130mmol/litre in the previous 2 months) (increased 
risk of hyponatraemia) 
Selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitors can cause 
syndrome of inappropriate ADH secretion - 
exacerbating hyponatraemia 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
SSRI prescribed concomitantly with tramadol 
(increased risk of serotonin syndrome) 
Drugs with serotonergic properties can increase 
the risk of CNS toxicity (serotonin syndrome) 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
SSRI prescribed concomitantly with pethidine 
(increased risk of serotonin syndrome) 
Drugs with serotonergic properties can increase 
the risk of CNS toxicity (serotonin syndrome) 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
SSRI prescribed concomitantly with aspirin without 
appropriate prophylaxis with antisecretory drugs or 
mucosal protectant (increased risk of gastrointestinal 
bleeding) 
Concomitant use of selective serotonin re-uptake 
inhibitors and aspirin can increase the risk of 
gastrointestinal bleeding 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
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Adult indicators previously published90 – results of review for consideration as paediatric indicators.          continued 
 
Indicator Original Adult Descriptor Include 
Y=Yes 
N=No 
M=Modified  
Notes and cross 
reference to 
final list 
Selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitors prescribed at 
the same time as monoamine oxidase inhibitors 
(increased risk of serotonin syndrome) 
Risk of serotonin syndrome when selective 
serotonin re-uptake inhibitors and monoamine 
oxidase inhibitors prescribed concomitantly 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Citalopram prescribed concomitantly with other QT 
prolonging drugs (increased risk of arrhythmias) 
Increased risk of arrhythmias N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
SSRI prescribed concomitantly with aspirin without 
appropriate prophylaxis with antisecretory drugs or 
mucosal protectant (increased risk of gastrointestinal 
bleeding) 
Concomitant use of Selective serotonin re-uptake 
inhibitors and aspirin can increase the risk of 
gastrointestinal bleeding 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Orlistat prescribed at the same time of day as 
antiepileptics (orlistat can reduce the absorption of 
antiepileptics, leading to loss of seizure control)  
Orlistat can reduce the absorption of 
antiepileptics, leading to loss of seizure control.  
Dose adjustment of antiepileptic may be required 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Prochlorperazine prescribed to a patient with 
parkinsonism (risk of exacerbating parkinsonism 
symptoms) 
Risk of exacerbating parkinsonism symptoms N Rare co-morbidity 
Metoclopramide prescribed to a patient with 
parkinsonism (risk of exacerbating parkinsonism 
symptoms) 
Risk of exacerbating parkinsonism symptoms N Rare co-morbidity 
Metoclopramide prescribed to a patient <20 years 
(except in cases of severe intractable vomiting of 
known cause, or due to 
cytotoxics/radiotherapy)(increased risk of 
extrapyramidal side-effects)  
Increased risk of extrapyramidal side-effects in 
children and young adults (especially 15-19 years 
old) 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
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Adult indicators previously published90 – results of review for consideration as paediatric indicators.          continued 
 
Indicator Original Adult Descriptor Include 
Y=Yes 
N=No 
M=Modified  
Notes and cross 
reference to 
final list 
Domperidone prescribed at a total daily dose 
exceeding 30mg/day or in adults >60yrs old 
(increased risk of QTc prolongation, serious 
ventricular arrhythmia and sudden cardiac death) 
QTc prolongation, increase risk of serious 
ventricular arrhythmia and sudden cardiac death 
M Amended to 
reflect paediatric 
maximum doses 
(1) 
Two concomitant opiate analgesics that are not in line 
with the WHO pain ladder (injudicious use of two 
opiates) 
Injudicious use of two opiates Y (26) 
Aspirin prescribed to a child < 16 years (except in 
Kawasaki's disease) (increased risk of Reye's 
syndrome)  
Risk of Reye's syndrome M Amended for to 
include other 
appropriate 
indications (18) 
More than one paracetamol- containing product 
prescribed to a patient at a time (maximum dose 
exceeded) 
Concomitant prescribing of more than one 
paracetamol containing product that can enable a 
dose of > 4g to be administered in 24 hours 
Y (23) 
Paracetamol prescribed at a dose of 1g over a 24 
hour to a patient under 50kg (risk of hepatocellular 
toxicity) 
Risk of heptaocellular toxicity N Adult specific 
dose 
Tramadol prescribed concomitantly with antiepileptics 
(increased risk of seizures in patients with 
uncontrolled epilepsy) 
Increased risk of seizures Y (25) 
Nefopam prescribed concomitantly with antiepileptics 
(increased risk of seizures in patients with 
uncontrolled epilepsy) 
Increased risk of seizures N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Regular opiates prescribed without concurrent use of 
laxatives (risk of severe constipation) 
Risk of severe constipation Y (27) 
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Adult indicators previously published90 – results of review for consideration as paediatric indicators.          continued 
 
Indicator Original Adult Descriptor Include 
Y=Yes 
N=No 
M=Modified  
Notes and cross 
reference to 
final list 
Prescribing of incorrect or inequivalent morphine 
(opiate) dose  via multiple routes. (risk of toxicity) 
Oral and intramuscular doses are not equivalent Y (28) 
Phenytoin and enteral feeds prescribed to a patient 
concomitantly (reduced absorption of phenytoin) 
Enteral feeds prevent the absorption of phenytoin.  
The feed should be stopped for at least 2 hours 
before the dose is given, and then a further 2 
hours before it is re-started 
Y (31, 42) 
Penicillin containing compound prescribed to a 
penicillin allergic patient without reasoning (e.g. a mild 
or non-allergy such as diarrhoea or vomiting entered 
as an allergy where the indication for penicillin is 
compelling) (risk of hypersensitivity reactions) 
Penicillin containing products are contraindicated 
in patients with an allergy 
Y (36) 
Cephalosporin antibacterial prescribed to an older 
adult (except under the direction of Microbiology or for 
suspected meningitis) (increased risk of antibiotic-
associated infections) 
Cephalosporins should be avoided in older adults 
where possible owing to the increased risk of 
antibiotic-associated infections 
N Rare co-morbidity 
Gentamicin prescribed to a patient with renal 
impairment without dose adjustment (increased risk of 
toxicity) 
Increased risk of toxicity if dose regimens are not 
adjusted for renal function 
Y (48) 
Gentamicin prescribed to an adult patient with normal 
renal function in a dose exceeding 7mg/kg/day 
(increased risk of toxicity) 
Doses should not exceed 7mg/kg/day owing to 
the risk of toxicity 
M Amended to 
reflect paediatric 
doses (49, 51) 
Gentamicin dose calculated based on actual body 
weight rather than ideal body weight in an obese 
patient (risk of excessive dosing and toxicity) 
Risk of excessive dosing and toxicity Y (50) 
  
1
5
2 
Adult indicators previously published90 – results of review for consideration as paediatric indicators.          continued 
 
Indicator Original Adult Descriptor Include 
Y=Yes 
N=No 
M=Modified  
Notes and cross 
reference to 
final list 
Macrolide antibacterial prescribed concomitantly with 
warfarin without appropriate dose adjustment or 
increased INR monitoring (increased risk of bleeding) 
Macrolide antibacterials can reduce the 
metabolism of warfarin, causing an increase in 
the INR and an increased risk of bleeding 
Y (52) 
Vancomycin prescribed intravenously at a rate of less 
than 60 minutes (rapid infusion of vancomycin can 
cause severe reactions) 
Rapid infusion of vancomycin can cause severe 
reactions, such as "red man syndrome" 
Y (59) 
Vancomycin prescribed to a patient with renal 
impairment without dose adjustment (increased risk of 
toxicity) 
Vancomycin dosing should be adjusted in renal 
impairment to avoid toxicity 
Y (58) 
Vancomycin prescribed intravenously for the 
treatment of Clostridium difficile infection (intravenous 
vancomycin has limited therapeutic effect) 
Intravenous vancomycin is not effective for the 
treatment of Clostridium difficile infection 
N Rare co-morbidity 
Quinolone antibacterial prescribed to a patient with 
epilepsy (increased risk of seizure threshold being 
reduced) 
Quinolone antibacterials lower the seizure 
threshold 
Y (40) 
Quinolone prescribed to a patient who is also 
receiving theophylline (possible increased risk of 
convulsions ) 
Possible increased risk of convulsions y (39) 
Oral quinolone antibacterial prescribed at the same 
time as iron (reduced absorption of quinolones) 
Iron  reduces the absorption of quinolone 
antibacterials. At last 4 hours should separate the 
administration of a quinolone and iron 
Y (41) 
Nitrofurantoin prescribed to a patient with renal 
impairment, avoid if eGFR <60ml/minute/1.73m2 (risk 
of peripheral neuropathy and inadequate 
concentration in urine) 
Risk of peripheral neuropathy and reduced 
therapeutic effect 
Y (44) 
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Adult indicators previously published90 – results of review for consideration as paediatric indicators.          continued 
 
Indicator Original Adult Descriptor Include 
Y=Yes 
N=No 
M=Modified  
Notes and cross 
reference to 
final list 
Triazole antifungal prescribed at the same time as 
fentanyl (increased risk of opiate toxicity) 
Increased risk of opiate toxicity N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Amphotericin B prescribed without stating the brand 
name and the dose in mg/kg (risk of fatal overdose 
due to confusion between lipid based and non-lipid 
formulations) 
Brand name should be specified, along with the 
dose calculation 
Y (64) 
Atazanavir prescribed concomitantly with proton-
pump inhibitors (concentration of atazanavir 
potentially reduced, reducing therapeutic effect) 
Proton-pump inhibitors can reduce the plasma 
concentration of atazanavir 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Rifampicin prescribed concomitantly with ritonavir 
(ritonavir concentration can be potentially be reduced, 
reducing its effect) 
Plasma concentration of ritonavir can be reduced 
by rifampicin 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Insulin prescribed to a patient at an inappropriate 
time, allowing for an administration without food 
(except once daily long-acting insulins) (increased risk 
of hypoglycaemia) 
Insulin should be prescribed at meal times to 
avoid the risk of hypoglycaemia 
Y (67) 
Soluble insulin prescribed to a patient on a when 
required (increased risk of serious episodes of 
hypoglycaemia and nocturnal hypoglycaemia post 
dose) 
Increased risk of serious episodes of 
hypoglycaemia and nocturnal hypoglycaemia 
especially if given more than 1 stat dose. Not 
managing the long-term condition 
Y (66) 
Glibenclamide prescribed to an older adult with Type 
2 diabetes mellitus (increased risk of hypoglycaemia) 
Risk of prolonged hypoglycaemia N Rare indication in 
paediatrics 
Metformin prescribed to a patient with eGFR < 30 
mls/min (increased risk of lactic acidosis) 
Metformin should be avoided in patients with an 
eGFR < 30 mls/min owing to the risk of lactic 
acidosis 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
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Adult indicators previously published90 – results of review for consideration as paediatric indicators.          continued 
 
Indicator Original Adult Descriptor Include 
Y=Yes 
N=No 
M=Modified  
Notes and cross 
reference to 
final list 
Pioglitazone prescribed to a patient with heart failure 
(risk of exacerbation of heart failure) 
Risk of exacerbation of heart failure N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Bisphosphonate prescribed to a patient with an 
inappropriate timing (increased risk of adverse effects 
and possible reduced absorption if given after food) 
Doses should be prescribed in the morning, at 
least 30 minutes before breakfast - the times on 
the prescription should be endorsed as such to 
ensure this 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Bisphosphonate prescribed to a patient at the same 
time of day as calcium (bisphosphonate absorption 
reduced by calcium salts) 
Doses of calcium should be delayed, 
administered at least 4 hours after the 
bisphosphonate dose (or completely omitted on 
the day of the weekly dose) 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Weekly dose of an oral bisphosphonate prescribed 
daily (risk of hypocalcaemia) 
Risk of hypocalcaemia when prescribed at doses 
exceeding the recommended range 
N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Oral methotrexate prescribed to a patient with an 
inappropriate frequency (increased risk of toxicity) 
Oral methotrexate should be dosed ONCE 
WEEKLY, and the prescription clear as to which 
day of the week this should be 
Y (76) 
Methotrexate prescribed to a patient with a clinically 
significant drop in white cell count or platelet count 
(risk of bone marrow suppression) 
Methotrexate should be stopped immediately if 
significantly low white cell count or platelet count  
due to risk of abrupt bone marrow suppression 
Y (75) 
Methotrexate prescribed to a patient with abnormal 
liver function tests (risk of liver toxicity) 
Risk of liver toxicity Y (77) 
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Adult indicators previously published90 – results of review for consideration as paediatric indicators.          continued 
 
Indicator Original Adult Descriptor Include 
Y=Yes 
N=No 
M=Modified  
Notes and cross 
reference to 
final list 
Methotrexate prescribed concomitantly with 
trimethoprim (increased risk of haematological 
toxicity) 
Trimethoprim suppresses activity of dihydrofolate 
reductase - potential for additive effect to produce 
folate deficiency. Increased risk of haematological 
toxicity when methotrexate given with 
trimethoprim (including trimethoprim containing 
compound - co-trimoxazole) 
Y (78) 
Methotrexate prescribed on the same day as folic acid 
(reduced efficacy of methotrexate) 
Concomitant administration of folic acid with 
methotrexate will reduce efficacy of methotrexate 
Y (79) 
Allopurinol prescribed concomitantly with azathiorpine 
(allopurinol enhances effect of azathioprine and 
increases risk of toxicity) 
Increased risk of toxicity and enhanced effects of 
azathioprine when given concomitantly.  The dose 
of mercaptopurine should be one quarter of usual 
dose 
Y (80) 
Allopurinol prescribed concomitantly with 
mercaptopurine (allopurinol enhances effect of 
mercaptopurine and increases risk of toxicity) 
Increased risk of toxicity and enhanced effects of 
mercaptopurine when given concomitantly.  The 
dose of mercaptopurine should be one quarter of 
usual dose 
Y (81) 
Calcium resonium prescribed when the potassium 
concentration is within the desired reference range 
(3.5–5.3 mmol/litre) (risk of hypokalaemia) 
Calcium resonium should be stopped when the 
potassium concentration is within the desired 
reference range, as it continues to work for a few 
days once discontinued 
Y (83) 
Potassium chloride supplements continued for longer 
than is required  (reference range 3.5–5.3 mmol/litre) 
(increased risk of hyperkalaemia) 
Failure to act on potassium chloride monitoring 
and continuing treatment for longer than required 
risks hyperkalaemia 
Y (84) 
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Adult indicators previously published90 – results of review for consideration as paediatric indicators.          continued 
 
Indicator Original Adult Descriptor Include 
Y=Yes 
N=No 
M=Modified  
Notes and cross 
reference to 
final list 
Potassium chloride infusions exceeding 40 mmol/litre 
given via the peripheral route (peripheral 
administration risks venous pooling, which can lead to 
sudden high concentrations of potassium chloride 
being delivered to the heart provoking an arrhythmia)  
Intravenous administration of potassium chloride 
solutions exceeding 40mmol/litre should be 
prescribed via the central route to avoid 
arrhythmias 
Y (86) 
NSAID prescribed to a patient with chronic renal 
failure (increased risk of deteriorating renal function) 
Sodium and water retention may occur. Risk of 
deteriorating renal function. 
Y (15) 
NSAID prescribed to a patient with a history of peptic 
ulcer disease or gastrointestinal bleeding without  
antisecretory drugs or mucosal protectants (increased 
risk of peptic ulceration and bleeding) 
Risk of peptic ulcer relapse or gastrointestinal 
bleeding 
Y (16) 
NSAID prescribed to a patient with a  history of heart 
failure (risk of exacerbation of heart failure) 
Risk of exacerbation of heart failure N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
Selective COX-2 inhibitor NSAID prescribed to a 
patient with cardiovascular disease (increased risk of 
thrombotic events) 
Increased risk of thrombotic events N Rare use in 
paediatrics 
More than one NSAID prescribed to a patient at a 
time (increased risk of bleeding) 
Increased risk of bleeding when more than one 
NSAID is prescribed.  
Y (89) 
Allopurinol prescribed at a dose exceeding 100 mg in 
a patient with renal impairment (risk of accumulation 
and subsequent toxicity) 
Prolonged half-life of allopurinol can lead to 
accumulation causing gastrointestinal adverse-
effects 
N Rare indication in 
paediatrics 
Brand specific prescribing of tacrolimus preparations 
(brands vary in their dosing and pharmacokinetics) 
Tacrolimus prescriptions should clearly state the 
brand name and formulation as switching 
between brands requires close medical 
supervision 
Y (82) 
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Adult indicators previously published90 – results of review for consideration as paediatric indicators.          continued 
 
Indicator Original Adult Descriptor Include 
Y=Yes 
N=No 
M=Modified  
Notes and cross 
reference to 
final list 
Live vaccine prescribed to an immunosuppressed 
patient, including those on corticosteroids (increased 
risk of reaction or infection) 
Risk of reaction/infection Y (91) 
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 Appendix 5 – Indicator Identification Search Strategy 
 
1. MEDLINE; *MEDICATION ERRORS/; 7056 results. 
2. MEDLINE; "prescribing error".ti,ab; 103 results. 
3. MEDLINE; "prescribing errors".ti,ab; 413 results. 
4. MEDLINE; "dispensing error".ti,ab; 68 results. 
5. MEDLINE; "dispensing errors".ti,ab; 166 results. 
6. MEDLINE; "administration error".ti,ab; 90 results. 
7. MEDLINE; "administration errors".ti,ab; 381 results. 
8. MEDLINE; 1 OR 2 OR 3 OR 4 OR 5 OR 6 OR 7; 7418 results. 
9. MEDLINE; 8 [Limit to: English Language and Humans and Publication Year 1999-2014]; 4992 
results. 
10. MEDLINE; exp ELECTRONIC PRESCRIBING/; 551 results. 
11. MEDLINE; exp MEDICAL ORDER ENTRY SYSTEMS/ OR exp DECISION SUPPORT 
SYSTEMS, 
CLINICAL/; 6225 results. 
12. MEDLINE; "electronic prescribing".ti,ab; 388 results. 
13. MEDLINE; "eprescribing".ti,ab; 35 results. 
14. MEDLINE; "e-prescribing".ti,ab; 287 results. 
15. MEDLINE; 10 OR 11 OR 12 OR 13 OR 14; 6923 results. 
16. MEDLINE; 15 [Limit to: English Language and Humans and Publication Year 1999-2014]; 5493 
results. 
17. MEDLINE; 16 [Limit to: English Language and Humans and Publication Year 1999-2014 and 
(Age Groups All 
Infant birth to 23 months or All Child 0 to 18 years or Newborn Infant birth to 1 month or Infant 1 to 
23 months or 
Preschool Child 2 to 5 years or Child 6 to 12 years or Adolescent 13 to 18 years)]; 452 results. 
18. MEDLINE; "prescribing indicator".ti,ab; 13 results. 
19. MEDLINE; *PEDIATRICS/; 29479 results. 
20. MEDLINE; 15 AND 19; 57 results. 
21. MEDLINE; "The impact of hospitalwide computerized physician order entry".ti; 1 results. 
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 Appendix 6 – Indicators from Literature Search 
 
Indicators considered from  literature search sources        continued 
Possible indicator 
drug/subject 
Outcome Reason (Cross Reference to Initial 
Indicator List) 
Ten times overdose 
prescribed155-157 
Included Specific indicator for opioid Included 
as part of documentation error 
review (29, Doc) 
Parenteral Nutrition158 Excluded Too complicated to collect data, 
stand alone EP systems for PN in 
use in most centres 
Lamotrigine  - Overdose159 Included Specifically relating to starting dose 
and combination with Sodium 
Valproate (33) 
Flecainide – overdose due to 
incorrect labelling of liquid 
strength160 
Excluded Dispensing error rather than 
prescribing. Rarely used drug. 
Vitamin D – case reports of 
high doses161-163 
Excluded Administration errors. 
Propofol – Case reports of 
overdose164, 165 
Excluded Administration errors 
Heparin dose166, 167 Included High risk drug also involved in local 
ME and local pharmacy interventions 
and NPSA Alert (19) 
Alfacalcidol 10 times 
overdoses168 
Included Specific documentation error (Doc). 
Anticonvulsants –  
Errors relating to transition of 
care and changes in 
weight169-171 
Included High risk medicines, picked up in 
local data  (30,31,32,33) 
Ketotifen overdose172 Excluded Rarely used drug.   
 
Chemotherapy medication 
errors173-176 
Included High risk medicine. Specific  
indicators relating to 
immunosuppressants and 
methotrexate (72,75,76) 
Polyethelene glycol – case 
report of inadvertent 
infusion177 
Excluded Administration error 
Paracetamol – prescribing 
and administration errors 
relating to  
duplicate paracetamol 
preparations and IV 
dosing178-180 
Included High risk drug also involved in local 
ME and local pharmacy interventions 
(23) 
Anti depressants – 
Surveillance report of 
medication errors relating to 
antidepressants181 
Excluded Rare indication in secondary care 
paediatrics 
Obesity – reports of dosing 
errors for antimicrobials and 
analgesics in obese 
patients182 
Included Theme for specific drugs (37, 50) 
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Indicators considered from  literature search sources        continued 
Possible indicator 
drug/subject 
Outcome Reason (Cross Reference to Initial 
Indicator List) 
Clonidine – case report of 
100 times overdose of 
caudal clonidine183 
Excluded Rare indication in paediatrics 
Labetolol – Case report of 
overdose in 8-month old 
infant184 
Excluded Rare use in paediatrics 
Metoprolol – Case report of 
prescribing error relating to 
use of decimal points185 
Excluded Rare use in paediatrics, general 
documentation error included (Doc) 
Di sodium Edetate – case 
reports of deaths relating to 
hypocalcaemia and chelation 
therapy186 
Excluded Rare indication in paediatrics 
Adrenaline – case report of 
overdose187 
Excluded Administration error 
Haloperidol.  Case reports of 
two patients with toxic levels 
following prescribing error188 
Excluded Rare indication in paediatrics 
Xanthine – Case report of 
overdose189 
Excluded  Rare use in paediatrics.  Caffeine 
included as specific documentation 
error (Doc) 
Salbutamol – Case report of 
oral overdose190 
Excluded Rare use of oral formulation in UK.  
IV infusion indicator included (21) 
Fluoxetine – Case report of 
dispensing error191 
Excluded Dispensing error and rare use in 
secondary care paediatrics. 
Amlodipine – Case report of 
poisoning192 
Excluded Administration error 
Risperidone – Review of 
accidental poisonings in 
France193 
Excluded Rare use in paediatrics 
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 Appendix 7 – Indicators from National Reporting and 
Learning System 
 
Indicators identified from NRLS95 reports considered for the paediatric indicators 
Possible indicator drug/subject Outcome Reason (Cross Reference to 
Initial Indicator List) 
Failure to prescribe or prescribe 
incorrect vaccinations for 
childhood immunisation 
Included Common area of 
concern/intervention (92).  Adult 
indicator also included in relation 
to the use of a live vaccine in an 
immunosuppressed  patient (91) 
Ten times overdose – incorrect 
calculation or use of decimal 
point resulting in ten times 
overdose 
Included Some specific overdose 
indicators included, as well as 
different descriptions of 
overdoses (95,96, 100) 
Administration of penicillin 
containing product to a patient 
with penicillin allergy 
Included Duplicated from other sources 
(36, 99) 
Lamotrigine and sodium 
valproate – prescribing of 
incorrect starting dose of 
lamotrigine when patient already 
on sodium valproate 
Included Complicated initial dose regime 
results in possible errors. (33) 
Dose of meropenem too low for 
indication 
Included Duplicated in local interventions 
(46)  
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 Appendix 8 – Indicators from Interventions and Incident 
Reports 
 
Indicators identified from intervention and incident reports        continued 
Indicator Outcome Reason (Cross Reference to 
Initial Indicator List) 
Common drugs with interaction 
including macrolides, rifampicin, 
ivacaftor, quinolones 
Included Range of interacting drugs 
included (22,39, 41,47,52-60) 
Dose of ganciclovir prescribed 
without reference to renal function 
Included High risk drug, more common in 
paediatric use in secondary 
care. (65) 
Potassium supplements prescribed 
for longer than required based on 
serum potassium levels 
Included Common reason for pharmacy 
intervention. (84) 
Midazolam prescribed at incorrect 
dose for preparation 
Included Numerous formulations and 
routes with different doses 
causes confusion (93) 
Co-prescription of trimethoprim 
prophylaxis with treatment 
antimicrobials 
Included Regularly encountered problem 
(35) 
Propranolol Concentration – Wrong 
strength propranolol  liquid 
prescribed or dispensed resulting in 
dosing error 
Excluded Dispensing error rather than  
prescribing error 
Failure to prescribe and/or 
administer folinic acid rescue 
therapy following high dose 
methotrexate therapy 
Included High risk error (73) 
Failure to prescribe and/or 
administer mesna therapy following 
cylophosphamide/Iphosphamide 
therapy 
Included High risk error (74) 
Wrong dose or rate of salbutamol 
infusion 
Included Complicated calculation 
required to prescribe high risk 
indication/drug (21) 
Confusion between 
clonazepam/clobazam 
Included Common confusion between 
two anti-convulsants (34) 
Changing dose frequencies with 
increasing age 
Included Several antimicrobials require 
an increase in frequency with 
increasing age (e.g. 
flucloxacillin) as a result of 
changing pharmacokinetics. 
(43,61,62,63,98) 
Specific dose of antimicrobial 
related to indication 
Included Specific indications require 
specific doses for some 
antimicrobials e.g. Meropenem 
for sepsis. (45, 46) 
IV to oral switch using requiring 
different dose 
Included Some antimicrobials require 
different doses when switching 
from IV to oral therapy.  E.g. 
Ciprofloxacin. (38, 97) 
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Indicators identified from intervention and incident reports        continued 
Indicator Outcome Reason (Cross Reference to 
Initial Indicator List) 
IV Vancomycin prescribed to run 
over less than 60 minutes 
Included Increased risk of red man 
syndrome with rapid infusion 
(59) 
Prescribing steroids concomitantly 
by different routes 
Included Risk of overdose when inhaled, 
oral IV steroids prescribed at 
the same time (68,69) 
Prescription for enteric coated 
prednisolone in a patient with 
inflammatory bowel disease. 
Included Reduced absorption from 
enteric coated formulation (70) 
Incorrect volume of maintenance 
fluid prescribed 
Included Complex calculation required 
for prescribing maintenance 
fluid (87) 
Dose of baclofen not reduced in the 
presence of renal failure 
Included Rare but serious overdose can 
occur, often due to limited 
knowledge of baclofen.(90) 
Incorrect dose/dilution of IV 
acetylcysteine for the treatment of 
paracetamol poisoning 
Included Complex calculation required to 
prescribe acetylcysteine (94) 
Desmopressin prescribed for 
nocturnal enuresis at any other 
time other than bedtime. 
Included Common cause of concern with 
desmopressin, must be taken at 
the correct time in relation to 
bedtime to avoid fluid overload. 
(71) 
Phenytoin prescribed to be 
administered at the same time as 
an enteral feed. 
Included Local interventions and 
recognised interaction (31) 
Co-prescribing of drugs that could 
cause QT prolongation 
Included Several adult indicators 
included this issue, revised to 
include reference to medicines 
commonly used in children e.g. 
macrolides. (53, 54) 
Common drugs requiring dose 
changes as a result of reduced 
renal function 
Included Several specific cases included 
(62) 
Digoxin loading and maintenance 
doses 
Included Complicated regimens based 
on age and weight (2,3) 
Drug food interactions Included Quinolones and enteral feed 
specifically (42) 
Allopurinol prescribed to a patient 
concomitantly with azathioprine or 
6-mecaptopurine 
Included Recognised interaction with 
severe consequence (80,81) 
Gentamicin overdose and under 
dose due to calculation error or 
reduced clearance 
Included Modified for both neonates and 
paediatrics (49, 51) 
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 Appendix 9 – Indicators from National Alerts 
 
Indicators identified from national alerts  
Possible indicator drug/subject Outcome Reason (Cross reference to 
Initial Indicator List) 
Metoclopramide risk of neurological 
adverse effects194 
Excluded Rare use outside of paediatric 
oncology, general dosing errors 
included under documentation 
Codeine for analgesia: restricted 
use in children because of reports of 
morphine toxicity114 
Included High risk medicine/group (24) 
Caffeine for apnoea of prematurity.  
Possible confusion over use of base 
and salt195 
Included Specific documentation error 
included relating to use of salt 
when prescribing (Doc) 
Maintenance Fluid – use of incorrect 
fluid can cause cerebral oedema113, 
196 
Included High risk issue nationally reported 
(85,87) 
Parenteral amphotericin B: fatal 
overdose risk due to confusion 
between lipid-based and non-lipid-
based formulations197 
Included High risk medicine (64) 
Oral tacrolimus products: prescribe 
and dispense by brand name only, 
risk of toxicity and graft rejection198 
Included High risk medicine (82) 
Domperidone: risks of cardiac side 
effects119 
 
Included Highly publicised issue within 
paediatrics (1) 
Oral Methotrexate prescribed or 
administered at an inappropriate 
frequency.199 
Included High risk medicine (76).  Other 
adult indicators also included 
(75.77,78,79) 
Phenytoin dose not reviewed in light 
of low albumin level95 
Included Serious incident reported via the 
national reporting system (30) 
Vincristine administered by the 
incorrect route200 
Excluded Administration error rather than 
prescribing 
Low molecular weight heparin201 Included Modified to relate to paediatrics 
(10, 11,12) 
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 Appendix 10 – Documentation Errors 
 
Documentation errors.  Shaded lines indicate errors identified by expert panel during round 1        continued 
Code 
Potential Indicator Supporting Information Source Error Type Outcome 
Reason For 
Exclusion 
D1 
Use of an unapproved 
abbreviation to indicate the drug 
required such as NaOH, NaPO4, 
AZT, CPL etc  
Ambiguous prescription 
with the potential for 
wrong drug or wrong dose 
Prescribing 
Standard Other Include 
 
D2 
Use of a trailing zero following a 
decimal point when expressing a 
dose Risk of ten times overdose 
Prescribing 
Standard Dose Include 
 
D3 
Strength of steroid inhaler or 
combination steroid inhaler not 
prescribed 
Risk of sub or 
supratherapeutic doses 
Pharmacist 
Interventions 
Therapeutic 
Duplication Include 
 
D4 
Presence of a prescription based 
on the weight of a child without a 
record of the weight on the 
prescription Risk of over/under dose Ghaleb et al 202 Dose Include 
 
D5 
Prescription for an intermittent 
intravenous infusion with no 
indication of the duration of the 
infusion (risk of adverse reaction) 
Risk of adverse reaction 
from rate Ghaleb et al202 Pharmaceutical Include 
 
D6 
Absence of a leading zero before 
a decimal point when expressing 
dose Risk of overdose 
Prescribing 
Standard Dose Include 
 
D7 
Total daily dose prescribed for 
each dose during the day Overdose 
Pharmacist 
Interventions Dose Include 
 
D8 
Tenfold overdose prescribed Overdose 
Pharmacist 
Interventions Dose Include 
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Documentation errors.  Shaded lines indicate errors identified by expert panel during round 1        continued 
Code 
Potential Indicator Supporting Information Source Error Type Outcome 
Reason For 
Exclusion 
D9 
Use of weight instead of BSA to 
calculate the dose of drug where 
BSA is meant to be used (e.g. 
aciclovir) 
Risk of sub or 
supratherapeutic doses 
increasing risk of adverse 
effects 
Prescribing 
Standard Dose Include 
 
D10 
Prescribing of dose per/kg value 
instead of required dose 
Risk of subtherapeutic 
doses decreasing efficacy NRLS95 Dose Include 
 
D11 
Inappropriate rounding of dose 
resulting in a clinically significant 
over or under dose based on the 
therapeutic range of the drug 
Risk of supratherapeutic 
doses increasing risk of 
adverse effects 
Pharmacist 
Interventions Dose Include 
 
D12 
Dose of liquid preparation 
expressed in ml rather than mg 
for a drug where the dose is 
expressed in mg in the BNFC 
Risk of supratherapeutic 
doses increasing risk of 
adverse effects 
Prescribing 
Standard Dose Include 
 
D13 
Dose value of alfacalcidol in 
nanograms expressed as 
micrograms 
Risk of 1000 time 
overdose NPSA168 Dose Include 
 
D14 
Prescription containing an 
abbreviation for units (risk of 
misreading u/iu resulting in 
overdose) 
Risk of 
insulin/heparin/other 
overdose NPSA9 Dose Include 
 
D15 
Use of ml instead of mg resulting 
in dose outside normal 
recommendations (severity drug 
dependent - need to record drug 
and severity rating) 
Risk of sub or 
supratherapeutic doses 
Prescribing 
Standard Dose Remove 
Too complex to 
collect due to lack 
of standard 
interpretation 
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Documentation errors.  Shaded lines indicate errors identified by expert panel during round 1        continued 
Code 
Potential Indicator Supporting Information Source Error Type Outcome 
Reason For 
Exclusion 
D16 
Use of incorrect weight resulting 
in dose outside normal 
recommendations (severity drug 
dependent - need to record drug 
and severity) 
Risk of sub or 
supratherapeutic doses NRLS95 Dose Include 
 
D17 
Prescribing Caffeine using base 
rather than salt i.e. Caffeine 
rather than Caffeine Citrate (risk 
of sub-therapeutic dosing) 
Risk of subtherapeutic 
dosing MHRA195 Other Remove 
Added as a 
specific 
prescribing 
indicator (94) 
D18 
18  or 36 hourly gentamicin 
frequency prescribed in a way 
that could result in a different 
frequency of administration (risk 
of toxicity) 
Risk of supratherapeutic 
doses increasing risk of 
adverse effects 
Maaskant JM 
et al120  and 
NPSA Dose Frequency Include 
 
D19 
Doses calculated using weight in 
pounds instead of kilograms 
Significant risk of 
overdose severity 
dependent on specific 
drug (will specify drug and 
severity score)  Severity 
will also depend on actual 
weight Should we specific 
an upper weight limit for 
this indicator? NRLS95 Dose Include 
 
D20 
Strength of steroid inhaler or 
combination steroid inhaler not 
prescribed 
Risk of sub or 
supratherapeutic doses 
Pharmacist 
Interventions 
Therapeutic 
Duplication Remove 
 
 D21 
Prescription without indication of 
dose form Increased risk of error     Include 
 
  
1
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Documentation errors.  Shaded lines indicate errors identified by expert panel during round 1        continued 
Code 
Potential Indicator Supporting Information Source Error Type Outcome 
Reason For 
Exclusion 
 D22 
1000 fold by overwriting mg with 
g 
Possible dose error if units 
not correctly indicated     Include 
 
 D23 
Working weight/dosing weight 
neonate 
Possible does error due to 
use of incorrect weight     Remove 
Captured by D16 
 D24 
Use of unapproved abbreviation 
to describe dose e.g. mcg, ng. Potential for dosing error     Include 
 
 D25 
using a decimal point for doses < 
1mg Potential 10 fold errors     Include 
 
 D26 
Drug prescribed where dose 
exceeds standard adult dose 
Risk of supratherapeutic 
doses     Include 
 
 D27 
Dose prescribe which is 
impossible to measure accurately 
(not rounded appropriately) 
Increase risk of 
inappropriate rounding of 
dose     Include 
 
 D28 
When required medication 
prescribed without indication 
Clarity over reason for 
medicine provides 
information about correct 
dose.     Include 
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 Appendix 11 – Indicators and Source Used for Rounds 1 and 2  
 
Indicator sent to expert panel members with reference code and source                      continued 
Code 
Potential Indicator Supporting Information 
Adult LIt 
Nat 
Report 
NRLS Pharm Int 
1 
Domperidone prescribed at > 1.2mg/kg/day 
max 20mg (prolongation of QT interval, 
sudden cardiac death) 
Increased risk of arrhythmias and 
sudden cardiac death 
Y 
 
Y 
  
2 
Digoxin Loading dose or frequency 
prescribed incorrectly according to BNFC  
Risk of supratherapeutic doses 
increasing risk of adverse effects     
Y 
3 
Digoxin maintenance dose started too soon 
or too late after completion of loading 
doses. 
Risk of supratherapeutic doses 
increasing risk of adverse effects     
Y 
4 
Digoxin dose not reviewed in light of 
reduced renal function 
Risk of supratherapeutic doses 
increasing risk of adverse effects 
Y 
    
5 
Potassium-sparing diuretic (excluding 
aldosterone antagonists) prescribed to a 
patient also receiving an ACE inhibitor or 
angiotensin-II receptor antagonist 
(increased risk of severe hyperkalaemia) 
Increased risk of severe 
hyperkalaemia 
Y 
    
6 
Amiodarone prescribed to a patient with 
abnormal thyroid function tests (increased 
risk of thyroid disorders) 
Amiodarone can cause thyroid 
abnormalities 
Y 
    
7 
Beta-adrenoceptor blocking drug 
prescribed to a patient with asthma 
(increased risk of bronchospasm and acute 
deterioration) 
Beta-adrenoceptor blocking drugs 
are known to cause 
bronchoconstriction in asthmatics, 
and can cause acute deterioration 
Y 
    
 
  
1
7
0
 
Indicator sent to expert panel members with reference code and source                      continued 
Code 
Potential Indicator Supporting Information 
Adult LIt 
Nat 
Report 
NRLS Pharm Int 
8 
ACE inhibitor or angotensin-II receptor 
antagonist prescribed to a patient with a 
potassium level >5.0 mmol/litre (can cause 
or exacerbate hyperkalaemia) 
ACE inhibitors and angiotensin-II 
receptor antagonists can cause 
hyperkalaemia and are 
contraindicated in patients with a 
potassium concentration about the 
desired reference range 
Y 
    
9 
Low molecular weight heparin prescribed to 
be administered concomitantly with 
unfractionated heparin (increased risk of 
bleeding) Increased risk of bleeding 
Y 
    
10 
Low molecular weight heparin not adjusted 
based on factor 10a levels (risk of 
inappropriate dose) 
Risk of sub or supratherapeutic 
doses   
Y 
  
11 
Low molecular weight heparin prescribed to 
a patient with renal impairment without 
dose adjustment (increased risk of 
bleeding) 
Increased risk of bleeding with the 
dose of low molecular weight 
heparin is not adjusted for renal 
function 
  
Y 
  
12 
Enoxaparin prescribed at the wrong 
frequency according to the BNFC or 
product literature 
risk of subtherapeutic levels of 
enoxaparin 
  
Y 
  
13 
Warfarin prescribed to a patient with a 
concurrent bleeding problem (risk of 
bleeding) 
High risk of bleeding when warfarin 
prescribed to patients with a past 
medical history of bleeding 
disorders 
Y 
    
14 
Warfarin prescribed concomitantly with a 
NSAID (increased risk of bleeding) 
Increased risk of bleeding when co-
prescribed with NSAID 
Y 
    
  
1
7
1
 
Indicator sent to expert panel members with reference code and source                      continued 
Code 
Potential Indicator Supporting Information 
Adult LIt 
Nat 
Report 
NRLS Pharm Int 
15 
NSAID prescribed to a patient with chronic 
renal failure (increased risk of deteriorating 
renal function) 
Sodium and water retention may 
occur risk of decreasing renal 
function 
Y 
    
16 
NSAID prescribed to a patient with a history 
of peptic ulcer disease or gastrointestinal 
bleeding without  antisecretory drugs or 
mucosal protectants (increased risk of 
peptic ulceration and bleeding) Risk of GI ulcer / reflux 
Y 
    
17 
Antiplatelet  prescribed to a patient with a 
concurrent bleeding disorder (increased 
risk of bleeding) 
High risk of bleeding when 
antiplatelets prescribed to patients 
with a past medical history of 
bleeding disorders 
Y 
    
18 
Aspirin prescribed to pt <16 without 
appropriate indication (risk of Reye's 
syndrome) Risk of Reye's Syndrome 
Y 
    
19 
Prescribing of intravenous heparin infusion 
for treatment of thromboembolic event 
using the wrong dose or infusion rate (risk 
of toxicity or therapeutic failure) 
Risk of supratherapeutic or 
subtherapeutic dose of heparin 
 
Y Y 
  
20 
Long-acting beta-2-agonist inhaler 
prescribed to a patient who is not also on 
an inhaled corticosteroid (evidence base - 
not in line with British Thoracic Society 
guidelines) 
Not in line with British Thoracic 
Society guidelines) 
Y 
    
21 
Prescribing of intravenous salbutamol 
infusion using the wrong dose or infusion 
rate (risk of toxicity or therapeutic failure) 
Risk of supratherapeutic or 
subtherapeutic dose of salbutamol 
    
Y 
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Indicator sent to expert panel members with reference code and source                      continued 
Code 
Potential Indicator Supporting Information 
Adult LIt 
Nat 
Report 
NRLS Pharm Int 
22 
Ivacaftor co-prescribed with an interacting 
drug with no dose adjustment of interacting 
drug (risk of subtherapeutic levels of 
interacting drug) 
Risk of supratherapeutic or 
subtherapeutic levels of ivacaftor 
due to enzyme induction or 
inhibition 
    
Y 
23 
More than one paracetamol-containing 
product prescribed to be administered 
concomitantly (maximum dose exceeded) 
Concomitant prescribing of more 
than one paracetamol containing 
product can result in doses over 
the daily limit for the age group 
 
Y 
   
24 Codeine phosphate prescribed to a patient 
under the age of 12 (contraindicated) 
MHRA guidance restrict use of 
codeine in children due to risk of 
fatal toxicity 
  
Y 
  
25 
Tramadol prescribed concomitantly with 
antiepileptics (increased risk of seizures in 
patients with uncontrolled epilepsy) Increased risk of seizures 
Y 
    
26 
Two concomitant opiate analgesics that are 
not in line with the WHO pain ladder 
(injudicious use of two opiates risk of 
toxicity) 
Injudicious use of two opiates Y 
    
27 
Regular opiates prescribed without 
concurrent use of laxatives (risk of severe 
constipation) 
Risk of severe constipation Y 
    
28 
Prescribing of incorrect or inequivalent 
morphine (opiate) dose via multiple routes. 
(risk of toxicity) 
Oral and intramuscular doses are 
not equivalent 
Y 
    
29 
Ten times overdose of opioid 
(overdose/respiratory arrest) 
Risk of supratherapeutic doses 
increasing risk of adverse effects  
Y 
 
Y 
 
30 
Phenytoin dose not reviewed in light of low 
albumin (potential for toxicity) Increased risk of toxicity  
Y Y 
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Indicator sent to expert panel members with reference code and source                      continued 
Code 
Potential Indicator Supporting Information 
Adult LIt 
Nat 
Report 
NRLS Pharm Int 
31 
Phenytoin and enteral feeds prescribed to a 
patient concomitantly (reduced absorption 
of phenytoin) 
Enteral feeds prevent the 
absorption of phenytoin.  The feed 
should be stopped for at least 2 
hours before the dose is given, and 
then a further 2 hours before it is 
re-started 
Y Y Y 
  
32 
Failure to increase dose of anticonvulsant 
in line with weight for epilepsy (increased 
risk of seizure) Increased risk of seizures 
 
Y 
   
33 
Prescribing an incorrect starting dose of 
lamotrigine when used in combination with 
sodium valproate (increased risk of ADR) 
Increased risk of adverse reaction 
in paritcualr rashes 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
34 
Clonazepam prescribed when clobazam 
required or vice versa 
Risk of incorrect dose of the wrong 
drug     
Y 
35 
Prophylactic  Trimethoprim and treatment 
antimicrobials for urinary tract infection 
prescribed to be administered 
concomitantly (increased risk of resistance) Risk of antimicrobial resistance  
    
Y 
36 
Penicillin containing compound prescribed 
to a penicillin allergic patient without 
reasoning (e.g. a mild or non-allergy such 
as diarrhoea or vomiting entered as an 
allergy where the indication for penicillin is 
compelling) (risk of hypersensitivity 
reactions) 
Contraindicated in pts with history 
of penicillin allergy. Risk of 
hypersensitivity reaction 
Y 
  
Y 
 
37 
More than 400mg per dose of oral or 
intravenous metronidazole prescribed to a 
patient weighing > 54kg (risk of toxicity) 
Risk of supratherapeutic doses 
increasing risk of adverse effects 
 
Y 
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Indicator sent to expert panel members with reference code and source                      continued 
Code 
Potential Indicator Supporting Information 
Adult LIt 
Nat 
Report 
NRLS Pharm Int 
38 
Dose change for metronidazole not made 
when switching from IV to oral (risk of 
overdose) risk of toxicity 
    
Y 
39 
Quinolone antibiotic prescribed to a patient 
who is also receiving theophylline (possible 
increased theophylline level ) 
Possible increased theophylline 
level 
Y 
   
Y 
40 
Quinolone antibiotic prescribed to a patient 
with epilepsy (increased risk of seizure 
threshold being reduced) 
Quinolone antibacterials lower the 
seizure threshold 
Y 
    
41 
Oral quinolone antibacterial prescribed at 
the same time as iron (reduced absorption 
of quinolones) 
Iron reduces the absorption of 
quinolone antibacterials. At last 4 
hours should separate the 
administration of a quinolone and 
iron 
Y 
    
42 
Oral Quinolones and enteral feeds 
prescribed concomitantly (risk of treatment 
failure with quinolone) Reduced absorption of quinolone 
Y 
   
Y 
43 
Intravenous ciprofloxacin prescribed twice 
daily instead of three times a day in 
children over 1 month old (risk of 
therapeutic failure) 
Risk of subtherapeutic levels of 
antibiotic 
    
Y 
44 
Nitrofurantoin prescribed to a patient with 
renal impairment, avoid if eGFR 
<60ml/minute/1.73m2 (risk of peripheral 
neuropathy and inadequate concentration 
in urine) 
Risk of peripheral neuropathy and 
reduced therapeutic effect 
Y 
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Indicator sent to expert panel members with reference code and source                      continued 
Code 
Potential Indicator Supporting Information 
Adult LIt 
Nat 
Report 
NRLS Pharm Int 
45 
Ceftriaxone prescribed at a dose of 
50mg/kg instead of 80mg/kg for severe 
infection/sepsis (risk of under dosage) 
Potential subtherapeutic dose for 
severe infection/sepsis 
    
Y 
46 
Meropenem prescribed at a dose of 
20mg/kg instead of 40mg/kg  for meningitis 
or exacerbation of CF (potential under 
treatment) 
Potential subtherapeutic dose for 
severe infection/sepsis 
   
Y 
 
47 
Co-prescribing of meropenem with sodium 
valproate (increased risk of seizure) 
Reduction in valproate levels 
leading to increased risk of seizure     
Y 
48 
Gentamicin prescribed to a patient with  at 
least mild renal impairment without dose 
adjustment (increased risk of toxicity) Increased risk of toxicity 
Y 
    
49 
Gentamicin prescribed at a dose exceeding 
7mg/kg/day to an child > 1month (risk of 
toxicity) Increased risk of toxicity 
  
Y 
  
50 
Gentamicin dose calculated based on 
actual body weight rather than ideal body 
weight in an obese patient (risk of 
excessive dosing and toxicity) 
Risk of excessive dosing and 
toxicity 
Y Y 
   
51 
Gentamicin prescribed at a dose exceeding 
5mg/kg/dose to a neonate (risk of toxicity) Increased risk of toxicity   
Y 
  
52 
Macrolide antibacterial prescribed 
concomitantly with warfarin without 
appropriate dose adjustment or increased 
INR monitoring (increased risk of bleeding) 
Macrolide antibacterials can reduce 
the metabolism of warfarin, causing 
an increase in the INR and an 
increased risk of bleeding 
    
Y 
53 
Co-prescribing of macrolides with 
interacting drug (QT prolongation) 
Risk of prolongation of QT interval 
and ventricular arrhythmia     
Y 
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Indicator sent to expert panel members with reference code and source                      continued 
Code 
Potential Indicator Supporting Information 
Adult LIt 
Nat 
Report 
NRLS Pharm Int 
54 
Co-prescribing of a macrolide with 
Domperidone (QT prolongation) 
Risk of prolongation of QT interval 
and ventricular arrhythmia     
Y 
55 
Co-prescribing of a macrolide with an 
anticonvulsant (risk of toxicity or 
subtherapeutic levels) 
Risk of supratherapeutic or 
subtherapeutic levels of 
anticonvulsant 
    
Y 
56 
Co-prescribing of a macrolide with 
ciclosporin or tacrolimus (increases plasma 
levels of anti-rejection agent) 
Increased plasma concentration of 
ciclosporin 
    
Y 
57 
Co-prescribing of a macrolide with 
Midazolam (risk of sedation) Increased sedation     
Y 
58 
Vancomycin prescribed intravenously to a 
patient with at least mild renal impairment 
without dose adjustment (increased risk of 
toxicity) Increased risk of toxicity 
Y 
   
Y 
59 
Vancomycin prescribed intravenously over 
less than 60 minutes (rapid infusion of 
vancomycin can cause severe reactions) Increased risk of Infusion reactions 
Y 
   
Y 
60 
Rifampicin co-prescribed with an interacting 
drug with no dose adjustment of interacting 
drug (risk of subtherapeutic levels of 
interacting drug) 
risk of subtherapeutic levels of 
interacting drug due to enzyme 
induction 
    
Y 
61 
Fluconazole prescribed more frequently 
than every 72 hours for a neonate < 14 
days old (risk of toxicity) 
Increased risk of toxic effects, 
Neonates have a 72 or 48 hour 
frequency based on age. 
    
Y 
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Indicator sent to expert panel members with reference code and source                      continued 
Code 
Potential Indicator Supporting Information 
Adult LIt 
Nat 
Report 
NRLS Pharm Int 
62 
Fluconazole prescribed as standard dose 
from day 2 of treatment in a patient with a 
creatinine clearance of < 50 ml/min/1.73m2 
(risk of toxicity, normally halve dose after 
first day) 
Increased risk of toxic effects 
Patient with renal failure 
<50ml/min/1.73m2 have standard 
dose for one dose then halved. 
    
Y 
63 
Fluconazole prescribed more frequently 
than every 48 hours for a neonate between 
14 and 28 days old (risk of toxicity) 
Increased risk of toxic effects, 
neonates have a 72 or 48 hour 
frequency based on age. 
    
Y 
64 
Amphotericin B prescribed without stating 
the brand name and the dose in mg/kg (risk 
of fatal overdose due to confusion between 
lipid based and non-lipid)  
Specification of brand name to 
reduce risk of wrong formulation 
being administered and resulting 
toxicity 
Y 
 
Y 
  
65 
Failure to adjust dose or frequency of 
Ganciclovir in the presence of altered renal 
function (risk of toxicity or treatment failure) 
Risk of supratherapeutic or 
subtherapeutic levels of ganciclovir 
    
Y 
66 
Soluble insulin prescribed to a patient on a 
when required basis (increased risk of 
serious episodes of hypoglycaemia and 
nocturnal hypoglycaemia post dose) 
Increased risk of serious episodes 
of hypoglycaemia and nocturnal 
hypoglycaemia especially if given 
more than 1 stat dose. Not 
managing the long-term condition 
Y 
    
67 
Insulin prescribed to a patient at an 
inappropriate time, allowing for an 
administration without food (except once 
daily long-acting insulins) (increased risk of 
hypoglycaemia) 
Insulin should be prescribed at 
meal times to avoid the risk of 
hypoglycaemia 
Y 
    
68 
Oral prednisolone and intravenous 
hydrocortisone prescribed to be 
administered concomitantly simultaneously 
(risk of toxicity) Increased risk of adverse effects  
    
Y 
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Indicator sent to expert panel members with reference code and source                      continued 
Code 
Potential Indicator Supporting Information 
Adult LIt 
Nat 
Report 
NRLS Pharm Int 
69 
Oral prednisolone and steroid inhalers 
prescribed to be administered 
concomitantly (risk of toxicity) Increased risk of adverse effects  
    
Y 
70 
Prednisolone EC prescribed for patient with 
Inflammatory Bowel Disease (reduced 
absorption of prednisolone) 
Reduced absorption of 
predinsolone 
    
Y 
71 
Desmopressin prescribed for nocturnal 
enuresis at any other time than at bedtime 
(risk of fluid overload) Risk of over hydration 
    
Y 
72 
Dose reduction of immunosuppressant not 
made despite low white cell count (risk of 
neutropenia) 
Increased risk of neutropenia and 
subsequent infection 
 
Y 
   
73 
Failure to prescribe folinic acid rescue 
therapy following high dose methotrexate 
chemotherapy (risk of methotrexate toxicity) Risk of methotrexate toxicity 
    
Y 
74 
Failure to prescribe mesna for patients 
receiving alkylating agents (risk of toxic 
symptoms) Risk of bladder toxicity 
    
Y 
75 
Methotrexate prescribed to a patient with a 
clinically significant drop in white cell count 
or platelet count (risk of bone marrow 
suppression) Risk of bone marrow suppression 
Y Y 
  
Y 
76 
Oral methotrexate prescribed to a patient 
with an inappropriate frequency (increased 
risk of toxicity) 
Oral methotrexate should be dosed 
ONCE WEEKLY, and the 
prescription clear as to which day 
of the week this should be 
Y Y 
  
Y 
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Indicator sent to expert panel members with reference code and source                      continued 
Code 
Potential Indicator Supporting Information 
Adult LIt 
Nat 
Report 
NRLS Pharm Int 
77 
Methotrexate prescribed to a patient with 
abnormal liver function tests (risk of liver 
toxicity) 
Risk of liver toxicity Y 
 
Y 
  
78 
Methotrexate prescribed concomitantly with 
trimethoprim (increased risk of 
haematological toxicity) 
Trimethoprim suppresses activity of 
dihydrofolate reductase - potential 
for additive effect to produce folate 
deficiency. Increased risk of 
haematological toxicity when 
methotrexate given with 
trimethoprim (including 
trimethoprim containing compound 
- co-trimoxazole) 
Y 
 
Y 
  
79 
Methotrexate prescribed to be administered 
on the same day as folic acid (reduced 
efficacy of methotrexate) 
Concomitant administration of folic 
acid with methotrexate will reduce 
efficacy of methotrexate 
Y 
 
Y 
  
80 
Allopurinol prescribed concomitantly with 
azathiorpine (allopurinol enhances effect of 
azathioprine and increases risk of toxicity) 
Increased risk of toxicity and 
enhanced effects of azathioprine 
when given concomitantly.  The 
dose of mercaptopurine should be 
one quarter of usual dose 
Y 
   
Y 
81 
Allopurinol prescribed concomitantly with 
mercaptopurine (allopurinol enhances 
effect of mercaptopurine and increases risk 
of toxicity) 
Increased risk of toxicity and 
enhanced effects of 
mercaptopurine when given 
concomitantly.  The dose of 
mercaptopurine should be one 
quarter of usual dose 
Y 
   
Y 
82 
Tacrolimus not prescribed using brand 
name (variation in pharmacokinetics and 
dosing) 
Risk of subtherapeutic levels due 
to differences in pharmacokinetics 
Y 
 
Y 
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Indicator sent to expert panel members with reference code and source                      continued 
Code 
Potential Indicator Supporting Information 
Adult LIt 
Nat 
Report 
NRLS Pharm Int 
83 
Calcium resonium prescribed when the 
potassium concentration is within the 
desired reference range (3.5–5.3 
mmol/litre) (risk of hypokalaemia) 
Calcium resonium should be 
stopped when the potassium 
concentration is within the desired 
reference range, as it continues to 
work for a few days once 
discontinued 
Y 
    
84 
Potassium chloride supplements continued 
for longer than is required  (reference range 
3.5–5.3 mmol/litre) (increased risk of 
hyperkalaemia) 
Failure to act on potassium 
chloride monitoring and continuing 
treatment for longer than required 
risks hyperkalaemia 
Y 
   
Y 
85 
Prescribing of hypotonic sodium solutions 
as post-operative intravenous fluid (risk of 
cerebral oedema) Rick of cerebral oedema 
  
Y 
  
86 
Potassium chloride infusions exceeding 40 
mmol/litre given via the peripheral route 
(peripheral administration risks venous 
pooling, which can lead to sudden high 
concentrations of potassium chloride being 
delivered to the heart provoking an 
arrhythmia)  
Intravenous administration of 
potassium chloride solutions 
exceeding 40mmol/litre should be 
prescribed via the central route to 
avoid arrhythmias 
Y 
    
87 
Incorrect volume of maintenance fluid 
prescribed 
Risk of fluid overload or inadequate 
hydration   
Y 
 
Y 
88 
Incorrect stock parenteral nutrition bag 
prescribed Risk of inappropriate nutrition    
Y 
 
89 
More than one NSAID prescribed to a 
patient at a time (increased risk of bleeding) 
Increased risk of bleeding when 
more than one NSAID is 
prescribed.  
Y 
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Indicator sent to expert panel members with reference code and source                      continued 
Code 
Potential Indicator Supporting Information 
Adult LIt 
Nat 
Report 
NRLS Pharm Int 
90 
Baclofen dose not reduced in response to 
decreased renal function (eGFR < 90 
ml/min/1.73m2) Increased risk of toxic effects 
    
Y 
91 
Live vaccine prescribed to an 
immunosuppressed patient, including those 
on corticosteroids (increased risk of 
reaction or infection) 
Risk of reaction/infection Y 
    
92 
Failure to prescribe or prescribing the 
incorrect vaccines for childhood 
immunisation (risk of serious childhood 
infection) 
Lack of immunity for serious  
childhood infections  
   
Y 
 
93 
Midazolam prescribed for procedural 
sedation at a dose inappropriate for the 
route of administration 
Risk of supratherapeutic or 
subtherapeutic dose of midazolam 
    
Y 
94 
Acetylcysteine prescribed at a dose 
inconsistent with the product literature for 
paracetamol poisoning 
Risk of sub or supratherapeutic 
doses 
    
Y 
95 
Prescribing of a dose exceeding standard 
adult dose of any drug (risk of overdose) Overdose    
Y 
 
96 
Prescribing a drug at a frequency not 
recommended for that formulation (risk of 
sub or supratherapeutic dose) 
Risk of supratherapeutic doses 
increasing risk of adverse effects 
   
Y 
 
97 
Dose change for ciprofloxacin not made 
when switching from IV to oral (risk of 
overdose) risk of toxic dose 
    
Y 
98 
Failure to increase frequency of antibiotic 
with increasing age of neonate over first 28 
days of life (risk of subtherapeutic dose) 
Risk of subtherapeutic dosing and 
treatment failure 
    
Y 
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Indicator sent to expert panel members with reference code and source                      continued 
Code 
Potential Indicator Supporting Information 
Adult LIt 
Nat 
Report 
NRLS Pharm Int 
99 
A prescription for a drug for a patient with a 
known allergy to that drug (risk of 
anaphylaxis) Risk of anaphylaxis 
   
Y 
 
100 
Prescribing of a dose that is not within +/- 
25% of the recommended dose for the 
indication (risk of subtherapeutic or toxic 
effects) 
Risk of supratherapeutic doses 
increasing risk of adverse effects 
   
Y 
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 Appendix 12 – New Indicator Suggestion Form 
New indicator suggestion form 
 
 
eDelphiPaed – New Indicator Form 
Exploratory Round : Identifying essential missing prescribing safety 
indicators 
Participant response to round 1 
 
 Having read the list of 100 paediatric prescribing safety indicators, I do not have any 
additional indicators to add. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Having read the list of 100 paediatric prescribing safety indicators, I wish to add the 
indicators described below: 
 
Proposed prescribing 
safety indicator title 
BNF 
class 
Source Supporting information 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
Please complete this form and return to:- 
 
 
 
Andy Fox 
Director – Southampton Pharmacy Research Centre(023 8120 4201) 
eDelphipaed@uhs.nhs.uk 
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 Appendix 13 – Indicator Scoring Instructions 
 
 
 
 
An evaluation of the impact of electronic prescribing on paediatric 
prescribing errors in a secondary care setting. 
 
Round 1 scoring the indicators 
 
In this round of the process, I wish to obtain each participant's view on the severity and 
likelihood of the error occurring in secondary care.  Please note that I am only considering 
prescribing safety in paediatric/neonatal practice, and are not considering errors relating to 
monitoring, administration, or dispensing. These indicators will be used to evaluate whether 
the introduction of electronic prescribing systems results in a reduction in clinically important 
errors.  
 
I have considered the suggested additional indicators provided by all of the participants 
some of which are now included.  Following your comments I have removed some original 
indicators and amended others. 
 
Round 2 therefore includes a total of 125 prescribing indicators (91 indicators from round 1 
and 34 additional indicators).  
 
Please score each indicator, each using a scale from 1–5 based on both the severity of the 
prescribing error and the likelihood of the prescribing error occurring. We acknowledge that 
your previous clinical practice (e.g. oncology, paediatrics) may influence your scoring, but 
please try to take a more general view in your interpretation of each indicator. 
 
Severity Scoring 
 
The severity score is defined as the consequence of the prescribing error to the patient 
should it occur. 
 
Severity 
Score 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Description 
Insignificant 
 
No risk of 
patient injury 
or harm and 
no intervention 
required 
Minor 
 
Minor injury 
or illness 
requiring 
minor 
intervention 
Moderate 
 
Moderate 
injury 
requiring 
intervention 
Major 
 
Major 
injury or 
illness 
leading to 
long-term 
incapacity / 
disability 
Catastrophic 
 
Leads to 
death, multiple 
permanent 
injuries or 
irreversible 
health effects 
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Likelihood Scoring 
 
The likelihood score is defined as the probability of the prescribing error occurring not the 
likelihood of an adverse outcome should the error occur 
Likelihood 
Score 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Description 
Rare 
 
This will 
probably 
never occur 
Unlikely 
 
Do not 
expect it to 
occur but it 
is possible it 
may do so 
Possible 
 
This might 
occasionally 
occur 
Likely 
 
This will 
probably 
occur 
 
Almost 
Certain 
 
This will 
undoubtedly 
occur, 
possibly 
frequently 
General Error Monitoring 
Many of the indicators that have been removed relate to general prescribing errors or 
legibility issues.  These will be included as part of the evaluation process but are not specific 
enough to be able to score for round 2.  E.g. inappropriate use of abbreviations or ten times 
overdoses.  Please be assured that these type of error will be included in an evaluation of 
electronic prescribing as part of the data collection tool. 
 
Round 3  
Participants will receive a second spreadsheet containing their initial score and the median 
score for each indicator. Participants will be asked if they want to change their score in 
response to the median value. A comments section will allow respondents to 
justify/comment on their scoring decision. 
 
If you have any further questions please do not hesitate to contact me. 
 
 
 
Andy Fox 
Director – Southampton Pharmacy Research Centre(023 8120 4201) 
eDelphipaed@uhs.nhs.uk 
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 Appendix 14 – Results of Consensus Scoring 
 
Full list of indicators and levels of consensus after 2 rounds of eDelphi                  continued 
No Indicator Supporting Information 
Median 
Risk Score 
Consensus Include 
1 
Domperidone prescribed at > 1.2mg/kg/day 
max 20mg (prolongation of QT interval, 
sudden cardiac death) 
Increased risk of arrhythmias and sudden 
cardiac death 
3 86% Y 
2 
Digoxin Loading dose or frequency (Oral or IV) 
prescribed incorrectly according to BNFC  
Risk of supratherapeutic doses increasing 
risk of adverse effects 
3 71% 
 
3 
Digoxin maintenance dose started too soon or 
too late after completion of loading doses. 
Risk of supratherapeutic doses increasing 
risk of adverse effects 
3 67% 
 
4 
Digoxin dose not reviewed in light of reduced 
renal function 
Risk of supratherapeutic doses increasing 
risk of adverse effects 
3 95% Y 
5 
Potassium-sparing diuretic (excluding 
aldosterone antagonists) prescribed to a 
patient also receiving an ACE inhibitor or 
angiotensin-II receptor antagonist (increased 
risk of severe hyperkalaemia) 
Increased risk of severe hyperkalaemia 3 90% Y 
6 
Amiodarone prescribed to a patient with 
abnormal thyroid function tests (increased risk 
of thyroid disorders) 
Amiodarone can cause thyroid abnormalities 2 71% 
 
7 
Beta-adrenoceptor blocking drug prescribed to 
a patient with asthma (increased risk of 
bronchospasm and acute deterioration) 
Beta-adrenoceptor blocking drugs are known 
to cause bronchoconstriction in asthmatics, 
and can cause acute deterioration 
3 81% Y 
8 
ACE inhibitor or angotensin-II receptor 
antagonist prescribed to a patient with a 
potassium level >5.0 mmol/litre (can cause or 
exacerbate hyperkalaemia) 
ACE inhibitors and angiotensin-II receptor 
antagonists can cause hyperkalaemia and 
are contraindicated in patients with a 
potassium concentration about the desired 
reference range 
3 71% 
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Full list of indicators and levels of consensus after 2 rounds of eDelphi                  continued 
No Indicator Supporting Information 
Median 
Risk Score 
Consensus Include 
9 
Low molecular weight heparin prescribed to be 
administered concomitantly with unfractionated 
heparin (increased risk of bleeding) 
Increased risk of bleeding 2 62% 
 
10 
Low molecular weight heparin prescribed to a 
patient with renal impairment without dose 
adjustment (increased risk of bleeding) 
Increased risk of bleeding with the dose of 
low molecular weight heparin is not adjusted 
for renal function 
3 86% Y 
11 
Low molecular weight heparin prescribed at 
the wrong frequency according to the BNFC or 
product literature 
Risk of supra or subtherapeutic levels of low 
molecular weight heparin 
3 62% 
 
12 
Warfarin prescribed to a patient with a 
concurrent bleeding problem (risk of bleeding) 
High risk of bleeding when warfarin 
prescribed to patients with a past medical 
history of bleeding disorders 
3 71% 
 
13 
Warfarin prescribed concomitantly with a 
NSAID (increased risk of bleeding) 
Increased risk of bleeding when co-
prescribed with NSAID 
3 75% 
 
14 
NSAID (excluding low dose aspirin) prescribed 
to a patient with chronic renal failure 
(increased risk of deteriorating renal function) 
Sodium and water retention may occur risk of 
decreasing renal function 
3 76% 
 
15 
NSAID prescribed to a patient with a history of 
peptic ulcer disease or gastrointestinal 
bleeding without  antisecretory drugs or 
mucosal protectants (increased risk of peptic 
ulceration and bleeding) 
Risk of GI ulcer / Reflux 3 71% 
 
16 
Antiplatelet  prescribed to a patient with a 
concurrent bleeding disorder (increased risk of 
bleeding) 
High risk of bleeding when antiplatelets 
prescribed to patients with a past medical 
history of bleeding disorders 
3 81% Y 
17 
Aspirin prescribed to pt <16 without 
appropriate indication (risk of Reye's 
syndrome) 
Risk of Reye's Syndrome 1 95% 
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Full list of indicators and levels of consensus after 2 rounds of eDelphi                  continued 
No Indicator Supporting Information 
Median 
Risk Score 
Consensus Include 
18 
Prescribing of intravenous heparin infusion for 
treatment of thromboembolic event using the 
wrong dose or infusion rate based on local 
protocol (risk of toxicity or therapeutic failure) 
Risk of supratherapeutic or subtherapeutic 
dose of heparin 
3 86% Y 
19 
Long-acting beta-2-agonist inhaler prescribed 
to a patient who is not also on an inhaled 
corticosteroid (evidence base - not in line with 
British Thoracic Society guidelines) 
Not in line with British Thoracic Society 
guidelines) 
2 100% 
 
20 
Prescribing of intravenous salbutamol infusion 
using the wrong dose or infusion rate (risk of 
toxicity or therapeutic failure) 
Risk of supratherapeutic or subtherapeutic 
dose of salbutamol 
3 81% Y 
21 
Ivacaftor co-prescribed with an interacting drug 
with no dose adjustment of interacting drug 
(risk of subtherapeutic levels of interacting 
drug) 
Risk of supratherapeutic or subtherapeutic 
levels of ivacaftor due to enzyme induction or 
inhibition 
2 76% 
 
22 
More than one paracetamol-containing product 
prescribed to be administered concomitantly 
(maximum dose exceeded) 
Concomitant prescribing of more than one 
paracetamol containing product can result in 
doses over the daily limit for the age group 
3 71% 
 
23 
Codeine phosphate prescribed to a patient 
under the age of 12 (contraindicated) 
MHRA guidance restrict use of codeine in 
children due to risk of fatal toxicity 
3 57% 
 
24 
Tramadol prescribed concomitantly with 
antiepileptics (increased risk of seizures in 
patients with uncontrolled epilepsy) 
Increased risk of seizures 3 71% 
 
25 
Two concomitant opiate analgesics that are 
not in line with the WHO pain ladder 
(injudicious use of two opiates risk of toxicity) 
Increased risk of opioid toxicity 3 86% Y 
26 
Regular opiates prescribed without concurrent 
use of laxatives (risk of severe constipation) 
Risk of severe constipation 2 52% 
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Full list of indicators and levels of consensus after 2 rounds of eDelphi                  continued 
No Indicator Supporting Information 
Median 
Risk Score 
Consensus Include 
27 
Prescribing of incorrect or inequivalent 
morphine (opiate) dose via multiple routes. 
(risk of toxicity) 
Oral and intramuscular doses are not 
equivalent, risk of therapeutic failure or 
toxicity 
3 81% Y 
28 
Phenytoin dose not reviewed in light of low 
albumin (potential for toxicity) 
Increased risk of phenytoin toxicity 3 86% Y 
29 
Failure to increase dose of anticonvulsant in 
line with weight for epilepsy (increased risk of 
seizure) 
Increased risk of seizures 3 52% 
 
30 
Prescribing an incorrect starting dose of 
lamotrigine when used in combination with 
Sodium Valproate (increased risk of ADR) 
Increased risk of adverse reaction in 
particular rashes 
2 71% 
 
31 
Clonazepam prescribed when clobazam 
required or vice versa 
Risk of incorrect dose of the wrong drug and 
subsequent toxicity or therapeutic failure 
3 76% 
 
32 
Prophylactic  antimicrobials and treatment 
antimicrobials prescribed to be administered 
concomitantly (increased risk of resistance) 
Risk of antimicrobial resistance  3 67% 
 
33 
Penicillin containing compound prescribed to a 
penicillin allergic patient without reasoning 
(e.g. a non-allergy such as diarrhoea or 
vomiting entered as an allergy where the 
indication for penicillin is compelling) (risk of 
hypersensitivity reactions) 
Contraindicated in pts with history of penicillin 
allergy. Risk of hypersensitivity reaction 
3 81% Y 
34 
Dose change for metronidazole not made 
when switching from an IV dose >400mg to 
oral (risk of overdose) 
Increased risk of supratherapeutic dose of 
metronidazole 
2 75% 
 
35 
Quinolone antibiotic prescribed to a patient 
who is also receiving theophylline (possible 
increased theophylline level ) 
Possible increased theophylline level 2 81% 
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Full list of indicators and levels of consensus after 2 rounds of eDelphi                  continued 
No Indicator Supporting Information 
Median 
Risk Score 
Consensus Include 
36 
Quinolone antibiotic prescribed to a patient 
with epilepsy (increased risk of seizure 
threshold being reduced) 
Quinolone antibacterials lower the seizure 
threshold 
3 57% 
 
37 
Oral quinolone antibacterial prescribed at the 
same time as iron (reduced absorption of 
quinolones) 
Iron  reduces the absorption of quinolone 
antibacterials. At last 4 hours should separate 
the administration of a quinolone and iron 
2 76% 
 
38 
Oral quinolones and enteral feeds prescribed 
concomitantly (risk of treatment failure with 
quinolone) 
Reduced absorption of quinolone 2 76% 
 
39 
Intravenous Ciprofloxacin prescribed Twice 
daily instead of three times a day in children 
over 1 month old (risk of therapeutic failure) 
Risk of subtherapeutic levels of ciprofloxacin 3 55% 
 
40 
Nitrofurantoin prescribed to a patient with renal 
impairment, avoid if eGFR 
<60ml/minute/1.73m2 (risk of peripheral 
neuropathy and inadequate concentration in 
urine) 
Risk of peripheral neuropathy and reduced 
therapeutic effect 
3 80% Y 
41 
Ceftriaxone prescribed at a total daily dose of 
50mg/kg instead of 80mg/kg for severe 
infection/sepsis in a patient > 1 month of age 
(risk of under dosage) 
Potential subtherapeutic dose for severe 
infection/sepsis 
3 90% Y 
42 
Meropenem prescribed at a dose of 20mg/kg 
instead of 40mg/kg  for meningitis or 
respiratory exacerbation of CF (potential under 
treatment) 
Potential subtherapeutic dose for severe 
infection/sepsis 
3 86% Y 
43 
Co-prescribing of meropenem with sodium 
valproate (increased risk of seizure) 
Reduction in valproate levels leading to 
increased risk of seizure 
3 71% 
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Full list of indicators and levels of consensus after 2 rounds of eDelphi                  continued 
No Indicator Supporting Information 
Median 
Risk Score 
Consensus Include 
44 
Gentamicin prescribed to a patient with  at 
least mild renal impairment without dose 
frequency adjustment (increased risk of 
toxicity) 
Increased risk of toxicity 3 81% Y 
45 
Gentamicin prescribed at a dose exceeding 
maximum stated in local protocol e.g. 
7mg/kg/day to a child > 1month (risk of toxicity) 
Increased risk of toxicity 2 62% 
 
46 
Gentamicin dose calculated based on actual 
body weight rather than ideal body weight in 
an obese patient (risk of excessive dosing and 
toxicity) 
Risk of excessive dosing and toxicity 3 100% Y 
47 
Gentamicin prescribed at a dose exceeding 
5mg/kg/dose to a neonate (risk of toxicity) 
Increased risk of toxicity 2 67% 
 
48 
Macrolide antibacterial prescribed 
concomitantly with warfarin without appropriate 
dose adjustment or increased INR monitoring 
(increased risk of bleeding) 
Macrolide antibacterials can reduce the 
metabolism of warfarin, causing an increase 
in the INR and an increased risk of bleeding 
3 90% Y 
49 
Co-prescribing of macrolides with interacting 
drug (QT prolongation) 
Risk of prolongation of QT interval and 
ventricular arrhythmia 
3 86% Y 
50 
Co-prescribing of a macrolide with 
domperidone (QT prolongation) 
Risk of prolongation of QT interval and 
ventricular arrhythmia 
3 76% 
 
51 
Co-prescribing of a macrolide with an 
anticonvulsant (risk of toxicity or 
subtherapeutic levels) 
Risk of supratherapeutic or subtherapeutic 
levels of anticonvulsant 
3 70% 
 
52 
Co-prescribing of a macrolide with ciclosporin 
or tacrolimus (increases plasma levels of anti-
rejection agent) 
Increased plasma concentration of 
ciclosporin 
3 86% Y 
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Full list of indicators and levels of consensus after 2 rounds of eDelphi                  continued 
No Indicator Supporting Information 
Median 
Risk Score 
Consensus Include 
53 
Co-prescribing of a macrolide with midazolam 
(risk of sedation) 
Increased risk of sedation 2 76% 
 
54 
Vancomycin prescribed intravenously to a 
patient with at least mild renal impairment 
without dose adjustment (increased risk of 
toxicity) 
Increased risk of toxicity 3 76% 
 
55 
Vancomycin prescribed intravenously over less 
than 60 minutes (rapid infusion of vancomycin 
can cause severe reactions) 
Increased risk of infusion reactions 3 81% Y 
56 
Rifampicin co-prescribed with an interacting 
drug with no dose adjustment of interacting 
drug (risk of subtherapeutic levels of 
interacting drug) 
Risk of subtherapeutic levels of interacting 
drug due to enzyme induction 
2 52% 
 
57 
Fluconazole prescribed more frequently than 
every 72 hours for a neonate < 14 days old 
(risk of toxicity) 
Increased risk of toxic effects, Neonates have 
a 72 or 48 hour frequency based on age. 
3 52% 
 
58 
Fluconazole prescribed as standard dose from 
day 2 of treatment in a patient with an 
estimated GFR of < 50 ml/min/1.73m2 (risk of 
toxicity, normally halve dose after first day) 
Increased risk of toxic effects. Patients with 
renal failure <50ml/min/1.73m2 have 
standard dose for one dose then halved. 
3 76% 
 
59 
Fluconazole prescribed more frequently than 
every 48 hours for a neonate between 14 and 
28 days old (risk of toxicity) 
Increased risk of toxic effects.  Neonates 
have a 72 or 48 hour frequency based on 
age. 
3 62% 
 
60 
Amphotericin B prescribed without additionally 
stating both brand name and the dose in 
mg/kg (risk of fatal overdose due to confusion 
between lipid based and non-lipid)  
Specification of brand name to reduce risk of 
wrong formulation being administered and 
resulting toxicity 
3 90% Y 
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Full list of indicators and levels of consensus after 2 rounds of eDelphi                  continued 
No Indicator Supporting Information 
Median 
Risk Score 
Consensus Include 
61 
Failure to adjust dose or frequency of 
ganciclovir in the presence of altered renal 
function (risk of toxicity or treatment failure) 
Risk of supratherapeutic or subtherapeutic 
levels of ganciclovir 
3 80% Y 
62 
Soluble insulin prescribed to a patient on a 
when required basis (increased risk of serious 
episodes of hypoglycaemia and nocturnal 
hypoglycaemia post dose) 
Increased risk of serious episodes of 
hypoglycaemia and nocturnal hypoglycaemia 
especially if given more than 1 stat dose. Not 
managing the long-term condition 
3 85% Y 
63 
Insulin prescribed to a patient at an 
inappropriate time, allowing for an 
administration without food (except once daily 
long-acting insulins) (increased risk of 
hypoglycaemia) 
Insulin should be prescribed at meal times to 
avoid the risk of hypoglycaemia 
3 76% 
 
64 
Oral prednisolone and intravenous 
hydrocortisone prescribed to be administered 
concomitantly simultaneously (risk of toxicity) 
Increased risk of adverse effects  2 86% 
 
65 
Oral prednisolone and steroid inhalers 
prescribed to be administered concomitantly 
(risk of toxicity) 
Increased risk of adverse effects  3 57% 
 
66 
Prednisolone EC Prescribed for patient with 
Inflammatory Bowel Disease (reduced 
absorption of prednisolone) 
Reduced absorption of predinsolone 2 76% 
 
67 
Desmopressin prescribed for nocturnal 
enuresis at any other time than at bedtime (risk 
of fluid overload) 
Risk of over hydration 2 81% 
 
68 
Dose reduction of immunosuppressant not 
made despite low white cell count (risk of 
neutropenia) 
Increased risk of neutropenia and 
subsequent infection, (list of common 
immunosuppressants will be included during 
data collection) 
3 90% Y 
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Full list of indicators and levels of consensus after 2 rounds of eDelphi                  continued 
No Indicator Supporting Information 
Median 
Risk Score 
Consensus Include 
69 
Failure to prescribe folinic acid rescue therapy 
following high dose methotrexate 
chemotherapy (risk of methotrexate toxicity) 
Risk of methotrexate toxicity 3 80% Y 
70 
Failure to prescribe mesna for patients 
receiving alkylating agents (risk of toxic 
symptoms) 
Risk of bladder toxicity 3 75% 
 
71 
Methotrexate prescribed to a patient with a 
clinically significant drop in white cell count or 
platelet count (risk of bone marrow 
suppression) 
Risk of bone marrow suppression 3 90% Y 
72 
Oral methotrexate prescribed to a patient with 
an inappropriate frequency (increased risk of 
toxicity) 
Oral methotrexate should be dosed ONCE 
WEEKLY, and the prescription clear as to 
which day of the week this should be 
3 100% Y 
73 
Methotrexate prescribed to a patient with 
abnormal liver function tests (risk of liver 
toxicity) 
Risk of liver toxicity 3 85% Y 
74 
Methotrexate prescribed concomitantly with 
trimethoprim (increased risk of haematological 
toxicity) 
Trimethoprim suppresses activity of 
dihydrofolate reductase - potential for additive 
effect to produce folate deficiency. Increased 
risk of haematological toxicity when 
methotrexate given with trimethoprim 
(including trimethoprim containing compound 
- co-trimoxazole) 
3 85% Y 
75 
Methotrexate prescribed to be administered on 
the same day as folic acid (reduced efficacy of 
methotrexate) 
Concomitant administration of folic acid with 
methotrexate will reduce efficacy of 
methotrexate 
2 75% 
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Full list of indicators and levels of consensus after 2 rounds of eDelphi                  continued 
No Indicator Supporting Information 
Median 
Risk Score 
Consensus Include 
76 
Allopurinol prescribed concomitantly with 
azathiorpine (Allopurinol enhances effect of 
azathioprine and increases risk of toxicity) 
Increased risk of toxicity and enhanced 
effects of azathioprine when given 
concomitantly.  The dose of mercaptopurine 
should be one quarter of usual dose 
3 65% 
 
77 
Allopurinol prescribed concomitantly with 
mercaptopurine (allopurinol enhances effect of 
mercaptopurine and increases risk of toxicity) 
Increased risk of toxicity and enhanced 
effects of mercaptopurine when given 
concomitantly.  The dose of mercaptopurine 
should be one quarter of usual dose 
3 80% Y 
78 
Tacrolimus prescribed without reference to 
brand name (variation in pharmacokinetics and 
dosing) 
Risk of subtherapeutic levels due to 
differences in pharmacokinetics 
2 55% 
 
79 
Calcium resonium prescribed when the 
potassium concentration is within the desired 
reference range (3.5–5.3 mmol/litre) (risk of 
hypokalaemia) 
Calcium resonium should be stopped when 
the potassium concentration is within the 
desired reference range, as it continues to 
work for a few days once discontinued 
2 85% 
 
80 
Potassium chloride supplements continued for 
longer than is required  (based on age 
appropriate local reference ranges approx 3.5–
5.3 mmol/litre) (increased risk of 
hyperkalaemia) 
Failure to act on potassium chloride 
monitoring and continuing treatment for 
longer than required risks hyperkalaemia 
3 81% Y 
81 
Prescribing of Sodium Chloride 0.18% with 
Glucose 4% solutions as post-operative 
intravenous fluid (risk of cerebral oedema) 
Risk of cerebral oedema 3 62% 
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Full list of indicators and levels of consensus after 2 rounds of eDelphi                  continued 
No Indicator Supporting Information 
Median 
Risk Score 
Consensus Include 
82 
Potassium chloride infusions exceeding 40 
mmol/litre prescribed to administered via the 
peripheral route (peripheral administration 
risks venous pooling, which can lead to 
sudden high concentrations of potassium 
chloride being delivered to the heart provoking 
an arrhythmia)  
Intravenous administration of potassium 
chloride solutions exceeding 40mmol/litre 
should be prescribed via the central route to 
avoid arrhythmias 
3 86% Y 
83 
Incorrect stock parenteral nutrition bag 
prescribed based on local protocol 
Risk of inappropriate nutrition 2 62% 
 
84 
More than one NSAID prescribed to a patient 
at a time (increased risk of bleeding) 
Increased risk of bleeding when more than 
one NSAID is prescribed.  
2 71% 
 
85 
Baclofen dose not reduced in response to 
decreased renal function (eGFR < 90 
ml/min/1.73m2) 
Increased risk of toxic effects 3 90% Y 
86 
Live vaccine prescribed to an 
immunosuppressed patient, including those on 
corticosteroids (increased risk of reaction or 
infection) 
Risk of reaction/infection 3 52% 
 
87 
Prescribing the incorrect vaccines for 
childhood immunisation based on the current 
vaccination guidelines (risk of serious 
childhood infection) 
Lack of immunity for serious  childhood 
infections  
2 90% 
 
88 
Midazolam prescribed for procedural sedation 
at a dose inappropriate for the route of 
administration 
Risk of supratherapeutic or subtherapeutic 
dose of midazolam 
3 81% Y 
89 
Acetylcysteine prescribed at a dose 
inconsistent with the product literature for 
paracetamol poisoning 
Risk of sub or supratherapeutic doses with 
treatment failure or toxicity 
3 70% 
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Full list of indicators and levels of consensus after 2 rounds of eDelphi                  continued 
No Indicator Supporting Information 
Median 
Risk Score 
Consensus Include 
90 
Dose change for ciprofloxacin not made when 
switching from IV to oral (risk of overdose) 
Risk of supratherapeutic dose of ciprofloxacin 2 90% 
 
91 
A prescription for a drug for a patient with a 
known allergy to that drug (risk of anaphylaxis) 
Risk of anaphylaxis 3 100% Y 
92 
Dose of paracetamol prescribed inappropriate 
for route of administration (potential overdose 
due to change in route or misreading of BNFC) 
Risk of paracetamol overdose 3 81% Y 
93 
Amiodarone prescribed to a patient on digoxin 
without review of the digoxin dose 
Risk of digoxin toxicity 3 81% Y 
94 
Caffeine Citrate maintenance dose prescribed 
to start too soon or too late after loading dose 
(should be 24 hours) 
Risk of sub or supra therapeutic dose 2 90% 
 
95 
Oral quinolone prescribed to be administered 
at the same time as an oral calcium 
Risk of treatment failure 2 81% 
 
96 
Ceftriaxone prescribed at a dose greater than 
50mg/kg in a patient < 1month old 
Risk of supratherapeutic dose of Ceftriaxone 2 90% 
 
97 
Aciclovir prescribed to a patient with at least 
mild renal impairment without dose adjustment 
Increased risk of toxicity 3 76% 
 
98 
Desmopressin nasal formulation prescribed for 
nocturnal enuresis (increased incidence of side 
effects) 
Risk of toxicity due to increased 
bioavailability of nasal formulation 
2 95% 
 
99 
Dose of cefotaxime exceeding  200mg/kg/day 
in patients <4 weeks old 
Risk of toxicity 2 100% 
 
100 
Amiodarone loading dose prescribed 
incorrectly according to BNFC 
Risk of sub or supra therapeutic dose 3 62% 
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Full list of indicators and levels of consensus after 2 rounds of eDelphi                  continued 
No Indicator Supporting Information 
Median 
Risk Score 
Consensus Include 
101 
Aciclovir prescribed at a dose of 250mg/m2 
instead of 500mg/m2 for herpes simplex 
encephalitis in patients aged between 3 
months and 12 years 
Risk of treatment failure 3 90% Y 
102 
Thiopurines (azathioprine and 6MP) 
prescription in presence of abnormal liver 
function tests (LFTs will be defined) 
Increased risk of toxicity 3 76% 
 
103 
Intravenous aminophylline prescribed without 
appropriate monitoring or adjustment of dose 
in relation to theophylline levels 
Risk of sub or supra therapeutic levels 3 71% 
 
104 
Ranitidine dose not altered when switching 
between oral and IV routes 
Risk of sub or supra therapeutic doses 2 86% 
 
105 
IV cefuroxime prescribed using the oral dose 
(20mg/kg/dose twice daily) 
Subtherapeutic dose leading to potential 
treatment failure 
3 52% 
 
106 
Gabapentin prescribed without gradually 
increasing the dose 
Increased risk of toxicity 2 71% 
 
107 
Theophylline prescribed without reference to 
the brand 
Risk of sub or supratherapeutic doses and 
subsequent treatment failure or toxicity 
2 65% 
 
108 
Furosemide prescribed twice daily in neonates 
< 31 weeks gestational age 
Risk of toxicity 3 67% 
 
109 
Prescription for beclometasone inhaler without 
reference to the brand 
Difference in bioavailability between Qvar 
and Clenil brands.  Risk of toxicity or 
treatment failure 
2 62% 
 
110 
Prescription for Intramuscular ceftriaxone 
without co-prescription of lidocaine for 
reconstitution 
Lidocaine used to prepare ceftriaxone and 
reduce pain at injection site.   
3 52% 
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Full list of indicators and levels of consensus after 2 rounds of eDelphi                  continued 
No Indicator Supporting Information 
Median 
Risk Score 
Consensus Include 
111 
Concomitant prescription of 
ibuprofen/indometacin and hydrocortisone in 
neonatal patient 
Risk of spontaneous gastrointestinal 
perforation 
3 65% 
 
112 
Co - prescribing of nebulised Tobramycin and 
intravenous tobramycin in CF patients 
Risk of toxicity 3 67% 
 
113 
Prescription of NSAIDS in suspected toxic 
shock syndrome (contraindicated but patients 
are pyrexial) 
Risk of enhanced cytokine release 
contributing to shock, organ failure etc 
3 81% Y 
114 
Regular prescription of anti-pyretic in 
paediatric oncology patients 
Risk of masking neutropenic sepsis 3 67% 
 
115 
Maintenance fluids prescribed such that >3l of 
fluid would be administered in 24 hours 
Exceeds maximum adult maintenance fluid 2 76% 
 
116 
Failure to increase of hydrocortisone to “sick 
day doses” from “maintenance” doses in those 
adrenally suppressed 
Reduces risk of shock 3 95% Y 
117 
Prescription of mycophenolate with no 
reference to salt or brand 
Risk of sub or supratherapeutic levels 3 68% 
 
118 
Failure to increase dose of prophylactic 
trimethoprim with increasing weight 
Risk of sub therapeutic levels and treatment 
failure 
2 67% 
 
119 
Failure to increase frequency of IV 
benzylpenicillin over the first 5 weeks of life 
Risk of treatment failure 3 67% 
 
120 
Failure to increase frequency of oral or IV 
Flucloxacillin over the first 4 weeks of life  
Risk of treatment failure 3 67% 
 
121 
Failure to increase the frequency of IV 
cefotaxime over the first 4 weeks of life 
Risk of treatment failure 3 67% 
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Full list of indicators and levels of consensus after 2 rounds of eDelphi                  continued 
No Indicator Supporting Information 
Median 
Risk Score 
Consensus Include 
122 
Sodium supplements continued for longer than 
is required  (based on age appropriate local 
reference ranges approx 135 - 145 mmol/litre) 
(increased risk of hypernatraemia) 
Risk of hypernatraemia 2 81% 
 
123 
Prescribing caffeine using base rather than salt 
i.e. caffeine rather than caffeine citrate (risk of 
sub-therapeutic dosing) 
Risk of subtherapeutic dosing 2 71% 
 
124 
Dose value of alfacalcidol in nanograms 
expressed as micrograms 
Risk of 1000 time overdose 3 71% 
 
125 
Prescribing a fluid containing dextrose rather 
than glucose 
Risk of confusion at drug 
selection/administration stage  
2 100% 
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 Appendix 15 – Paediatric Indicator Simulation Survey 
 
Instructions 
A. For each indicator test whether your prescribing system would allow it to occur in paediatric patients. 
B. For each indicator choose the level of decision support triggered during the prescribing process using the descriptions below, if more than 
one apply please state in the notes 
C. Describe the warnings/alerts provided to the prescriber and the input required to continue prescribing if prescribing is possible 
D.  Provide explanatory notes as appropriate. 
E  & F.  Provide a judgment of the likelihood  for the questions posed using a scale of 1-5 where 1 = never and 5 = certain. 
Definitions 
Paediatric Patient:- Use your local definition of paediatric patient and please clarify how the system uses this e.g. a clearly defined global 
setting for age, ward based setting or combination. 
Definitions of levels of clinical decision support (CDS): 
Restricted: -Error was prevented by the system as prescribers could not proceed or were blocked 
Guided:- -Default fields pre-populated to encourage the prescriber to accept and continue 
Permitted (with input):-An alert where a reason needs to be given to override 
Alert (without input):-An alert where no reason needs to be given for override 
None:-No interruptive CDS present 
NB- If more than one apply please state in the notes column (C/D) 
 
 
Paediatric indicator simulation survey                          continued 
No Indicator 
Indicator 
Permitted 
Y/N  
Level of Decision 
Support  
Description of 
decision support Likert 1 Likert 2 
1a 
Domperidone prescribed at > 1.2mg/kg/day (prolongation 
of QT interval, sudden cardiac death)           
1b 
Domperidone prescribed at a dose exceeding 20mg per 
day (max BNFC dose)           
2 
Digoxin dose not reviewed in light of reduced renal 
function (less than 50ml/min/1.73m2)           
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Paediatric indicator simulation survey                          continued 
No Indicator 
Indicator 
Permitted 
Y/N  
Level of Decision 
Support  
Description of 
decision support Likert 1 Likert 2 
3a 
Potassium-sparing diuretic (excluding aldosterone 
antagonists) prescribed to a patient also receiving an 
ACE inhibitor (increased risk of severe hyperkalaemia)           
3b 
Potassium-sparing diuretic (excluding aldosterone 
antagonists) prescribed to a patient also receiving an 
angiotensin-II receptor antagonist (increased risk of 
severe hyperkalaemia)           
4 
Beta-adrenoceptor blocking drug prescribed to a patient 
with asthma (increased risk of bronchospasm and acute 
deterioration)           
5 
Low molecular weight heparin prescribed to a patient with 
renal impairment without dose adjustment 
(<30ml/min/1.73m2) (increased risk of bleeding)           
6 
Antiplatelet  prescribed to a patient with a concurrent 
bleeding disorder (increased risk of bleeding)           
7 
Prescribing of intravenous heparin infusion for treatment 
of thromboembolic event using the wrong dose or infusion 
rate based on local protocol (risk of toxicity or therapeutic 
failure)           
8 
Prescribing of intravenous salbutamol infusion using the 
wrong dose or infusion rate (risk of toxicity or therapeutic 
failure)           
9 
Two concomitant opiate analgesics that are not in line 
with the WHO pain ladder (injudicious use of two opiates 
risk of toxicity)           
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Paediatric indicator simulation survey                          continued 
No Indicator 
Indicator 
Permitted 
Y/N  
Level of Decision 
Support  
Description of 
decision support Likert 1 Likert 2 
10 
Prescribing of incorrect or inequivalent morphine (opiate) 
dose via multiple routes. (risk of toxicity) e.g. morphine 
10mg IV/PO/SC           
11 
Phenytoin dose not reviewed in light of low albumin 
(potential for toxicity)           
12 
Penicillin containing compound prescribed to a penicillin 
allergic patient (please describe in the notes whether 
symptoms of reaction can be added and hence whether a 
reason for prescribing can be made clear)           
13 
Nitrofurantoin prescribed to a patient with renal 
impairment, avoid if eGFR <60ml/minute/1.73m2 (risk of 
peripheral neuropathy and inadequate concentration in 
urine)           
14 
Ceftriaxone prescribed at a total daily dose of 50mg/kg 
instead of 80mg/kg for severe infection/sepsis in a patient 
> 1 month of age (risk of under dosage)           
15 
Meropenem prescribed at a dose of 20mg/kg instead of 
40mg/kg  for meningitis or respiratory exacerbation of CF 
(potential under treatment)           
16 
Gentamicin prescribed to a patient with  at least mild 
renal impairment without dose frequency adjustment 
according to local policy (increased risk of toxicity)           
17 
Gentamicin dose calculated based on actual body weight 
rather than ideal body weight in an obese patient (risk of 
excessive dosing and toxicity)           
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Paediatric indicator simulation survey                          continued 
No Indicator 
Indicator 
Permitted 
Y/N  
Level of Decision 
Support  
Description of 
decision support Likert 1 Likert 2 
18 
Macrolide antibacterial prescribed concomitantly with 
warfarin without appropriate dose adjustment or 
increased INR monitoring (increased risk of bleeding)           
19 
Co-prescribing of macrolides with interacting drug (QT 
prolongation) Do not test with all possible drugs, please 
test with three appropriate drugs from the QT Drug 
worksheet and state which drugs in the notes column           
20a 
Co-prescribing of a macrolide with tacrolimus (increases 
plasma levels of anti-rejection agent)           
20b 
Co-prescribing of a macrolide with ciclosporin (increases 
plasma levels of anti-rejection agent)           
21 
Vancomycin prescribed intravenously over less than 60 
minutes (rapid infusion of vancomycin can cause severe 
reactions)           
22 
Amphotericin B prescribed without additionally stating 
both brand name and the dose in mg/kg (risk of fatal 
overdose due to confusion between lipid based and non-
lipid)            
23 
Failure to adjust dose or frequency of Ganciclovir in the 
presence of altered renal function (less than 
70ml/min/1.73m2) (risk of toxicity or treatment failure)           
24 
Soluble insulin prescribed to a patient on a when required 
basis (increased risk of serious episodes of 
hypoglycaemia and nocturnal hypoglycaemia post dose)           
25a 
Dose reduction of Ciclosporin not made despite low White 
Cell Count (Less than 3.5 x 109/L) (risk of neutropenia)             
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Paediatric indicator simulation survey                          continued 
No Indicator 
Indicator 
Permitted 
Y/N  
Level of Decision 
Support  
Description of 
decision support Likert 1 Likert 2 
25b 
Dose reduction of Tacrolimus not made despite low White 
Cell Count (Less than 3.5 x 109/L) (risk of neutropenia)             
25c 
Dose reduction of Mycophenolate not made despite low 
White Cell Count (Less than 3.5 x 109/L) (risk of 
neutropenia)           
25d 
Dose reduction of Azathioprine not made despite low 
White Cell Count (Less than 3.5 x 109/L) (risk of 
neutropenia)            
25e 
Dose reduction of Mercaptopurine not made despite low 
White Cell Count (Less than 3.5 x 109/L) (risk of 
neutropenia)             
26 
Failure to prescribe folinic acid rescue therapy following 
high dose methotrexate chemotherapy (risk of 
methotrexate toxicity)           
27a 
Methotrexate prescribed to a patient with a clinically 
significant drop in white cell count (< 4 x109/L) (risk of 
bone marrow suppression)           
27b 
Methotrexate prescribed to a patient with a clinically 
significant drop in platelet count (< 150 x 109/L) (risk of 
bone marrow suppression)           
28 
Oral methotrexate prescribed to a patient with an 
inappropriate frequency (increased risk of toxicity)           
29 
Methotrexate prescribed to a patient with abnormal liver 
function tests (risk of liver toxicity)           
30 
Methotrexate prescribed concomitantly with trimethoprim 
(increased risk of haematological toxicity)           
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Paediatric indicator simulation survey                          continued 
No Indicator 
Indicator 
Permitted 
Y/N  
Level of Decision 
Support  
Description of 
decision support Likert 1 Likert 2 
31 
Allopurinol prescribed concomitantly with mercaptopurine 
(allopurinol enhances effect of mercaptopurine and 
increases risk of toxicity)           
32 
Potassium chloride supplements continued for longer 
than is required  (based on age appropriate local 
reference ranges approx 3.5–5.3 mmol/litre) (increased 
risk of hyperkalaemia)           
33 
Potassium chloride infusions exceeding 40 mmol/litre 
prescribed to be administered via the peripheral route 
(peripheral administration risks venous pooling, which can 
lead to sudden high concentrations of potassium chloride 
being delivered to the heart provoking an arrhythmia)            
34 
Baclofen dose not reduced in response to decreased 
renal function (eGFR < 90 ml/min/1.73m2)           
35 
Midazolam prescribed for procedural sedation at a dose 
inappropriate for the route of administration (e.g. oral 
dose prescribed via buccal route)           
36 
A prescription for a drug for a patient with a known allergy 
to that drug (risk of anaphylaxis) excluding penicillins           
37 
Dose of paracetamol prescribed inappropriate for route of 
administration           
38 
Amiodarone prescribed to a patient on digoxin, system 
prompts a review of digoxin dose           
39 
Aciclovir prescribed at a dose of 250mg/m2 instead of 
500mg/m2 for herpes simplex encephalitis in patients 
aged between 3 months and 12 years           
  
2
0
7 
Paediatric indicator simulation survey                          continued 
No Indicator 
Indicator 
Permitted 
Y/N  
Level of Decision 
Support  
Description of 
decision support Likert 1 Likert 2 
40 
Prescription of NSAIDS in suspected toxic shock 
syndrome (contraindicated but patients are pyrexial)           
41 
Failure to increase of hydrocortisone to “sick day doses” 
from “maintenance” doses in those adrenally suppressed           
 
 
 208 
 
 Appendix 16 – Supplementary Questions 
Supplementary questions for completion at sites undertaking paediatric indicator 
simulation 
 
 
 
Your Contact Details here
Question
Response
 (use this  column for your main response)
Notes
 (use this  column to provide any explanatory notes  you 
feel  would be needed to interpret your response)
1 Organisation
2 Electronic Prescribing (EP) System
3 EP Version
4 Hospital Type
5
eP System spread within organisation - what proportion 
of inpatients use this system (%)
Number of Paediatric Beds
6 How long has this eP system been in use for children?
7
Does the system use abbreviations to describe drugs 
(e.g. AZT or NaCl) rather than approved names?
8
Does the system allow prescribers to enter drugs as 
freetext prescriptions (Y/N)?
9
Can doses be entered by the prescriber using a trailing 
zero after a decimal point (e.g. 5.0mg or 2.0g)?
10
If "Yes" what does the system display following entry?  If 
"No" what warning is provided to the prescriber
11
Does the system require a weight to be entered before 
any prescribing can take place? Y/N
12
If "Yes" is the weight used to calculate doses 
automatically? (if yes please clarify if all drugs or 
selected drugs)
13
Does the system check if a weight is out of date based on 
internal rules? Y/N
14
Does the system allow a drug that is usually prescibed by 
weight to be prescribed without the presence of an up-
to-date weight (defined by internal rules if present).
15
Does the system calculate BSA if so please describe how 
(using weight or weight and height)?
16
For drugs that are prescribed by BSA does the system 
allow the drug to be prescribed without the presence of 
an up to date BSA value (based on internal rules if 
present).
17
Does  the system round doses Y/N to measurable 
amounts.  - if so please describe for all relevant 
formulation types (liq, solid, inj) in the notes column
18 Does the system abbreviate units by using "u" or "iu"
19
Does the system allow/support 18 hourly or 36 hourly 
dosing
20 Does the system abbreviate micrograms and nanograms?  
Please explain if different in different views
Paediatric Indicator Simulation - General Information
Instructions:
Please complete the answers to the first  five questions in relation to the whole organisation
The subsequent questions relate to the way the ePrescribing system works when prescribing for children.  Please use your local definition of children.
If you have any questions please contact Andy Fox  at eDelphiPaed@uhs.nhs.uk or  02381204201
Once completed please go to the indicator worksheet next.
If you use more than one EPrescribing system for children please complete the questionnaire for each system.
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 Appendix 17 – Full Indicator Simulation Results 
 
Full results of indicator simulation exercise                                                                                                                     continued 
Key: - R = Restricted, G – Guided, P = Permitted (with input), A = Alert (no input), n = number of responses 
 
No Indicator System Error Type 
Permitted CDS level (see key) Likert Scores (Median/IQR) 
Y N N/A R G P A None n 
Error 
Prescribed 
Reach 
Patient n 
1a 
Domperidone prescribed at > 
1.2mg/kg/day (prolongation 
of QT interval, sudden 
cardiac death) Gastrointestinal Dosing 15 0 0 0 1 1 0 13 15 4/2 3/2 12 
1b 
Domperidone prescribed at a 
dose exceeding 20mg per 
day (max BNFC dose) Gastrointestinal Dosing 15 0 0 0 1 1 0 13 15 4/3 2/1 12 
2 
Digoxin dose not reviewed in 
light of reduced renal function 
(less than 50ml/min/1.73m
2
) Cardiovascular Dosing 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 15 5/2.25 3/1.25 12 
3a 
Potassium-sparing diuretic 
(excluding aldosterone 
antagonists) prescribed to a 
patient also receiving an ACE 
inhibitor (increased risk of 
severe hyperkalaemia) Cardiovascular 
Drug-Drug 
Interaction 15 0 0 0 0 6 3 6 15 3/2.25 3/2 12 
3b 
Potassium-sparing diuretic 
(excluding aldosterone 
antagonists) prescribed to a 
patient also receiving an 
angiotensin-II receptor 
antagonist (increased risk of 
severe hyperkalaemia) Cardiovascular 
Drug-Drug 
Interaction 15 0 0 0 0 4 3 8 15 3/3 3/2 12 
  
2
1
0
 
Full results of indicator simulation exercise                                                                                                                     continued 
Key: - R = Restricted, G – Guided, P = Permitted (with input), A = Alert (no input), n = number of responses 
 
No Indicator System Error Type 
Permitted CDS level (see key) Likert Scores (Median/IQR) 
Y N N/A R G P A None n 
Error 
Prescribed 
Reach 
Patient n 
4 
Beta-adrenoceptor blocking 
drug prescribed to a patient 
with asthma (increased risk 
of bronchospasm and acute 
deterioration) Cardiovascular 
Clinical 
Contraindic
ation 15 0 0 0 0 2 0 13 15 4/1.5 3/2 12 
5 
Low molecular weight 
heparin prescribed to a 
patient with renal impairment 
without dose adjustment 
(<30ml/min/1.73m
2
) 
(increased risk of bleeding) Cardiovascular Dosing 15 0 0 0 1 0 0 14 15 5/1.25 3/1.25 12 
6 
Antiplatelet  prescribed to a 
patient with a concurrent 
bleeding disorder (increased 
risk of bleeding) Cardiovascular 
Clinical 
Contraindic
ation 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 15 5/1.25 3/2 12 
7 
Prescribing of intravenous 
heparin infusion for treatment 
of thromboembolic event 
using the wrong dose or 
infusion rate based on local 
protocol (risk of toxicity or 
therapeutic failure) Cardiovascular Dosing 4 0 11 0 1 1 0 13 15 3/2.5 2/0.5 8 
8 
Prescribing of intravenous 
salbutamol infusion using the 
wrong dose or infusion rate 
(risk of toxicity or therapeutic 
failure) Respiratory Dosing 6 0 9 0 0 1 0 14 15 3/2.5 2/0.25 8 
  
2
1
1
 
Full results of indicator simulation exercise                                                                                                                     continued 
Key: - R = Restricted, G – Guided, P = Permitted (with input), A = Alert (no input), n = number of responses 
 
No Indicator System Error Type 
Permitted CDS level (see key) Likert Scores (Median/IQR) 
Y N N/A R G P A None n 
Error 
Prescribed 
Reach 
Patient n 
9 
Two concomitant opiate 
analgesics that are not in line 
with the WHO pain ladder 
(injudicious use of two 
opiates risk of toxicity) 
Central Nervous 
System 
Therapeutic 
Duplication 14 0 0 0 0 9 2 3 14 3/1.25 2.5/1 12 
10 
Prescribing of incorrect or 
inequivalent morphine 
(opiate) dose via multiple 
routes. (risk of toxicity) e.g. 
Morphine 10mg IV/PO/SC 
Central Nervous 
System 
Therapeutic 
Duplication 11 3 0 2 3 5 1 3 14 3/2.25 2/1.5 12 
11 
Phenytoin dose not reviewed 
in light of low albumin 
(potential for toxicity) 
Central Nervous 
System Dosing 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 15 5/1 3.5/1 12 
12 
Penicillin containing 
compound prescribed to a 
penicillin allergic patient 
(please describe in the notes 
whether symptoms of 
reaction can be added and 
hence whether a reason for 
prescribing can be made 
clear) Antimicrobial Allergy 14 1 0 1 0 13 1 0 15 2/0 2/1.25 12 
13 
Nitrofurantoin prescribed to a 
patient with renal impairment, 
avoid if eGFR 
<60ml/minute/1.73m
2
 (risk of 
peripheral neuropathy and 
inadequate concentration in 
urine) Antimicrobial Dosing 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 14 5/1,25 3.5/2 12 
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Full results of indicator simulation exercise                                                                                                                     continued 
Key: - R = Restricted, G – Guided, P = Permitted (with input), A = Alert (no input), n = number of responses 
 
No Indicator System Error Type 
Permitted CDS level (see key) Likert Scores (Median/IQR) 
Y N N/A R G P A None n 
Error 
Prescribed 
Reach 
Patient n 
14 
Ceftriaxone prescribed at a 
total daily dose of 50mg/kg 
instead of 80mg/kg for severe 
infection/sepsis in a patient > 
1 month of age (risk of under 
dosage) Antimicrobial Dosing 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 14 5/1 3/1.25 12 
15 
Meropenem prescribed at a 
dose of 20mg/kg instead of 
40mg/kg  for meningitis or 
respiratory exacerbation of 
CF (potential under 
treatment) Antimicrobial Dosing 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 14 5/1 3/1.25 12 
16 
Gentamicin prescribed to a 
patient with  at least mild 
renal impairment without 
dose frequency adjustment 
according to local policy 
(increased risk of toxicity) Antimicrobial Dosing 13 0 1 0 0 0 0 14 14 4/2 3/2 12 
17 
Gentamicin dose calculated 
based on actual body weight 
rather than ideal body weight 
in an obese patient (risk of 
excessive dosing and 
toxicity) Antimicrobial Dosing 13 0 1 0 0 1 0 13 14 4/1.25 3/1.25 12 
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Full results of indicator simulation exercise                                                                                                                     continued 
Key: - R = Restricted, G – Guided, P = Permitted (with input), A = Alert (no input), n = number of responses 
 
No Indicator System Error Type 
Permitted CDS level (see key) Likert Scores (Median/IQR) 
Y N N/A R G P A None n 
Error 
Prescribed 
Reach 
Patient n 
18 
Macrolide antibacterial 
prescribed concomitantly with 
warfarin without appropriate 
dose adjustment or increased 
INR monitoring (increased 
risk of bleeding) Antimicrobial 
Drug-Drug 
Interaction 14 0 0 0 0 4 4 6 14 4/3 3/2 12 
19 
Co-prescribing of macrolides 
with interacting drug (QT 
prolongation) Do not test with 
all possible drugs, please test 
with three appropriate drugs 
from the QT Drug worksheet 
and state which drugs in the 
notes column Antimicrobial 
Drug-Drug 
Interaction 14 0 0 0 0 4 4 6 14 4/2 3/1.25 12 
20a 
Co-prescribing of a macrolide 
with tacrolimus (increases 
plasma levels of anti-rejection 
agent) Antimicrobial 
Drug-Drug 
Interaction 14 0 0 0 0 6 3 5 14 3/1.5 3/1.25 12 
20b 
Co-prescribing of a macrolide 
with ciclosporin (increases 
plasma levels of anti-rejection 
agent) Antimicrobial 
Drug-Drug 
Interaction 14 0 0 0 0 6 3 5 14 3/1.5 3/1.25 12 
21 
Vancomycin prescribed 
intravenously over less than 
60 minutes (rapid infusion of 
vancomycin can cause 
severe reactions) Antimicrobial 
Intravenous 
Rate 12 0 2 0 3 0 0 11 14 2/2.5 2/1 12 
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Full results of indicator simulation exercise                                                                                                                     continued 
Key: - R = Restricted, G – Guided, P = Permitted (with input), A = Alert (no input), n = number of responses 
 
No Indicator System Error Type 
Permitted CDS level (see key) Likert Scores (Median/IQR) 
Y N N/A R G P A None n 
Error 
Prescribed 
Reach 
Patient n 
22 
Amphotericin B prescribed 
without additionally stating 
both brand name and the 
dose in mg/kg (risk of fatal 
overdose due to confusion 
between lipid based and non-
lipid)  Antimicrobial Drug Name 6 8 0 9 1 0 0 4 14 1/1 1/1 11 
23 
Failure to adjust dose or 
frequency of ganciclovir in 
the presence of altered renal 
function (less than 
70ml/min/1.73m
2
) (risk of 
toxicity or treatment failure) Antimicrobial Dosing 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 14 4/2.25 2/1.25 12 
24 
Soluble insulin prescribed to 
a patient on a when required 
basis (increased risk of 
serious episodes of 
hypoglycaemia and nocturnal 
hypoglycaemia post dose) Endocrine 
Clinical 
Contraindic
ation 10 1 3 1 3 0 0 10 14 2/3 2/1 12 
25a 
Dose reduction of ciclosporin 
not made despite low white 
cell count (less than 3.5 x 
10
9
/L) (risk of neutropenia)   
Immunosuppres
sant Dosing 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 14 4/2 3/2 12 
25b 
Dose reduction of tacrolimus 
not made despite low white 
cell count (less than 3.5 x 
10
9
/L) (risk of neutropenia)   
Immunosuppres
sant Dosing 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 14 4/2 3/2 12 
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Full results of indicator simulation exercise                                                                                                                     continued 
Key: - R = Restricted, G – Guided, P = Permitted (with input), A = Alert (no input), n = number of responses 
 
No Indicator System Error Type 
Permitted CDS level (see key) Likert Scores (Median/IQR) 
Y N N/A R G P A None n 
Error 
Prescribed 
Reach 
Patient n 
25c 
Dose reduction of 
mycophenolate not made 
despite low white cell count 
(less than 3.5 x 10
9
/L) (risk of 
neutropenia) 
Immunosuppres
sant Dosing 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 14 4/2 3/2 12 
25d 
Dose reduction of 
azathioprine not made 
despite low white cell count 
(less than 3.5 x 10
9
/L) (risk of 
neutropenia)  
Immunosuppres
sant Dosing 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 14 4/2 3/2 12 
25e 
Dose reduction of 
mercaptopurine not made 
despite low white cell count 
(less than 3.5 x 10
9
/L) (risk of 
neutropenia)   
Immunosuppres
sant Dosing 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 14 4/2 2.5/2 12 
26 
Failure to prescribe folinic 
acid rescue therapy following 
high dose methotrexate 
chemotherapy (risk of 
methotrexate toxicity) 
Immunosuppres
sant Omission 9 0 5 0 0 0 0 14 14 4/2.75 2/1 10 
27a 
Methotrexate prescribed to a 
patient with a clinically 
significant drop in white cell 
count (< 4 x10
9
/L) (risk of 
bone marrow suppression) 
Immunosuppres
sant 
Clinical 
Contraindic
ation 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 14 4/2 2.5/2 12 
  
2
1
6
 
Full results of indicator simulation exercise                                                                                                                     continued 
Key: - R = Restricted, G – Guided, P = Permitted (with input), A = Alert (no input), n = number of responses 
 
No Indicator System Error Type 
Permitted CDS level (see key) Likert Scores (Median/IQR) 
Y N N/A R G P A None n 
Error 
Prescribed 
Reach 
Patient n 
27b 
Methotrexate prescribed to a 
patient with a clinically 
significant drop in platelet 
count (< 150 x 10
9
/L) (risk of 
bone marrow suppression) 
Immunosuppres
sant 
Clinical 
Contraindic
ation 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 14 4/2 2.5/2 12 
28 
Oral methotrexate prescribed 
to a patient with an 
inappropriate frequency 
(increased risk of toxicity) 
Immunosuppres
sant Dosing 8 6 0 6 2 2 2 2 14 1/1 1/0.25 12 
29 
Methotrexate prescribed to a 
patient with abnormal liver 
function tests (risk of liver 
toxicity) 
Immunosuppres
sant 
Clinical 
Contraindic
ation 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 14 4/2 3/2 12 
30 
Methotrexate prescribed 
concomitantly with 
trimethoprim (increased risk 
of haematological toxicity) 
Immunosuppres
sant 
Drug-drug 
interaction 14 0 0 0 0 6 3 5 14 3/2 3/2 12 
31 
Allopurinol prescribed 
concomitantly with 
mercaptopurine (allopurinol 
enhances effect of 
mercaptopurine and 
increases risk of toxicity) 
Immunosuppres
sant 
Drug-drug 
interaction 14 0 0 0 0 4 3 7 14 3/2 3/2 12 
  
2
1
7
 
Full results of indicator simulation exercise                                                                                                                     continued 
Key: - R = Restricted, G – Guided, P = Permitted (with input), A = Alert (no input), n = number of responses 
 
No Indicator System Error Type 
Permitted CDS level (see key) Likert Scores (Median/IQR) 
Y N N/A R G P A None n 
Error 
Prescribed 
Reach 
Patient n 
32 
Potassium chloride 
supplements continued for 
longer than is required  
(based on age appropriate 
local reference ranges 
approx 3.5–5.3 mmol/litre) 
(increased risk of 
hyperkalaemia) Nutrition Duration 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 14 4/1 3/0.5 12 
33 
Potassium chloride infusions 
exceeding 40 mmol/litre 
prescribed to be administered 
via the peripheral route 
(peripheral administration 
risks venous pooling, which 
can lead to sudden high 
concentrations of potassium 
chloride being delivered to 
the heart provoking an 
arrhythmia)  Nutrition Route 4 1 9 1 1 0 0 12 14 3/2.25 2/0 8 
34 
Baclofen dose not reduced in 
response to decreased renal 
function (eGFR < 90 
ml/min/1.73m
2
) 
Central Nervous 
System Dosing 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 14 4/1 3/1.25 12 
35 
Midazolam prescribed for 
procedural sedation at a dose 
inappropriate for the route of 
administration (e.g. oral dose 
prescribed via buccal route) Anaesthetic Dosing 10 4 0 3 3 0 0 8 14 2/3 2/2 12 
  
2
1
8
 
Full results of indicator simulation exercise                                                                                                                     continued 
Key: - R = Restricted, G – Guided, P = Permitted (with input), A = Alert (no input), n = number of responses 
 
No Indicator System Error Type 
Permitted CDS level (see key) Likert Scores (Median/IQR) 
Y N N/A R G P A None n 
Error 
Prescribed 
Reach 
Patient n 
36 
A prescription for a drug for a 
patient with a known allergy 
to that drug (risk of 
anaphylaxis) excluding 
penicillins General Allergy 11 4 0 2 1 11 1 0 15 2/1 2/1.25 12 
37 
Dose of paracetamol 
prescribed inappropriate for 
route of administration 
Central Nervous 
System Dosing 13 1 0 0 2 3 1 8 14 4/3 2/1 12 
38 
Amiodarone prescribed to a 
patient on digoxin, system 
prompts a review of digoxin 
dose Cardiovascular 
Drug-Drug 
interaction 14 0 0 0 0 7 1 6 14 4/1.25 3/2 12 
39 
Aciclovir prescribed at a dose 
of 250mg/m
2
 instead of 
500mg/m2 for herpes simplex 
encephalitis in patients aged 
between 3 months and 12 
years Antimicrobial Dosing 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 14 5/1.25 3/2 12 
40 
Nitrofurantoin prescribed to a 
patient with renal impairment, 
avoid if eGFR 
<60ml/minute/1.73m
2
 (risk of 
peripheral neuropathy and 
inadequate concentration in 
urine) Musculoskeletal 
Clinical 
Contraindic
ation 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 14 4/1 3/1.25 12 
  
2
1
9
 
Full results of indicator simulation exercise                                                                                                                     continued 
Key: - R = Restricted, G – Guided, P = Permitted (with input), A = Alert (no input), n = number of responses 
 
No Indicator System Error Type 
Permitted CDS level (see key) Likert Scores (Median/IQR) 
Y N N/A R G P A None n 
Error 
Prescribed 
Reach 
Patient n 
41 
Failure to increase of 
hydrocortisone to “sick day 
doses” from “maintenance” 
doses in those adrenally 
suppressed Endocrine Dosing 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 14 4/1 3.5/1.25 12 
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